


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Current History

FEBRUARY, 1986

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This issue reviews five of the Middle East countries and examines the relationship between Islam and politics. Our lead article on United States foreign policy toward the region argues that "many adherents of the Israel-first school of thought and the self-styled 'realists' counsel 'benign neglect' as the best American approach to the Middle East. To them, the region is essentially stable, despite all the turmoil. Observers more familiar with the region, however, believe that the present situation is explosive and dangerous for Americans and American interests."

United States Policy in the Middle East: Opportunities and Dangers

BY MICHAEL C. HUDSON

Director, Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University

THE year 1986 may mark a turning point in the relationship between the United States and the Middle East. On the one hand, the United States may confirm that it has become irrevocably committed to an anti-Arab (and especially, anti-Palestinian) position; on the other, there are indications that Washington may at long last become serious about a "peace process" that would lead to an end of the nearly 70-year-old struggle for Palestine.

The choice is crucial, as far as American interests throughout the Middle East and the Islamic world are concerned, because a United States failure to return to evenhandedness will almost certainly lead to further regional instability and Soviet penetration of an area of vital importance to the United States and its Western allies. In Washington during the coming months, the struggle between the advocates of these two approaches may prove to be more important than events in the Middle East itself.

The events of 1985 have convinced many people that the second administration of President Ronald Reagan has tilted decisively against the Arabs. Arab public opinion—in the conservative, "moderate" states as well as in the militant states—expresses deep skepticism, not to say anger, about United States vetoes of UN resolutions criticizing Israeli treatment of the Palestinians in the occupied territories, about United States presidential applause¹ for Israel's attack on the headquarters of the

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Tunis, about the American interception of an Egyptian airliner carrying the Palestinians responsible for the seizure of an Italian cruise ship, and about United States congressional opposition to arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Moreover, the delay in pursuing a tangible United States dialogue with a Jordanian–Palestinian delegation, preparatory to negotiations with Israel, appears to many observers to signal America's lack of interest in dealing with legitimate Palestinian representatives. And the cancellation of a meeting between a Jordanian–PLO delegation and the British foreign minister in October, 1985, is attributed to United States pressure. As a result, United States relations with its key Arab friends—the regimes in Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia—are severely strained.

At the same time, conditions in the Middle East are becoming more volatile. Frustration, despair and extremism are growing. In Israel, Jewish religio-nationalist fundamentalist groups to the right of the Likud coalition have become more popular, and the 50,000 settlers in the occupied Palestinian territories are a major political force working against Israeli withdrawals that would be necessary in a peace settlement. In the Arab world, a severe economic recession resulting from the world oil glut is raising social and political tensions at a time when Arab governments are beset by regional conflicts—in Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, the Sudan, and Western Sahara, not to mention the steady deterioration of security in the occupied territories and on the borders with Israel. From this pessimistic standpoint, the obstacles in the way of any diplomatic "peace process" are considerable, and

¹Editor's Note: The President's statement was subsequently modified. See *The New York Times*, October 2 and 6, 1985.

one or more serious crises in the months ahead could substantially weaken American security, economic and cultural interests in the Middle East.

There is also, however, a more optimistic perspective, which holds that United States policymakers are energetically pursuing a diplomatic initiative that goes back to the so-called Reagan plan of September, 1982. The administration's reaction to the agreement of February, 1985, between Jordan and the PLO on the establishment of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation was to commit the United States to meeting with a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation as a step toward direct Arab negotiations with Israel. (The actual meeting, however, was indefinitely postponed, because of disagreement over the identity of the Palestinian members and, specifically, how closely they could be associated with the PLO.) The activity of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy and his new deputy, Wat Cluverius, is another encouraging sign. The visits of these diplomats to the principal leaders in the region suggest a more dynamic American role than has been observed since the withdrawal of the United States Marines from Lebanon early in 1984.

On the Israeli side, optimism has been stimulated by the new flexibility articulated by Prime Minister Shimon Peres, whose speech at the United Nations in October, 1985, hinted that Israel might be prepared to talk to Jordan and non-PLO Palestinians in the context of an international forum involving the superpowers. What Peres meant by an international forum was not spelled out. But the necessity for Soviet as well as American involvement has been a firm demand of the Jordanians and Palestinians alike—and of course of Syria, whose power to obstruct a diplomatic process is considerable. Until 1986, this has been a major stumbling block because of Israeli (and American) refusal to include Soviet leaders.

As for the Arabs, optimistic observers point to a number of recent developments. First among them is the Fez plan of 1982. At an Arab summit conference in the Moroccan city, most Arab governments (including Jordan, the PLO, and Syria) agreed on a common position, under which the legitimacy of all states (not excluding Israel) would be recognized as part of a solution that would establish Palestinian political rights, including a state. The 1985 Jordan-PLO agreement, although its authors subject it to different interpretations, appears to restrict to some degree the independence of the Palestinian group in this proposed confederation. Meanwhile, the gradual reintegration of Egypt into the Arab political system, despite its peace treaty with Israel, suggests a further softening of the Arab position. And the beginnings of rapprochement between Jordan and Syria that became noticeable in November, 1985, could be interpreted as a step toward a common Arab negotiating position. The oil glut and economic recession in the Arab world, moreover, are seen by some observers as conducive to Arab flexibility, just as Israel's economic woes are seen as increasing

its vulnerability to United States diplomatic leverage. This upbeat reading of the overall situation suggests that a "peace process" actively encouraged by the United States might begin to cut through the historic impasse.

THE STRUGGLE TO SHAPE U.S. POLICY

Few observers doubt that the United States could significantly ease the growing Middle East tensions in 1986 if it chooses to do so. Whether in fact it will choose to do so depends on the course of two parallel struggles that are being waged to shape the direction of American policy. One is intellectual, the other political.

In the intellectual struggle, a doctrine that American interests are best served by a United States-backed dominant Israel is countered by a doctrine that calls for United States evenhandedness. The first school favors the maintenance of an Israel so superior in strength to its neighbors that it can not only surmount its own worst case security problems but can also prevent (or at least mitigate) the rise of anti-American radicalism and Soviet influence throughout Arab Asia and Arab Africa. A corollary of this "strategic asset" doctrine is the policy of "benign neglect," which former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and others have elaborated.

According to this theory, the Arab Middle East is too divided and too weak to be interested in or able to make durable peace. Israel, however, is secure—as long as it continues to receive upward of \$3 billion in American aid every year—and so the present Middle East situation while worrisome, is not fundamentally dangerous. Moreover, the argument goes, the United States probably cannot do much about the Middle East anyway. American policy on the Arab/Palestinian-Israeli dispute and the other major regional conflicts in Lebanon and the Persian Gulf should be guided by "conflict management" rather than by comprehensive peace initiatives.

A related theme maintains that "moderate" Arab regimes are too dependent on the United States for their security against internal unrest and regional enemies to abandon their American connection; hence it is relatively unimportant that these regimes complain about America's Israel-first policy. Indeed, America's support for Israel, it is said, actually enhances American leverage with various Arab governments. As for hostile Arab public opinion, the "benign neglect" school denies its political significance and calculates that incumbent regimes, thanks to the growing power of the state vis-à-vis society, are more stable than many in the regimes themselves believe. The Israel-first school, rooted in *Realpolitik*, thus sees the Jewish state as a cornerstone of regional order and as a bulwark against Soviet penetration.

The Israel-first school sees Israel not only as a strategic asset (indeed, *the* strategic asset), but also as worthy of full support on moral grounds—its democratic form of government, its Western cultural norms and, above all, its function as a refuge and recompense for the historically persecuted Jewish people.

The alternative school of thought—the “evenhanded” school—suggests that unstinting American support for Israel in its present form—occupying the West Bank, eastern Jerusalem, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights and controlling a border zone in southern Lebanon—does not serve America’s many important interests in the Arab Middle East and the Islamic world. The frustration that this “Greater Israel” generates provides opportunities for the Soviet Union to make inroads as it encourages Arab regimes to look for a superpower counterweight to the United States. The recent decisions by Oman and the United Arab Emirates to establish diplomatic relations with Moscow are seen as fresh and ominous evidence. Lavish and largely uncritical American support for an enlarged Israel turns Arab opinion against America and thus threatens United States access to Arab oil and markets. Arab oil reserves, the largest in the world, are of long-term strategic and economic importance to the West, the current oil glut notwithstanding.

ISRAEL-FIRST POLICY

The American “Israel-first” policy, according to the “evenhanded” school, places great strains on Arab regimes like Jordan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which rely on the United States for military and economic assistance. One of the main consequences of “Greater Israel” and United States support for Greater Israel has been the growth of radical Islamic fundamentalist movements that threaten even the personal security of Americans in the Middle East. From this perspective, American support for a just solution to the legitimate political grievances of the Palestinian people would improve decisively the position of the United States throughout the Arab world, the Islamic world and the third world. Recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and American willingness to discuss the establishment of a Palestinian state—which the United States supported when it backed the creation of Israel in a UN resolution in 1947—would, in this view, provide genuine momentum for a peace process. The “evenhanded” school warns that continued American one-sidedness will eventually so alienate Arab public opinion that “moderate” regimes will fall, pro-American elites will be displaced, United States access to Arab resources and markets will be restricted, and Soviet influence will spread.

Policy is not the product of the clash of ideas alone; these competing intellectual currents have their political analogues. The “Israel-first” or “strategic asset” school dominates the United States Middle East policymaking process because it is supported by an alliance of powerful political forces that effectively mobilize both interest and sentiment on behalf of the Jewish state. At the pinnacle of the United States government, the President repeatedly demonstrates his adherence to this outlook. Key officials in the National Security Council, the Defense Department, the State Department, and the intelligence community are among its advocates. Both houses of Congress

vote consistently for legislation that strengthens Israel’s dominance in the region without encouraging Israeli flexibility.

Outside the government, the Israel-first doctrine is pressed by an array of political action committees, publicists, academics, lobbyists and Jewish organizations. Both major political parties compete for their support. A preponderance of editorial writers and columnists are committed to Israel-first. Candidates for public office who endorse the doctrine often receive financial support for their campaigns and promises of votes, while candidates who do not endorse it may anticipate organized opposition. One of the most important developments in foreign policy opinion in the Reagan era has been the emergence of the neoconservative movement, led by individuals like Jeane Kirkpatrick, Norman Podhoretz and Martin Peretz, whose militant anti-Soviet orientation is matched by their enthusiasm for the Israel-first doctrine. The Israel-first doctrine has also been adopted by the growing Protestant fundamentalist movement.

The competing school of “evenhandedness” also has political supporters. They are not inconsiderable, but their political clout is much weaker. Support for the evenhandedness doctrine is solid in the middle-level branches of the State Department responsible for Middle Eastern affairs. Specialists on the Arab world have long criticized the Israel-first orientation, but they can only do so internally. They are joined by Middle East specialists scattered in other parts of the executive branch.

Evenhandedness has very few advocates in Congress, with the exception of a handful of representatives of Arab-American background and some members of the Black Congressional Caucus. There are several Arab-American and Palestinian-American lobbying groups, and they have grown considerably over the past decade. But their influence is minuscule compared to that of the Israel lobby. Oddly, American multinational businesses—particularly oil companies, construction firms, arms manufacturers and banks—with enormous business involvement in the Arab world seem unable to exert effective counterpressures to the Israel-first advocates, despite their reputed access to high-level decisionmakers.

Nevertheless, the evenhandedness doctrine has gained greater visibility and respectability in recent years in large part because of its articulation by a few influential columnists like Anthony Lewis of *The New York Times*, Philip Geyelin of the *Washington Post* and Joseph C. Harsch of the *Christian Science Monitor*. Debate continues, but the political forces behind the two points of view are vastly unequal.

THE PEACE PROCESS: SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS

When American warplanes forced down an Egyptian civil airliner carrying the Palestinian hijackers of the cruise ship *Achille Lauro* in October, 1985, the act was greeted in the United States with euphoria; it was seen as a rare victory in the fight against “international terror-

ism" and a blow to all extremists opposing the peace process in the Middle East. It was indeed almost the only "good" thing to have happened to the United States in the Middle East since the Camp David accords and the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in the late 1970's. It was a reply in kind to the political humiliations suffered in Iran and Lebanon and the injuries suffered by individual Americans. The neoconservatives applauded the application of United States muscle as a deterrent to future terrorism, and other pro-Israel groups were heartened by the President's approval of Israel's raid on the PLO headquarters in Tunis.

At the same time, the United States, attempting to play the role of "honest broker," was urging Israel and Jordan (in conjunction with non-PLO Palestinians) to engage in a peace process. Unfortunately, recent dramatic events and the American involvement in them do not augur well for the short-term prospects of a United States-sponsored peace process. Both regional tensions and domestic constraints place serious obstacles in the way of American diplomacy. However satisfying most Americans found the dramas of Tunis and the Egyptian airliner, they complicated American diplomatic efforts. To humiliate moderate Arab governments like Egypt and Tunisia is to weaken them—which is not helpful in any peace process. The humiliation of PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat and the PLO was a blow against the moderate tendency in the Palestinian movement. Nor has Jordan been well served, because King Hussein requires the collaboration of a moderate and credible Arafat to reach the diplomatic table. The United States Congress's decision to postpone a major arms sale to Jordan until the King demonstrated his readiness to sit down with Israel further embarrassed Hussein. Similarly, the administration's earlier decision to drop a proposed major military aircraft sale to Saudi Arabia to avoid an anticipated congressional "veto" showed the Saudi ruling elite how tentative their American security connection has become.

Yet there can be no doubt that in the Arab world and in Israel people and leaders are desperately anxious for a peace that provides both justice and security. The key Middle East leaders today—Peres, Hussein, Arafat, Mubarak, Assad and Fahd²—are all relatively pragmatic. But how long will they be on the scene? The short term—a year or maybe less—apparently offers a window of opportunity for the Reagan administration. The spirit of cordiality that emerged from the superpower summit meeting in Geneva may enhance the prospects for constructive participation (or at least the avoidance of sabotage) by Syria and more militant Palestinian elements, over whom the Soviet Union has considerable leverage. The official United States position is in fact far more evenhanded than its actual behavior, so the United States

needs no new policy. Rather, the question is whether the United States is prepared to apply the necessary pressure on Israel to persuade it to reconsider the United States and Arab initiatives that it previously rejected.

Specifically, the core issues for United States policy are the following: the nature of Palestinian participation (i.e. how to deal with the PLO); and the nature of an international forum including the Soviet Union, for the conduct of negotiations. Unfortunately, the American Middle East policymaking process, in which the Israel-first doctrine has greater support than the evenhandedness doctrine, suggests that the most serious impediments to American diplomacy may be internal, not external. Thus the short-term prospects are mixed. And the long-term situation is far more gloomy.

THE LONG-TERM OUTLOOK

Three factors contribute to the dangerous long-term situation in the region today: the strategic impasse in the Palestinian/Arab-Israeli conflict; the sociopolitical consequences of the oil-induced recession in the Middle East; and the rise of extremism in the Arab world and in Israel. While these conditions underline the urgent need for energetic and effective diplomacy, they also obviously increase the difficulties in the way of a successful peace process.

Whatever Arab or Israeli leaders may say, the Middle East conflict is perhaps more intractable than it has ever been in its nearly 70-year history because of military, demographic, and political realities. In the territories occupied by Israel since the 1967 war, the expansion and the strengthening of Israeli settlements have accelerated. The Israeli acquisition of Arab land and its domination of water supplies continue. Economic conditions among the Palestinians have worsened under occupation with the decline in Israel's own economic position. The repression of Palestinian political and even cultural activity is severe.

As for the Palestinians, the PLO has suffered repeated and major defeats almost since its inception in 1964; yet it remains the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It was crushed in Jordan in 1970 and 1971; it was bypassed in the 1973 war and in the United States-engineered settlements; it was bypassed again in the Camp David framework; it was decimated militarily in Lebanon by the Israelis in 1982 and again by the Syrians in 1983; and, in 1985, its international and internal standing was rocked by its stunning

(Continued on page 83)

Michael C. Hudson is Seif Ghobash Professor at Georgetown University. He is the editor of a recent book *Alternative Approaches to the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, 1984), to which he also contributed a paper. His 1968 study of Lebanese politics, *The Precarious Republic*, has recently been reissued (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1985).

²Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres, Jordan's King Hussein, PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Syria's President Hafez Assad, and Saudi Arabian King Fahd.

"Islamic governments and movements manifest a broad range of positions in their ideology, actors and policies. Islam has been used to legitimate monarchies, military regimes, and a theocracy. These self-styled Islamic regimes span the ideological spectrum, from Libya's radical socialist 'state of the masses' to the conservative monarchy of Saudi Arabia. Islamic actors display a similar diversity: clerical and lay, traditionalist and modernist, highly educated and illiterate, moderate and terrorist."

Islam in the Politics of the Middle East

BY JOHN L. ESPOSITO

Professor of Religious Studies, College of the Holy Cross

ISLAM has emerged dramatically in the politics and headlines of the Middle East. Islamic resurgence and Islamic fundamentalism are only a few of the banners used to describe events as diverse as Libyan Muammar Qaddafi's espousal of Islamic law and ideology (1971), General Zia ul-Haq's coup d'état in Pakistan (1977), Iran's "Islamic revolution" and the seizure of the Grand Mosque by militants in Saudi Arabia (1979), the assassination of Egypt's Anwar Sadat (1981), the revolt of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (1982), and terrorist attacks against American personnel and interests in Lebanon and Kuwait (1983–1985).¹

Why has religion become such a visible force in Middle East politics? There is no single answer. Rather, a confluence of events has contributed to the widespread reemergence of Islam in politics. This phenomenon is not simply a reaffirmation of the presence and continued vitality of religion as a social force in Muslim societies but, most important, a response to the failures and crises of authority and legitimacy that have plagued most modern Muslim states. The experience of failure—military, political, socioeconomic and cultural—has paved the way for Islam as an alternative ideology for state and society.

The resurgence of Islam in Muslim politics is rooted in a broader religious revivalism that has encompassed personal as well as political life. The personal dimension is reflected in increased emphasis on the performance of religious observances: mosque attendance, fasting during the month of Ramadan, and abstention from alcohol and gambling. This has been accompanied by more religious programming in the media, a proliferation of religious

literature, the growth of new Islamic associations—in particular vibrant missionary (*dawa*) movements. These movements are devoted not only to their traditional task of converting non-Muslims but also to the Islamization of Muslim populations, i.e., the deepening of religious commitment and observance.

For many, religious revivalism has simply meant greater piety; for others, it has included a reassertion of Islam as a total or comprehensive way of public and private life. As a result, both incumbent governments and opposition movements have appealed to Islam to legitimate their actions and policies. State Islam has taken many forms under Libya's Muammar Qaddafi, Pakistan's Zia ul-Haq, Sudan's Gafaar Nimeiry, and Iran's Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Muslim countries have introduced Islamic laws and regulations, implemented Islamic taxes and established Islamic banks, finance corporations and insurance companies on an interest-free basis. At the same time, opposition movements, ranging from political parties and groups to radical revolutionaries, have also appealed to Islam for legitimacy. Islam has become the battle cry for the *mujahideen* freedom fighters of Afghanistan and for the Islamic Jihad terrorists of Lebanon.

Four themes capture the general mood of Islamic revivalism: disenchantment with and rejection of the West; disillusion with the political and socioeconomic realities of Muslim life; a quest for identity and authenticity—an attempt to root the development of Muslim society in indigenous cultural values; and the reassertion of Islam as an alternative ideology for state and society.

Many Muslims (in common with others in the third world) have become progressively ambivalent toward the West. Western models of political, social and economic development are viewed as inappropriate transplants from an alien historical/cultural experience that have been uncritically applied to Muslim societies. Western liberal nationalism, capitalism and socialism are perceived as having failed to meet the political and socioeconomic needs of Muslim societies.²

In much of the Muslim world, political systems have not been able to provide a base for national unity and political legitimacy. Despite constitutional and par-

¹For detailed studies on Islam's role in Middle East politics, see John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984); Edward Mortimer, *Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam* (New York: Random House, 1982); Ali E. Hilal Dessouki, ed., *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World* (New York: Praeger, 1982).

²See, for example, Khurshid Ahmad, "The Nature of the Islamic Resurgence," in John L. Esposito, ed., *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983); Mustafa Mahmud, "Islam vs. Marxism and Capitalism," in John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, eds., *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

liamentary forms of government, Muslim rulers are often regarded as autocratic heads of corrupt, authoritarian regimes that are propped up by Western governments and multinational corporations. Neither Western capitalism nor Marxist socialism has been able to redress widespread poverty and the maldistribution of wealth. Capitalism is condemned as consumerism and unbridled materialism blind to issues of social justice. Marxist socialism is rejected as a godless alternative that reduces human life to the material and thus strikes at the heart of religion. Modernization is accused of fostering the Westernization and secularization of Muslim societies: a blind, uncritical pursuit of progress at any cost, "valueless" social change. Infatuation with and imitation of the West, sometimes characterized as "Westoxification" or "Westomania," is blamed for a general moral and cultural decline and a loss of identity and values that have led to the breakdown of Muslim society, the disruption of family life, increased crime and promiscuity and spiritual malaise.

Attributing the failure of Muslim societies to straying from Islam, revivalists believe Islam's revitalization depends on a return to Islam in both individual and community life: a restoration of Islamic identity, pride and values. Islam is reaffirmed as a total way of life. This belief is rooted in the revivalists' understanding of Islamic history. They believe that both revelation (the Koran) and the example of Mohammed and the early community support the belief that the Islamic community is (or should be) a *religiopolitical community or state governed by Islamic law (the Shariah)*. Revivalists view the spectacular early spread of Islam and the creation of an Islamic empire or commonwealth as validating the truth of Islam's message and mission and as a sign of God's guidance. Success, power and wealth are seen as the signs of a faithful community. Subjugation and decline are the fruits of departure from the path of Islam. Thus Islamic political activists believe that Muslims must reestablish or reorient their government and society through the implementation of Islamic law in order to regain their rightful place in the world.

THE IDEOLOGY OF ISLAMIC REVIVALISM

The ideological framework for Islamic activists may be summarized by the following beliefs:

- 1) Islam is a comprehensive way of life. Religion is integral to politics, state, law and society.
- 2) Muslim societies fail because they depart from this understanding of Islam by following Western secular and materialistic ideologies and values.
- 3) Renewal calls for an Islamic political and social revolution that draws its inspiration from the Koran and from Mohammed, who led the first Islamic movement.
- 4) To reestablish God's rule, Western-inspired civil law must be replaced by Islamic law, which is the blueprint for Muslim society.
- 5) While the Westernization of society is condemned,

modernization as such is not. Science and technology are accepted, but they are to be subordinated to Islam in order to guard against the infiltration of Western values.

Radical movements go beyond these principles and operate on the following assumptions:

- 1) A Western Judeo-Christian conspiracy pits the West against the Islamic world. It results from the combination of neocolonialist ambitions and the power of Zionism.
- 2) Establishing an Islamic system of government is not simply an alternative but an Islamic imperative, based on God's command. All Muslims must obey. Those who fail to comply, governments or individuals, are no longer Muslim; they are unbelievers, or atheists—the enemies of God. True Muslims are obliged to wage holy war (*jihad*) against these infidels. This belief provided the rationale for the assassination of President Sadat of Egypt by members of Egypt's al-Jihad, for whom Sadat's failure to implement Islamic law made him the hypocritical head of an atheist state.
- 3) Christians and Jews, who are not judged "true believers," are no longer regarded as the "people of the book" but as unbelievers.

ISLAMIC ACTIVISTS: WHO ARE THEY?

Islamic activists and organizations range from moderate to radical. Contrary to popular stereotypes, most Islamic revivalists are not uneducated, antimodern reactionaries seeking refuge in the seventh century. Many combine a traditional religious upbringing with degrees in education, science, engineering and medicine. They are graduates of Cairo, Khartoum, Teheran and the American University of Beirut as well as Harvard, Indiana, Oxford and the Sorbonne. While the ulema (clergy) play a more important role among the Shiites, the leadership of Sunni organizations is predominantly lay rather than clerical. Activists include members of the lower middle and middle class, both city dwellers and villagers; they are educated, pious and highly motivated; many are upwardly mobile students and young professionals recruited from mosques and schools.

Most Islamic organizations, like the Egyptian, Sudanese and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhoods, Kuwait's Islamic Reform Society and Pakistan's Jamaat-i-Islami work within existing political systems. They participate in elections, organize students and run youth centers, clinics and legal aid societies. However, government suppression or what are perceived as hostile actions, directly or indirectly supported by Western powers, can radicalize moderates, transforming reformers into revolutionaries.

A minority of Islamic organizations, like Egypt's al-Jihad and Lebanon's Hezbollah, pursue a policy of violent confrontation, believing that the political realities of Muslim life require armed struggle or *jihad*. Radicals view their governments as anti-Islamic regimes who either control religion or repress the attempts of authentic Islam.

lamic movements to implement Islam. Violent acts and armed revolution are viewed as necessary and appropriate responses to the enemies of God—despotic rulers and their Western allies.

THE POLITICS OF RESURGENT ISLAM

A series of crises served as catalysts for Islamic revivalism. Among the more significant events were the 1967 Arab–Israeli war, the 1971 Pakistan–Bangladesh civil war, the Arab–Israeli war and Arab oil embargo of 1973, and the growth of political dissent and civil war in Iran and Lebanon.

In many ways, 1967 marked a turning point in Arab politics. Israel's quick and decisive defeat of a combined Arab force (Egypt, Syria and Jordan), with staggering Arab military, economic and territorial losses (Gaza, the Sinai, the Golan Heights, the West Bank and especially the holy city of Jerusalem), seemed the clearest sign of Arab Muslim impotence. Israeli rule over a unified Jerusalem and the transfer of Israel's capital from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem made the occupation of Jerusalem an Islamic as well as an Arab issue. While some attributed the loss to the continued influence of a backward religious tradition, for others "the disaster" (as it was called) raised many questions about the direction of Muslim governments and about the West as a model for development. The mood of disenchantment and soul-searching unified clergy and laity, literate and illiterate, traditionalist and modernist in a quest for identity and authenticity. They shared a desire to renew and restore, to bring about a revitalization of Muslim societies that would root their present more firmly in past history, culture and values. As a result, the framework and the terminology of political discourse and action shifted.

Since the 1970's, Islam has displaced nationalism and socialism as the dominant factor in the ideology and politics of Middle East regimes and opposition movements. Middle East governments exploit and experiment while Islamic organizations proliferate and engage in political and social action.

THE DIVERSITY OF MUSLIM POLITICS

Thus, political Islam is not a monolith; it has taken many different forms. The specific causes of Islamic revivalism in the Middle East and its diversity of expressions are seen in the individual countries and movements from Libya to Pakistan.³

Libya was the site of one of the earliest and most controversial state implementations of Islam. When Muammar Qaddafi seized power in 1969, he self-consciously emulated his hero—Egypt's President Ga-

mal Abdel Nasser. However, it was not long before the slogans and ideology of Arab nationalism and socialism gave way to Qaddafi's espousal of Islam as the Third Way, the alternative for Libya and the Muslim world. Qaddafi announced the introduction of Islamic law in the early 1970's. Islamic regulations prohibiting alcohol and gambling and Islamic punishments for theft and adultery were introduced. However, the full implementation of Islamic law was soon ignored as Qaddafi delineated his Third Way in a series of three slim volumes, *The Green Book*.

Setting aside traditional interpretations of Islamic law, Qaddafi's *Green Book* was to provide the blueprint for a new Libyan society and an example for the Arab world. He radically redefined Islam and Arab nationalism, stamping them with his own interpretation. Indeed, the *Green Book* replaced the Shariah as the program for Libya's political and social order and the basis for its cultural revolution. Qaddafi's personal ideological statement, the Third International Theory, proclaims a revolutionary alternative to capitalism and communism. Mixing populist rhetoric with political, social and economic experimentation, he has attempted to implement an ideological revolution in Libya and to export it internationally.

The Libyan Arab Republic has become the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (rule of the masses) with Qaddafi as its philosopher-ideologue, guiding a decentralized populist government of revolutionary people's committees that control government offices, schools, the media and many corporations. Qaddafi's radical socialist redefinition of Islam and its cultural revolution have alienated landed and business sectors as well as traditional religious authorities (the ulema), who have condemned his radical reinterpretation of Islam and its socialist policies.

Egyptian politics of the 1970's offers a vivid picture of government and opposition uses of Islam. From the beginning of his presidency, Anwar Sadat appealed to Islam for legitimacy and popular support. Whereas Nasser had been the father of Arab nationalism, Sadat took the title "The Believer President." He lifted the constraints placed by Nasser on the Muslim Brotherhood, whose leaders were released from prison. Sadat's government supported Islamic student organizations in university elections both to neutralize the influence of Nasserist and leftist forces and to enhance his rule. The use of Islam was extended to the Egyptian–Israeli October War of 1973. It was the Ramadan War; its battle cry (Allahu Akbar, God is Most Great) was the traditional Islamic battle cry; its code name was Badr, the first major victory of Mohammed. The relative success of Egyptian forces (combined with the effectiveness of the Arab oil embargo) was a source of immense pride in the Muslim world.

By the mid-1970's, Sadat's use of Islam was beginning to backfire. State support for Islamic revivalism resulted

³See James P. Piscatori, ed., *Islam in the Political Process* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 155–159; John O. Voll, *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (Boulder: Westview, 1982); John L. Esposito, ed., *Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical Change* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1980) and Robin Wright, *Sacred Rage* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985).

in mounting criticism of the regime by the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic student organizations. Sadat's initiatives, like the Camp David accords, support for the Shah of Iran, and changes in Muslim family laws, brought criticism not only from moderate Islamic groups but from a new crop of radical organizations. The radicals rejected the "Islamic legitimacy" of a government that appealed to Islam but did not reinstitute an Islamic state based on Islamic law. Many radical groups were led by former Muslim Brothers whose prison experience or life underground had convinced them that a more radical revolutionary course was necessary. They viewed most Middle East regimes as anti-Islamic governments who either repressed Islamic movements or coopted religion through control of the religious establishment.

Radical Islamic organizations like the Islamic Liberation Organization (Mohammed's Youth) and Takfir wal Hijra (Excommunication and Emigration) attempted a coup d'état in 1974 and kidnapped and executed a former government minister in 1977. Despite government crackdowns and executions, groups like the Army of God (Jund Allah) and the Holy War Society (Jamaat al-Jihad) mushroomed underground. Members of the latter group finally assassinated Sadat in October, 1981.

In Egypt, the government's use of Islam thus served as a two-edged sword. As Islam became legitimate, it became the yardstick whereby the government was judged un-Islamic by its opposition.

PROTEST AND REVOLUTION IN IRAN AND LEBANON

A turning point in Iranian history and a singular event in contemporary Islamic politics took place in 1978–1979. A seemingly enlightened, entrenched monarch, an American ally, was overthrown by a popular revolution. The source of its leadership and ideology, Shia Islam, was particularly astonishing. The Shah and the Ayatollah Khomeini represented incongruous national alternatives. Postrevolutionary Iran influenced the emergence of Shia political activism in quiescent Shia minority communities in Sunni-dominated states like Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Pakistan. In Lebanon, Shia Islam has become a major political force; radical Shia groups have been blamed for attacks against American, French and Israeli personnel across the Middle East.

Shia Islam provides an ideological framework for protest and revolution. Although they share a common faith, Shia and Sunni Muslims follow different political ideologies. In contrast to the Sunni majority, the Shiites, who constitute about 15 percent of the world's Muslims, believe that Islamic history reveals that they are a disenfranchised minority. Unlike the Sunnis, who perceive a past characterized by success and power, the Shiites see themselves as oppressed and disinherited, prevented by Sunni governments from assuming their rightful place in Islam.

The pivotal issue that has divided Sunni and Shia is the leadership of the Islamic community. Sunni Muslims believe that Mohammed died without designating an heir

and that his successor (caliph) can be selected or elected as head of state. The Shiites (the "party of Ali") believe that Mohammed designated Ali, his cousin and son-in-law, as the divinely inspired religiopolitical leader (Imam) and that leadership of the Islamic community belongs to his descendants, i.e., remains within the family of the prophet Mohammed. Despite this belief, the Shiites have lived under Sunni rule throughout most of Islamic history.

One event in particular, the martyrdom of Ali's son Hussein, embodies the Shia world view and has provided the ideological basis of contemporary Shia politics. In 680 A.D., the Imam Hussein challenged the leadership of the Sunni Caliph Yazid, who was regarded as a usurper. Hussein and his followers were vanquished by Yazid's army at Karbala in Iraq. The memory of this "martyrdom," including a willingness to sacrifice and die for God, constitutes the religious paradigm for Shia Muslims, and it is reenacted ritually in a moving drama each year. This "passion play" recounts the struggle of the small righteous party or army of God against Satan, the overwhelming force of evil. The battle of Karbala is the model for Shia Islam's sacred task, the age-long battle against tyranny and oppression that is to continue until the coming of the *mahdi*, a messianic leader, whose rule will usher in an age of righteousness and social justice.

Coupled with the 1973 Arab oil embargo, Iran's Islamic revolution of 1978–1979 seemed to many Muslims the clearest sign of a resurgent Islam. Many Muslims saw these two events as signs of the return of Islamic political and economic independence after a long period of subjugation to and dependence on Western interests. Yet many others were puzzled both by the fall of the Shah and by the manner in which it occurred. The White Revolution (the Shah's ambitious modernization program) had been swept aside by the Islamic revolution.

The promise of rapid modernization was apparently eclipsed by those who promised a retreat to the past. Discontent with the fast pace of modernization (Westernization) and the increasing autocracy of the Shah led to the development of an alliance of traditional religious leaders, merchants and lay intellectuals, both secular and Islamic. Members of this alliance shared common concerns about political participation and freedom, military and economic dependence on the United States, and the progressive Westernization of Iranian education and society. The preservation of Irano-Islamic culture and the fear of losing national identity and autonomy became common rallying points.

Shia Islam emerged as the most viable vehicle for mass mobilization against a regime whose authoritarian suppression turned reformers into revolutionaries. It provided a common set of symbols, a historic identity and a value system that was non-Western, indigenous, and broadly appealing. Moreover, Shia Islam possessed an ideological framework of protest and opposition to social injustice within which a variety of political and religious

factions could function. The religious establishment was relatively independent and, unlike the ulema in Sunni countries, it possessed a hierarchical organization with charismatic ayatollahs, a number of whom (the Ayatollahs Khomeini, Mohammed Taleqani and Kazem Shariatmadari) had suffered because of their opposition to the Shah's government. Moreover, lay reformers like Ali Shariati and Mehdi Bazargan enjoyed respect, especially the respect of an increasingly alienated and militant younger generation. Finally, the mullah (the local religious leaders)—mosque system proved to be a natural, informal, nationwide communications network.

A coalition of heterogeneous groups spanning Iran's political spectrum, from liberal democrats to Marxists, from secularists to conservatives and Islamic modernists, joined under the banner of Islam. While they shared a unity of purpose—opposition to the Shah and a desire for a more indigenously rooted modernity—their religious and political positions and agenda were diverse. The sharp differences among the revolutionary factions came to a head after the fall of the Shah. Few Iranians anticipated a clerically dominated state guided by the Ayatollah Khomeini.

Today, the clergy control the Islamic Republic party and many key government positions. Under Khomeini's doctrine of governance of the jurist (*velayat-e-faqih*), the Islamic Republic of Iran is guided by Islamic law as interpreted by its supreme leader or jurist. Islamic government has been implemented as much by punitive restrictions as by inspiration. All opposition—monarchists, Marxists, liberal constitutionalists—has been silenced in the name of the state's Islamic ideology. The clergy, like Ayatollah Shariatmadari, and early supporters of Khomeini, like Iran's first postrevolutionary President, its Prime Minister and its foreign minister, have fled the country, have resigned or have been executed. Press and media censorship are enforced, restrictions on women's dress and employment have been introduced—all in the name of Islam.

LEBANON

Lebanon offers the second major example of militant Shia politics. Since the late 1970's, organizations like Amal and Hezbollah have mobilized Shia Muslims in protest and revolutionary movements. As a result, a religiopolitical community, long a distant third in political and economic power in a confessional state dominated by Maronite Christians and Sunni Muslims, has become a formidable force.

In the mid-1970's, Shia Islam, whose followers were predominantly rural, poor and disorganized, spawned its first protest movement. The "Movement for the Dispossessed" evolved into "The Battalions of the Resistance," whose acronym is Amal, "Hope." Amal was originally organized by Imam Musa Sadr, an Iranian-born and Iranian-educated leader of Lebanon's Shia community, to defend the rights of a people who had over the years

become Lebanon's largest confessional group. It attracted upwardly mobile professionals, businessmen and clergy. Iran's revolution and the Israeli invasions of 1978 and 1982 with Israel's subsequent occupation and "Iron Fist" policy, contributed to the radicalization of Shia youth, in particular, and the consequent growth of Amal as well as more extremist groups like Hezbollah (Party of God) and the shadowy Islamic Jihad (Holy War).

Under Nabih Berri (Musa Sadr having disappeared mysteriously in Libya in 1978), Amal has asserted its leadership as a relatively moderate organization. Its goal is a pluralistic Lebanese state in which the Shiites enjoy their rightful proportional share of power. Amal's militias have battled with Israeli, Lebanese and PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) forces. At the same time, Berri has been a force for moderation, mediating the release of American hostages and serving as a member of Lebanon's Cabinet.

In contrast to Amal, Hezbollah has close ties with Iran, is strongly influenced by Lebanese clerics like Sheikh Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, advocates the creation of an Islamic state, and is believed to be responsible for extremist actions like the bombing of the American Marine barracks in 1983. Finally, there is the Islamic Jihad, an organization that often takes credit for assassinations and suicide attacks, but about which little is known.

ISSUES AND PROBLEMS

Islamic governments and movements manifest a broad range of positions in their ideology, actors and policies. Islam has been used to legitimate monarchies (Saudi Arabia and Morocco), military regimes (Pakistan, Libya and Sudan), and a theocracy (Iran). These self-styled Islamic regimes span the ideological spectrum, from Libya's radical socialist "state of the masses" to the conservative monarchy of Saudi Arabia. Islamic actors display a similar diversity: clerical and lay, traditionalist and modernist, highly educated and illiterate, moderate and terrorist. Islamic organizations vary from the relatively moderate Muslim Brotherhoods of Egypt and the Sudan to the radical Egyptian al-Jihad and the Lebanese Hezbollah.

The euphoria engendered by events in 1973 and reinforced by Iran's revolution has been challenged by recent realities. Oil revenue has decreased dramatically; Iran and Iraq are locked in a seemingly endless war; Lebanon has been shattered; and the Arab-Israeli conflict seems no closer to resolution. Islamic revivalism has often

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John L. Esposito writes on Islam's role in effecting sociopolitical change. Among his publications are *Islam and Politics* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984), *Voices of Resurgent Islam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), and *Women in Muslim Family Law* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1982).

In Lebanon, "leadership struggles within the Sunni, Shiite and Maronite communities are unlikely to end soon, and there will be no early halt to the intersectorian fighting that springs from irreconcilable visions of Lebanon's future."

Estrangement and Fragmentation in Lebanon

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TODAY a malaise hangs over Lebanon, a palpable sense of hopelessness that is reflected in people's faces, in a strong pessimism and in a ruined economy.* Perhaps it is in economic terms that Lebanon's sad state is most starkly illustrated. Throughout the turmoil of the past decade, which included two invasions and three foreign interventions—not to mention general chaos—the sturdy Lebanese currency held its ground, illustrating the resilience of the Lebanese and their *laissez-faire* economy. From the time the fighting began in 1975 until the Israeli invasion of 1982, the Lebanese pound (LL) faltered only slightly, and in the autumn following the invasion—when many thought the country was on the threshold of rebirth—the LL traded at just over 3LL to the United States dollar. But the high hopes of 1982 vanished, and the once durable LL opened 1985 by trading at 12LL:\$1 and ended the year at an abysmal 18LL:\$1 (even that was a recovery from mid-1985, when the LL reached 21 to the dollar).¹

Thwarted hopes, impoverishment and continuing violence have pushed many Lebanese into the familiar comfort of their sectarian identities. In 1986, more than at any time during the decade of slaughter and mayhem, the hyphenated identity of the Lebanese as Lebanese-Maronites, Lebanese-Shiites, Lebanese-Druse and Lebanese-Sunnis has come to demarcate the Lebanese political scene. The retreat into communal identities has been spawned by the widespread recognition that the retention of privileges by one sect necessitates the denial of those privileges to another sect. But heightened sectarianism has not engendered sectarian unity. Intergenerational competition, contending regional interests, personal rivalries, the resentment of the poor, the selfishness of the rich, and the contradictory conceptions of the role of religion in defining society have made rampant factionalism a defining characteristic of Lebanese politics.

Aspiring sectarian leaders face challenges both across the barricades and behind the barricades. The processes of modernization, education, labor migration, improved

access to the media and the metropolis, to name a few decisive factors, have fed the politicization of the lower and lower middle classes. Old-style politics, based on political bosses and charismatic leadership, has been rejected without an effective substitute. Awash in relatively sophisticated weaponry, Lebanon is a country in which the instruments of violence have been democratized and violence has become cruelly indiscriminate. The ultimate expression of the indiscriminate, but hardly random, violence is the continuous use of car and truck bombs that kill and maim innocents more frequently than they kill belligerents. In three 1985 incidents alone—in Tripoli, Bir al-Abd and Sinn al-Fil—over 205 human beings died from this blatant form of terrorism. Militias dominate the landscape, yet the weakness of the militias is more apparent than their strength. No single militia is capable of imposing its will on contentious Lebanon, yet each can subvert stability and deny peace to Lebanon.

Of Lebanon's 17 sects, 4 are playing particularly important, if very different, roles. Except for the Druse, each is fractionalized politically and dispersed geographically.

Traditionally the dominant sect in modern Lebanon, the Maronite Christians were accorded a monopoly on the presidency in the 1943 National Pact (Mithaq al-Watani) that distributed the three major political posts—the presidency, the prime ministership and the office of speaker of Parliament—to the Maronites, the Sunnis and the Shiites, respectively, on the basis of supposed population shares. In addition, the National Pact divided the seats in the Chamber of Deputies between Christians and Muslims, with proportionate shares for each sect on the basis of six Christian seats to every five Muslim seats.**

Differences in the growth of population have invalidated the demographic assumptions that justified the original formula, and the widespread modernization that has characterized Lebanon since the end of World War II has thrust forward ranks of newly politicized citizens who believe that they have been shortchanged in the political bargain. Thus, Christian dominance has been increasingly challenged; and as early as 1976 Suleiman Franjeh, the Lebanese President, accepted a "constitutional document" negotiated in Damascus that would have given the Muslims and Christians equal seats in the Parliament and would have limited the considerable powers of the President. Unfortunately, the agreement

*The views reflected in this article are the author's.

**In the current 99-seat Chamber, elected in 1972, the allocation is 30 Maronite, 20 Sunni, 19 Shiite, 11 Greek Orthodox, 6 Druse, 5 Armenian, 6 Greek Catholic and 2 Protestant seats.

¹For information on the economy, see *Al Tadamun*, April 6, 1985, p. 31.

came to naught, in large measure because of the disruptive measures of Kamal Jumblat, the father of the current Druse leader.

During the civil war of 1975–1976, the traditional political parties of the Maronite community—the National Liberal party of Camille Chamoun and the Phalange party of Pierre Gemayel—were joined by the Lebanese Forces (al-Quwat al-Lubaniya), a militia that drew into its ranks many lower and lower middle class Maronites (as well as many Greek Catholics and some Armenians) who felt that the traditional parties were unrepresentative and staid.² The Lebanese Forces were the vehicle for the rise of Bashir Gemayel, the son of Pierre Gemayel, whose charismatic, if authoritarian, style brought him to the forefront of Maronite politics.

The Lebanese Forces, the co-conspirators in Israel's 1982 invasion, were (or so it was thought at the time) the vicarious victors in the Lebanese civil war. The assassination of Bashir in September, 1982, brought the victory celebrations, but not the ambitions of Bashir's heirs, to an end. The election of Bashir's brother, Amin, to the presidency was a bitter pill for the Lebanese Forces to swallow, and in many Maronite circles Amin was seen as little more than a usurper of the role that rightfully belonged to the martyred Bashir. From the beginning of his tenure, Amin did not have the support of his own community, and it was only the considerable presence of the respected father, Pierre (who died in September, 1984), that kept his Maronite adversaries at bay.

Amin has been deeply conscious of the Lebanese Forces, and he has spent much of his presidency casting worried glances over his shoulder. Amin's failure to move toward intercommunal reconciliation, when he had a real chance to do so in 1982 and early 1983, was in no small part due to his personal commitment to restore the old Lebanon rather than to build a new one, but it also stemmed from his desire to satisfy his Maronite detractors, who sought to consolidate the victory that they thought Israeli arms had bought for them in 1982.

From 1982 to 1985, the Lebanese Forces suffered a series of defeats. Each defeat not only diminished the militia's power, but also eroded the position of Amin, who had come to be seen as the protector of Maronite privilege rather than the architect of a reformed political system. In attempting to subdue the Druse-populated regions of Aley and the Shouf, the Lebanese Forces were defeated by Druse militiamen, who once again demonstrated the

military prowess that has long distinguished their sect. Arguably, it was the Lebanese Forces' adventure in the Druse region that contributed most profoundly to the thwarting of the hopes that had blossomed in 1982. In the south of Lebanon and in Beirut, the Lebanese Forces also attempted to expand their domain, failing in both cases. When they attempted to exploit the Israeli withdrawal from Sidon in March and April, 1985, they were soundly defeated by a Syrian-encouraged coalition of Druse, Sunni and Shiite fighters, leaving behind about 50,000 Christian villagers who were displaced as a result of the fighting.³

The one event that most obviously emasculated Amin Gemayel occurred in February, 1984. After a particularly senseless shelling of the Shiite suburbs south of Beirut by the Lebanese Army, the Shiite Muslims rebelled, and on February 6 they seized West Beirut with the assistance of the Druse.⁴ This development precipitated the hasty "re-deployment" of the Multinational Force that had been deployed to Lebanon in a fit of moral embarrassment over the slaughter of Palestinians in the Sabra and Shatila Palestinian refugee camps.

Pressured by both the Druse and the Shiites, Amin was increasingly susceptible to Syrian influence. This was demonstrated by the sardonically named National Unity Cabinet formed in April, 1984, a Cabinet that brought both Walid Jumblat and Nabih Berri, respectively the Druse and Shiite militia leaders, into the government. In March, the problematic May 17 agreement between Lebanon and Israel, a prime irritant to Syria, was annulled. In October, Kamil Assad, the leading Shiite ally of the Maronite community, was replaced by Hussein Husseini, who is on friendly terms with Damascus and who certainly does not generate the same visceral enmity that Assad did within the Shiite community. The opponents of the Lebanese Forces were clearly on the rise.

Nonetheless, there was still one act to play before the Lebanese Forces came to recognize Syria's inevitable role in Lebanon. In early 1985, Damascus attempted to secure its gains by beginning a process of negotiations between its allies and its friends in Lebanon. Rather than capitulate to Syrian influence, the 33-year-old Samir Geagea, a seasoned veteran of nine years of frontline fighting, seized control of the Lebanese Forces and declared that his organization rejected any sort of security pact or customs union with Syria and that he would stand against the mounting political claims of the Sunnis, the Shiites and the Druse. Geagea's coup de main proved to be short-lived.

On April 1, President Hafez Assad dispatched General Muhammad Kholi to Amin Gemayel with a tough message: bring the uprising (*intifadah*) under control or else.⁵ Amin was aided by a shrewd former President, Camille Chamoun, who organized a conference of many major Christian politicians and religious leaders in Bkirki on April 9, 1985. The outcome of the conference was a statement intended to assuage the Syrian President. The

²The seminal study on the Lebanese Forces is Lewis W. Winder, "The Lebanese Forces: Their Origins and Role in Lebanon's Politics," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 38, no. 1 (Winter, 1984).

³For figures on the destruction of sectors of Lebanon's economy, see *An Nahar Arab Report and Memo*, May 6, 1985, pp. 2–3.

⁴The intricacies of Lebanon sometimes seem Byzantine to be extreme. It is widely believed that the man who sold the shells to the Lebanese Army that were used to shell the suburbs was a Shiite who brokered the sale with Israel.

⁵Jim Muir, "Assad Tightens His Grip on Lebanon," *Middle East International*, no. 249 (May 3, 1985), pp. 3–5.

attendees committed themselves to the unity of Lebanon, to its Arab identity and to a special relationship with Syria. In addition, the partition or cantonization of Lebanon was denounced. The Bkirki conference, combined with the defeats that Geagea's forces were to suffer in south Lebanon, insured that the uprising would fail.

On May 9, Geagea was replaced by Elie Hobeika, who had commanded the forces that carried out the carnage in the Palestinian camps in September, 1982. Hobeika was appointed the chief of a newly formed executive committee of the Lebanese Forces, and he wasted little time in voicing his support for Syria and cutting the Forces' ties to Israel. On May 18, the Lebanese Forces office that had been opened in Jerusalem in 1982 was closed, and the head of the office, Pierre Yazbaek, voiced the compelling calculus that had motivated Hobeika and his colleagues:

We have no option but to reach an understanding with Syria. Our strategy now is simply survival. Anything else would be sheer suicide.⁶

Hobeika seems to be inching toward a Syrian-engineered solution that would see a significant decrease in the powers of the presidency, a revised allocation of parliamentary seats to give the Sunnis, the Shiites and the Maronites an equal number of seats, and a six-member presidential council composed of Shiite, Druse, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic and Maronite members. On September 9, Hobeika became the first Lebanese Forces leader to visit Damascus and, like an errant prodigal son, he was warmly received by Hafez Assad. Up to the writing of this article, Syria has chaired a series of tripartite negotiations with the principal Druse, Shiite and Maronite Forces militia leaders, Jumblat, Berri and Hobeika. The result has been a widely awaited but frequently postponed agreement.

Hobeika's ability to deliver the Maronite community is very much in question. His militia may be the largest but it is not the only Maronite militia, and it certainly lacks the ability to impose its will on an unreceptive community. Moreover, Hobeika's tenure is hardly guaranteed, especially if he proves to be an impediment rather than an asset in Hafez Assad's eyes. Significantly, Hobeika's efforts appear to be opposed by three former Presidents, Charles Helou, Camille Chamoun and Suleiman Franjich, as well as by Franjich's son Tony and Chamoun's

son Dany, neither of whom has displayed any inclination to turn away from politics.⁷ Although the Forces can take tough steps selectively, as when they confronted Samir Geagea's rump elements in East Beirut on October 14, it is very doubtful that the 29-year-old Hobeika can proceed without caution.

THE DRUSE

Comprising only six or seven percent of Lebanon's population, the Druse have been historically one of the most powerful sects in the country. Geopolitical factors have given the Druse a mountainous redoubt that is not easily taken by an invader, as the Lebanese Forces discovered only three years ago. Druse-Maronite agreement has made periods of stability possible in Lebanon, but the past also includes a litany of excesses by one community against the other.⁸

Throughout much of Druse history in Lebanon, the leadership of the Druse has been contested by two clans, the Jumblats and the Yazbaeks. Walid Jumblat has, however, enjoyed a historic opportunity because the Arsalan family (representing the Yazbaek clan) failed to produce a powerful successor to the now deceased Majid Arsalan. Majid was for many years the political foe of Kamal Jumblat, Walid's father, who died at Syrian hands in 1977. Majid's son, Faisal, made the politically fatal mistake of discrediting himself by an alignment with Bashir Gemayel's Lebanese Forces.⁹ Walid's remaining challengers are narrowly based and lack his formidable hereditary claim to leadership.

Walid is the president of the Progressive Socialist party (PSP, al-Hizb al-Taquadami al-Ishtaraki); although purportedly a secular party, it serves, in effect, as the Druse militia. Walid, long dismissed as immature and uncourageous, has surprised many of his critics and even a fair number of his supporters, and he may well prove to be the cleverest and most effective player on the Lebanese political scene.

When the Lebanese Forces made their way into his barony, Walid cut a deal with Israel, which was finding the Maronite militia too weak a reed for its goal of reshaping Lebanon. The parameters of the Israeli-Druse bargain were that the Druse would guarantee to keep the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) out of their areas in return for an Israeli withdrawal. The Israelis occupied the Druse mountains until August, 1983; and there were odd tacit alliances at work. Israeli soldiers looked the other way while Syrian-supplied military matériel flowed to the Druse; and the Israelis themselves (in part responding to pressures from their own small but influential Druse community) supplied the Druse with weapons even as they were continuing to provision the Lebanese Forces. Although little discussed in public, in private senior Israeli officials see their arrangements with the Druse as a great success, and one they wish they were able to emulate with the Shiites of the south.

Taking his allies where he could find them, Walid

⁶Jim Muir, "In the Lap of the Syrians," *Middle East International*, no. 258 (September 13, 1985), pp. 8-9.

⁷A report on the Presidents' meeting in Smar Jubayl on September 18, 1985, was broadcast by Beirut Domestic Service, September 18, 1985, and translated, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Middle East and Africa* (hereafter FBIS), vol. 5, no. 182 (September 19, 1985).

⁸Kamal Joumblatt, *I Speak for Lebanon* (London: Zed Press, 1982). The enmity between the Druse and the Maronites is unmistakable in Joumblatt's rendition of Lebanese politics from a distinctively Druse point of view.

⁹As'ad AbuKhalil, "Druze, Sunni and Shiite Political Leadership in Present-day Lebanon," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, vol. 7, no. 4 (Fall, 1985), p. 33.

found a useful ally in the Shiite Amal movement and its leader, Nabih Berri. The Druse provided key support for Amal's takeover of West Beirut in February, 1984, but even then there were significant tensions in the relationship. In April and May, 1985, when Amal struck against the Sunni Murabitun militia in West Beirut, Druse support proved important and crucially timed. However, when on May 19 Amal began its bloody campaigns against the Palestinian camps south of Beirut, the Druse not only refused to join, but they allowed elements of the anti-Arafat Palestine National Salvation Front units positioned in the Shouf Mountains to provide artillery fire against Amal positions. It is widely believed that the failure of the Druse to support the drive against the camps made Walid and the Progressive Socialist party many enemies in Amal and among the Shiites in general, but in fact they had many enemies there already. The PSP and Amal have clashed repeatedly in West Beirut, most recently in November, 1985, and there is good reason to doubt that the Amal-PSP alliance will long persist, despite the creation of ephemeral organizations that unify the two militias.

On August 6, 1985, Jumblat and Berri met in Shtawah to announce formerly the creation of a National Union Front (*Jabhah al-Ittihad al-Qawmi*). (The Front also includes a number of small pro-Syrian parties, like the Arab Democratic party and the Lebanese Communist party.) The Front's program calls for a new constitution, the abolition of sectarianism in politics, the promulgation of a new electoral law that would make Lebanon a single electoral district, and the strengthening of Parliament at the expense of the presidency.

The National Union Front program, if implemented, would result in a significant weakening of the political power of both the Sunni and the Maronite communities, because they would lose their rights to the presidency and the prime ministership, respectively. Moreover, by abolishing the multiple electoral districts in favor of a single national district, traditional political leaders would find that their locally based patronage networks might no longer serve as a guarantee to elected office.

It was hardly unexpected that the program was widely condemned by Maronite and Sunni politicians, as well as by Shiite competitors of the Amal movement, who see in the program the enhancement of Amal at their expense. Finally, it would be odd if a nonsectarian outcome emerged from a gathering of organizations that are sectarian in their essence.*

Walid Jumblat's strategy seems to be two-pronged. First, he will do nothing to alienate Hafez Assad, but he will do his best to keep his distance whenever possible. In his regard, good Druse relations with both Libya and the Soviet Union serve to counterbalance Syrian influence, as does the Druse working arrangement with Israel. Second, Walid will focus on buttressing his political stronghold by continuing to maintain his autonomy from the Beirut

government. He has been operating a port at Khaldah since 1984, thus providing the Druse with a crucial outlet to the Mediterranean Sea. His public statements, typically dripping with cynicism, clearly indicate his aspirations for a Lebanon that he can dominate, or no Lebanon at all, and he is enough of a realist to understand that the former possibility is not a serious one.¹⁰

THE SUNNIS

The Sunni community, urbane, well educated and the traditional trustee of the prime ministership, is clearly the most fragmented politically. Unlike Lebanon's other sects, which are minorities both in Lebanon and in the larger Arab world, the Sunnis suffer from no insecurity. Their brethren dominate the Arab world, and for that matter the Islamic *ummah* (community). The Sunnis' militia was the PLO, and as the fortunes of the PLO have waned in Lebanon so have those of the Sunni community. Now the Sunnis find themselves exposed and vulnerable in Lebanon, where they lack powerful militias, and they are sensitive to the danger that the Syrian regime will sacrifice their interests in order to strike a deal with the Maronite, Shiite and Druse militias.

In West Beirut, where Shiite control has been consolidated since February, 1984, the Sunnis find themselves in the unaccustomed role of the dominated. The Amal assault on the Palestinian camps in May and June had a traumatic effect on the Sunnis, who were probably correct in deducing that by reducing the power of the predominantly Sunni Palestinians the Shiites sought to emasculate the Lebanese Sunnis. The small Murabitun militia, whose perilous situation is illustrated by the fact that its leader, Ibrahim Qulaylat, lives in Paris, has been the frequent target of Amal attacks, most seriously on April 16 and 17, when Amal fighters, with Druse support, attacked Murabitun offices and positions. The Sunni militia has responded with sniping attacks, but there is little prospect that the militia will pose a serious threat to the numerically superior Amal.

Although not widely noticed outside of Lebanon, several Beirut-based Sunni Muslim organizations have capitalized on Shiite-Sunni tensions to recruit followings along sectarian lines. These organizations tend to be loosely structured associations that are neighborhood-based. Abdul Hafiz Qasim, the head of the Muslim Ulema Association, leads one of the most important such movements, the Islamic Military Council, which asserts an independent Sunni identity. Also important is Sheik Habashi, a militant cleric who has stated that it is legal (from the standpoint of Islamic law) to spill the blood of a Shiite; he has also preached hatred of the Druse.¹¹

In Sidon, the two most important Sunni leaders are Nazih Bizri, who earned significant local support with his staunch opposition to the Israeli occupation, and Mustafa Saad, the leader of the locally based Popular Nassirist Organization (*al-Tanzim al-Shabi al-Nasiri*). Both Bizri and Saad have developed a tenuous working relationship

¹⁰See his interview in *Al Safir*, April 5, 1985, p. 4.

¹¹AbuKhalil, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

with the Shiite Amal movement. A militia grouping created by Saad played an important role in defeating the Lebanese Forces in the villages east of Sidon in April, 1985.

The traditional Sunni leadership has been ineffective in representing Sunni interests under Lebanon's tumultuous conditions. Sunni notables, including Rashid Karami, the present Prime Minister, and former Prime Ministers Saeb Salam and Salim Huss remain suspicious of Druse-Shiite ambitions, but they lack a popular following, and they have been reduced to making obligatory pilgrimages to Damascus. In September, after fighting once again erupted around the Palestinian camps and in the midst of heavy shelling between East and West Beirut, Prime Minister Karami sent Salim Huss to Damascus to request Syrian military intervention to put an end to the fighting. However, the Syrians have already experienced the costs and futility of heavy military involvement, and they have kept their troops away from the fray.

In Lebanon's second largest city, Tripoli, Sheik Said Shaaban leads the Tawhid or Islamic Unity Movement, which he founded in 1982. Shaaban is widely believed to receive financial support from Iran, and his relations with Iran's Islamic Republic are excellent. The fiery, anti-Christian Shaaban calls for an Islamic state; in his view the only alternative to Islamic rule is pagan rule.¹²

Tawhid and several allied groups have tried to control Tripoli. Tawhid has acted ruthlessly against leftists and secularists, and one author reports that, in 1983, the movement massacred Communists and their families, and then discarded their corpses in the sea to rid the earth of their bad influence.¹³ The forces opposing Shaaban's movement include the Arab Democratic party, which has been heavily backed by Syria and whose ranks include a number of Alawites imported from Syria. Serious fighting occurred in 1984 and, despite Syria's September, 1984, efforts to reach an agreement that would have Tripoli policed by Syrian and Lebanese forces, fighting continued into 1985.

The most recent heavy fighting in Tripoli occurred in September, 1985, when Syrian artillery supported Lebanese militiamen attacking the Tawhid positions. Press reports indicated that over 200,000 people were forced to flee the city to escape the heavy shellfire. Outgunned and suffering heavy casualties, it appeared that Tawhid would be decisively defeated, but two apparently interrelated developments intervened to bring the fighting to an uneasy end. On September 30, four Soviet embassy employees were kidnapped in Beirut by the Islamic Liberation Organization, which subsequently demanded that Syria stop the fighting in Tripoli if it wished to see the hostages released. On October 1, following the interces-

sion of Iran's President Hojatoleslam Khamenei, an Iranian delegation proceeded to Tripoli to provide safe conduct for Shaaban to travel to Damascus. On October 3, an agreement between Hafez Assad and Said Shaaban was reached whereby all the Tawhid heavy and medium weapons would be turned over to the Syrians, and the secular allies of Damascus would again be allowed to establish offices in Tripoli. The agreement was a bitter one for Shaaban; he had rejected similar terms a month earlier, but he had to agree. At the end of October, three of the four Soviet hostages were released (one had been killed shortly after being abducted), and the Syrians set about enforcing the agreement with at least temporary success.

If the situation in Tripoli holds, the Syrians will have brought a modicum of peace to two Lebanese cities. On September 7, 1985, the Syrians engineered a security plan for the Greek Catholic city of Zahle, which provided for a Syrian contingent of 100 soldiers and 20 intelligence agents to cooperate with local police to establish law and order. Meanwhile, the intrepid Shaaban, who can hardly be accused of diffidence, may well attempt to extend his influence to Beirut, where Sunni-Shiite tensions are likely to provide a receptive audience.

SHIITES

Without question, the most important development in Lebanon during the 1980's has been the emergence of an assertive, politicized, but riven Shiite community. Long the pawns of Lebanese politics, the Shiites were beginning to find their political voice well before the Israeli invasion of 1982. Spurred by a growing enmity toward the Palestinian resistance, whose battles with Israel exposed the heavily Shiite south to continuous Israeli incursions, attacks and bombardment and whose high-handed behavior fed resentment, the Shiites were at war with the PLO and its Lebanese allies long before the fateful events of 1982. Under the leaky umbrella of the Amal movement, many Shiites had taken up arms in what they felt was self-defense against the depredations of the PLO.

Thus, when Israel excised the PLO from south Lebanon in June, 1982, there was a collective sigh of relief. Subsequently, in August, 1982, when the bulk of the PLO forces were withdrawn from Beirut, the Amal leaders let no doubt of their unwillingness to allow the PLO to establish a military presence in Lebanon. As the carnage of May, June and September, 1985, emphasized, Lebanese enmity toward the PLO has not attenuated

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Augustus Richard Norton's articles on Lebanon have appeared in *The New York Times* and the *Middle East Journal*, among other publications. His study on the Shiites of Lebanon will be published later this year. He is also the author of "Shi'ism and Social Protest in Lebanon," in *Shi'ism and Social Protest* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986).

¹²See the interview with Sheik Shaban, *al-Nahar al-Arabi wa al-Duwalli*, July 21, 1985, pp. 14-17, and the *Daily Star* (Beirut), November 14, 1984, p. 2.

¹³AbuKhalil, op. cit., p. 42.

In Israel, Labor and Likud "observe an uneasy truce, a truce that maintains the status quo because neither side possesses the political strength to move ahead. Nevertheless, [Prime Minister] Peres appears determined to attempt to initiate negotiations [with Jordan] before his term ends."

Disunity in Israel's Unity Government

BY HAROLD M. WALLER

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ISRAEL'S first year under the national unity government was eventful, but it was not a year of unity. Despite the facade provided by a Cabinet evenly balanced between Labor and Likud, the two major parties, the serious policy differences that have characterized Israeli politics for many years remained. During its first year, the unity government headed by Prime Minister Shimon Peres did not have to face hard decisions about Middle East peace talks. Thus it could concentrate on domestic issues like the economy, where there was a consensus that action had to be taken, although there might be disagreement about the methods.

But as 1985 drew to a close, some parties to the protracted Arab-Israeli conflict were apparently inching closer to the negotiating table, thereby redirecting Israeli attention to the peace process. And there was no consensus on the negotiating posture that Israel might adopt if peace talks were to begin with Jordan.

The rotation agreement that was adopted after the 1984 election was a condition for the establishment of the new Israeli government. According to the agreement, Peres heads the government until October, 1986; then Likud leader (now Foreign Minister) Yitzhak Shamir becomes the Prime Minister for the balance of the 50-month term. Barring an election before the transfer of power, Peres and his Labor party colleagues know that they must try to accomplish their objectives in a limited time span. This consideration has given an unusual sense of urgency to their plans for government action. However, the even division of power between the two major parties is a compensating factor; any significant move requires consensus. Predictably, there are disputes over the question of what constitutes a "significant" move.¹

On balance, the national unity government has to be judged a qualified success. In a sense, Peres has derived the greatest benefit from the opportunity to demonstrate his skills. He has overcome some of the skepticism that has plagued his career for many years, certainly since he

took over the leadership of the Labor party nearly a decade ago. The government has withdrawn from Lebanon and has tackled the economy with some vigor. However, it has faced a constant undercurrent of dissent and criticism from Likud; the opposition includes some Cabinet ministers, like the mercurial Industry and Trade Minister Ariel Sharon. Some disunity can be explained by the infighting in Likud for future control of the party. Nevertheless, the primary cause of disunity is Likud's belief that it must be vigilant in order to prevent any Labor action that goes beyond the coalition agreement, especially an action that does not require a formal vote. Under such circumstances, a leak or a rumor can be a useful tool.

When the unity government was formed in September, 1984, there was a widespread belief that it would not last, because of differences of opinion between Labor and Likud. In November, 1985, for example, Sharon sharply criticized Peres for his handling of discussions relating to peace negotiations. Sharon's dismissal was averted only by his apology to Peres.

In large measure, the coalition has not been dissolved at this writing because of the perception that neither side has much to gain if it is held responsible for terminating the arrangement. Likud wants to hold the government together because of the rotation agreement and its own electoral calculations. If Likud pulled out of the government, Shamir would give up his automatic resumption of the top post in the fall of 1986. Shamir, whose hold on his party's leadership is shaky, faces serious internal problems and probable repudiation by Likud if he does not become Prime Minister on schedule. Moreover, for some months opinion polls have shown that Labor holds a substantial lead over Likud.²

As for Labor, the party cannot afford to be described to the electorate as a party of expedience that brings down the government for narrow partisan advantage. Only a major issue could move Peres to risk asking the Knesset to dissolve itself and call new elections. The resolution of the Sharon-Peres confrontation of November actually allows Sharon to provoke the breakup of the coalition almost at will because Peres has pledged to sack him in the event of another personal attack.

In principle, dissolving the coalition would not neces-

¹Likud ministers openly rejected any suggestion that Israel might be willing to consider an international conference as a venue for peace talks. See Michael Eilan and Sarah Honig, "The Likud's Four 'No's' to Peres," *Jerusalem Post International Edition (JPPIE)*, no. 1304 (November 2, 1985), p. 1.

²JPPIE, no. 1296 (September 7, 1985), p. 14.

sarily lead to elections. Either of the two leading parties could attempt to build a new, narrow coalition with several small parties. But Likud and its allies cannot put together enough votes. And Labor and its allies would have to forge an alliance with at least some of the religious parties. Hence the unity government is likely to survive for want of a better alternative, unless Labor finds it opportune to allow Likud to force it into an election that Labor is likely to win.

It is in the nature of coalition government in Israel that smaller parties press their own issues on the margin of public policy, leaving the larger issues to the dominant coalition partner. At times, policy questions can become matters of high principle (e.g., the definition of Jewishness) and intense controversy. But in the final analysis, the minor parties have traditionally understood that there are limits to their expectations.³

In the present government, major issues are decided by Likud and Labor, acting in concert. On the major foreign policy and security issue—the negotiating posture toward Jordan (or a joint Jordanian–Palestinian delegation)—there is a wide gulf between the two parties. In effect, they are working at cross-purposes, as was clear in November when the conflict between Peres and Sharon became public.⁴ That incident was only the most visible evidence of division in the Cabinet. A decision on a specific negotiating stance would bring out the underlying contradictions of the coalition; under such circumstances, the coalition could not survive. Therefore the two sides observe an uneasy truce, a truce that maintains the status quo because neither side possesses the political strength to move ahead. Nevertheless, Peres appears determined to attempt to initiate negotiations before his term ends, although he must first find a negotiating partner.

The two major parties have both been beset by internal rivalries. In the Labor party, former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and his supporters energetically contested the party leadership held by Shimon Peres for a number of years. But Peres prevailed before the 1984 election. Rabin appears to have accepted subordinate status and has approached his job as minister of defense with enthusiasm and competence. Peres's gain in stature during his first year as Prime Minister has effectively ended any challenge to his leadership, and the party is operating in greater harmony than it has for many years.

In the Likud, the situation is different. Menachem

Begin headed the Herut party and later the Likud from the founding of the state until his retirement in 1983. Shamir, his successor, does not have Begin's hold on the party or his leadership skills. His tenure has been marked by squabbling, jockeying for position, and open challenges to his authority. As a result, there may be a formal leadership decision early in 1986. The two major contenders are Deputy Prime Minister David Levy and Sharon, the latter one of the most controversial figures in Israeli politics. Levy represents the Sephardic Jews, who were instrumental in bringing Likud to power for the first time in 1977; Sharon is perceived as the quintessential hardliner, who is not reluctant to utilize military force when he deems it appropriate. Minister without Portfolio Moshe Arens may also be waiting in the wings. The open maneuvering by or on behalf of these possible candidates undermines Shamir's position and weakens Likud's effectiveness in the unity government. Under the circumstances, Shamir may try to avoid any bold moves, to avoid giving his rivals an excuse to oust him. However, his rivals may decide that the sacrifice of the rotation agreement is worth the opportunity to become party leader, especially if the electoral outlook for the Likud, or the right in general, improves.

Shamir's position in his party has also been weakened because of Peres's standing in public opinion polls. For years, Peres was an unpopular politician, with an image as a wheeler-dealer who was willing to pursue expediency instead of principles. However, as Prime Minister, Peres has transformed his public image. In 1985, his popularity shot above the 50 percent level, while Shamir was relegated to the lower reaches of the opinion polls.⁵ In terms of domestic politics, Peres's transformation into a confident, credible and reasonably popular leader has been a key development.

The other major political developments have been on the right. One is the increasing militancy of the settlers in Judea and Samaria, some of whom were so brazen as to threaten civil war. Militant settlers are apparently willing to go to great lengths to integrate the occupied territories into Israel. Members of the militant underground directly challenge the authority of the state to compensate for the government's alleged failure to suppress Arab terrorism. They may perhaps act in an effort to force the government's hand on the annexation issue by precipitating conflict and crisis.

Even after most members of the underground were arrested, tried and convicted, the settlers, led by the Council of Jewish Settlement in Judea and Samaria, declared that plans of "handing over to the enemy all or part of the Land of Israel are an illegal action and must not be obeyed."⁶ Elyakim Haetzni, a member of the Council, warned that an Israeli agreement with Jordan to trade territory for peace might precipitate "a struggle—I hesitate to use the term war—with the Jews."⁷

Thus the possibility of unprecedented civil disobedience and perhaps armed struggle overshadowed the gov-

³Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel* (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), chapter 6.

⁴An astute analysis of the incident is found in Thomas L. Friedman, "Cabinet in Israel Averts Collapse," *The New York Times* (NYT), November 15, 1985, p. A1.

⁵Thomas L. Friedman, "Israel's Peres: Voters Turning to Him," NYT, August 18, 1985, p. 8. See also *JPIE*, no. 1299 (September 28, 1985), p. 9.

⁶Thomas L. Friedman, "Settlers in West Bank Threaten Disobedience," NYT, November 6, 1985, p. A15.

⁷Ibid.

ernment's attempts to pursue the opening created by the February 11, 1985, statement by King Hussein of Jordan and Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), despite subsequent more temperate statements from the settlers.⁸ The implications for the Israeli political process are serious indeed.

The other key development on the right is the emergence of Rabbi Meir Kahane and his Kach party. A phenomenon like Kahane could hardly have been imagined in Israel 10 years ago. But continued tension may have made some Israelis more willing to listen to Kahane's strident chauvinism. In the 1984 election, the Kach party received 1.2 percent of the vote, just over the minimum votes necessary to obtain one Knesset seat. But more recent public opinion polls indicate that the Kach party might have won anywhere from five to ten seats had an election been held in 1985.⁹ Despite Likud claims to the contrary, it is hard to see how Kahane could be kept out of a rightist coalition if he won half a dozen seats, although a new national unity coalition would certainly bar him from sharing power.

Of course, a showing in a poll well before the probable date of the next election can hardly be taken as an indication of what to expect in the election itself. Nevertheless many Israelis are concerned about Kahane's growing support, particularly among the young. His simplistic solution to the problem of what to do with the territories and their inhabitants—to expel the Arabs from the Land of Israel—may prove attractive to those who are unwilling or unable to deal with a complex problem.¹⁰ But Kahane's proposal is not taken seriously except by Kahane's supporters. Nonetheless, as their numbers grow, it becomes increasingly difficult to ignore the threat or to isolate Kahane. Most Israelis oppose Kahane, and this is an encouraging sign of the vitality of the political system. However, the militant settlers combined with growing contingents of Kahane's followers impose a serious constraint on the government's choices. Although Kahane can be excluded from government, his influence will be felt, albeit indirectly.

Looking ahead, the prospects for the unity government are mixed. Peres will probably be tough with his Likud partners, structuring confrontation so Likud will be blamed if the coalition is dissolved. Shamir, on the other hand, will be subject to the policy divergences that pull him away from Labor while his desire to regain the post of Prime Minister pulls him toward the coalition.

ECONOMIC POLICY

During the government's first year, the main issue it confronted was economic, especially the huge inflation rate, about 1,000 percent annually, and the attendant

deterioration of the currency. Inflation was caused by excessive government spending and the private consumption of imported goods. A major goal of the Likud-Labor government was the imposition of unpopular policies in such a way that neither party would be blamed. Finance Minister Yitzhak Modai instituted some short-term measures late in 1984, but he reserved more drastic policies for the summer of 1985. In 1984, he cut the budget by about six percent, but because of debt service and defense needs, most reductions came out of the education, welfare and social service sectors. Defense was not exempt, despite concerns that the country's security might be adversely affected. There was also worry that the decline in government spending would induce a recession that would cause unemployment to rise. Israel has traditionally maintained a lower rate of unemployment (usually less than five percent) than many other industrialized countries, a stance that may have contributed to other economic problems.

The 1985 austerity program hit the country hard, especially because the purchasing power of wages was reduced by deindexing combined with a reduction in government subsidies on certain consumer products. There was also a devaluation of the shekel, a sharp increase in the travel tax, and the imposition of currency restrictions. Further budget cuts were also part of the package, especially a cut in public sector salaries, the elimination of several thousand government jobs, a wage freeze for non-government workers, and a price freeze. When the plan was introduced, the Histadrut labor federation protested vigorously and struck to accentuate its position. Eventually, government concessions defused the protests, but the cost borne by the workers was still substantial.

After a few months, the economic indicators were encouraging; in particular there was a dramatically lower inflation rate. The decline of United States dollar reserves was arrested; exports increased while imports decreased; and tourism showed a healthy gain.

Despite the encouraging macroeconomic signs, the economic situation continued to trouble the average Israeli. Taxation remained high, real wages dropped, and the cornucopia of consumer goods seemed increasingly out of reach. As anticipated, unemployment climbed by over 1.5 percent to nearly 8 percent, a high figure by Israeli standards. Government officials maintained that after a few years the economy would improve. In the meantime, a free-trade agreement with the United States went into effect on September 1; in 10 years, all tariffs between the two countries will be removed. Combined with a similar arrangement with the European Economic Community, Israel will have an unusual opportunity to market its exports; at the same time, the Israeli economy is challenged to become more competitive.

FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign policy has a high priority for Israeli governments, but foreign policy was overshadowed by economic

⁸*JPIE*, no. 1306 (November 16, 1985), p. 1.

⁹*JPIE*, no. 1296 (September 7, 1985), p. 14.

¹⁰Thomas L. Friedman quotes Kahane: "I say we have a problem and here's my answer: throw them out." Reported in *NYT*, August 5, 1985, p. 4.

concerns until late 1985. Most troubling was the continuing coolness of Israeli-Egyptian relations.¹¹ Despite frequent indications that Prime Minister Peres would welcome a meeting with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, there was little enthusiasm in Cairo. Even after the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in June, 1985, there was no action on the Egyptian side.

A nettlesome issue that has proved very divisive is Taba, a very small strip of land near Eilat, the location of an Israeli hotel. Egypt claims that Taba is part of Sinai and should be returned; Israel claims that it is not. Lengthy negotiations have failed to resolve the issue. Egypt has asked for international arbitration but Israel has refused. Whereas the Labor party might be willing to arbitrate, Likud appears to be unalterably opposed. Cool relations were strained by the assassination of an Israeli diplomat in Cairo in the summer of 1985, the incident at Ras Burka in the Sinai last fall (when seven Israeli tourists were shot under peculiar circumstances by an Egyptian soldier and were then allowed to bleed to death on the sand), and the *Achille Lauro* hijacking incident, all of which fanned anti-Egyptian feeling in Israel. However, formal nonbelligerent relations and communication between the two countries have been maintained. On balance, Peres is probably disappointed that he has been unable to improve relations with Egypt, but he may be satisfied that the deterioration of relations has apparently been arrested.

When the government of national unity was formed, Lebanon overshadowed most foreign policy issues. It was clear that Israel's political goals in that country were beyond reach; the Syrians had established a firm grip on Lebanese policy, even though the various Lebanese factions continued to struggle against one another. Israel therefore gave up its hope for a negotiated agreement and decided to withdraw unilaterally, if the South Lebanese Army of General Antoine Lahad would maintain a buffer zone for several miles north of the border. The border has been relatively quiet, and Israeli detachments have continued to patrol in southern Lebanon.

Supporters of the war may claim that Israel's military objectives have been achieved. But overall, the invasion of Lebanon must be evaluated in negative terms for Israel. In addition to the economic costs of the war, the international criticism and the unfavorable publicity following the massacres of Palestinians at the Sabra and Shatilla refugee camps were costly.

Substantial Israeli casualties contributed to public division over the wisdom of the war. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was expelled from southern

¹¹A detailed analysis of the state of Israeli-Egyptian relations can be found in two articles by Hirsh Goodman in *JPIE*, no. 1304 (November 2, 1985), p. 16, and no. 1305 (November 9, 1985), p. 14.

¹²For example, Peres proposed very specific steps in order to get peace talks under way. See Moshe Brilliant, "Israel Proposes 5-Point Plan As Alternative to Hussein's," *NYT*, June 11, 1985, p. A1.

Lebanon, but it may not be excluded indefinitely. And the Shiites in southern Lebanon were radicalized and mobilized against Israeli troops. The Shiites' war of attrition against the Israeli army has inspired those who are engaging in unconventional warfare on other fronts, especially in the occupied territories. Peres and Rabin were determined to disengage from the morass that Lebanon had become, and handled the withdrawal fairly effectively.

Relations with the United States have improved considerably since Peres became Prime Minister.¹² Despite inevitable conflicts between Israeli and American interests, the overall thrust of American policy during the first year of President Ronald Reagan's second term was generally supportive of Israel. And although Israel has strenuously opposed the Reagan administration's arms deal with Jordan, this disagreement has apparently not affected United States-Israeli relations.

Israel has also become more actively involved with the Soviet Union. Several Israeli governments have tried to restore diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and the other East European nations. Talks between Israel and the Soviet Union have continued at various levels for some time, and the prospects for renewed ties have apparently improved since the establishment of the unity government. Unconfirmed rumors have circulated about the possible granting of exit visas to tens of thousands of Soviet Jews.

The reestablishment of relations is probably closer than at any time since 1967, because both Israel and the Soviet Union recognize that ties would be in their mutual interest. Soviet leaders have come to the conclusion that their influence in the Middle East peace process is severely limited unless they restore relations with Israel, which has insisted that foreign powers that might become involved in an international conference must recognize Israel diplomatically. For its part, Israel sees a value in making the Soviet Union a party to any agreement, so that it cannot attack from the outside.

In addition, Jordan has insisted on an international conference to provide at least a formal appearance of multilateralism. Israel has traditionally resisted such a demand, but appears prepared to concede that point, especially if it can link acceptance of the Soviet role with the restoration of relations and some relief for refuseniks and other Soviet Jews. The decision of Poland and Hungary to establish low-level diplomatic relations with Israel must have been taken with the prior approval of the Soviet Union. This suggests the possibility of further progress.

Since the installation of the unity government, Israel's
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Harold M. Waller, former chairman of the department of political science at McGill University, has written many articles on Israeli politics and foreign policy and United States foreign policy in the Middle East.

"Syria has been working consistently to seek a responsive regime in Lebanon, to control the Palestinians and to exert an influence in Jordan. . . . Its policy reflects Syria's perception of itself as the rightful dominating force in geographic Syria, and it derives strength from Assad's ambition to be that region's chief Arab leader."

Syria: Consistency at Home and Abroad

BY JOHN F. DEVLIN

Author, Syria: Modern State in an Ancient Land

TWENTY years ago, the second generation of Baathists seized power in Damascus. The subsequent continuity of administration stands in sharp contrast to the first two decades of independence (1946–1966), during which Syria averaged a military coup d'état every two years, submerged its identity in the United Arab Republic for three and a half years, and experienced the extinction of the political and economic power of its traditional ruling elite. The first several years of government by this second generation were marked by dissension within the ruling group. But Hafez Assad, a key member of the government after February, 1966, took full control of Syria in November, 1970, in a movement regularly described as correcting the mistakes of the past. Assad has dominated the country's affairs ever since.

Continuity in government is reflected in both domestic and external affairs. Over half the population of Syria has known no government other than the Baath. The road to advancement in the civil bureaucracy, in the all-important military establishment or in the Baath party requires a substantial measure of conformity to an authoritarian system. Challenge to that system from outside has so far proved unrewarding. Assad remains President, commander of the armed forces and secretary general of the party. Under his leadership, Syria has progressed internally and has tried forcefully to advance its interests in neighboring states. Because of its stable leadership, Syria has been able to project its influence in ways that pre-Baath governments could not.

Assad and his lieutenants have developed a system that combines centralized authority with a measure of accommodation to private initiative and long-standing custom. Assad makes the basic decisions, but he considers the views of his chief subordinates and, through them, he notes a wider range of opinion.¹ Economic decisions are made at the highest levels of government, and much of the economy is state-run. Yet most agriculture is in private

hands, and the considerable scope for the private sector in services and small-scale commercial enterprises serves to accommodate a historical streak of stubborn individuality in the Syrian character.

For more than 20 years, the very large military establishment has been the political preserve of the Baath party; it is illegal for a military man to profess any other ideology or for any political organization to attempt to proselytize the military. Despite this stress on ideological conformity, over the past 12 or 15 years professional military qualifications have become more important and competence has increased.

The Baathists have revolutionized Syria over the past two decades, and the changes they have brought are accepted by the majority and welcomed by many. Because there are no opinion polls and because broadcast and print media are dominated by the government or the party, it is impossible to develop greater precision in assessing popular attitudes. The government has devoted substantial resources to the countryside for roads, rural electrification, schools and agricultural services. A generation or two ago, a Syrian's opportunity was largely determined by family, place of birth and religion; today, application of the Baath party's principles of educational and social justice has had a profound impact. Syria is a country of rising literacy. In 1981–1982, there were 121,000 students in the country's four universities, as against 46,000 10 years earlier.² In the 1983–1984 school year, nearly 2.5 million Syrian children attended school, also an enormous increase over a decade earlier.³ Job opportunities for the educated are good, and Syria is not a major exporter of labor to other parts of the Middle East.

In a perverse way, opportunity has brought about one of Syria's knottier issues—the dominant role of the Alawites in the country's power structure. Members of this minority group (15 percent of a population that is 70 percent Sunni Muslim), which was poor, disadvantaged and despised by Syria's traditional elite, took advantage of the spread of schooling to the provinces during and after the French Mandate and the enlarging of the military academy in the 1940's and 1950's. President Assad is an Alawite and, although he has members of the Sunni Muslim majority among his chief aides—Vice Presidents Abdul Halim Khaddam and Zuhair Mushariqah, De-

¹Cf. Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1982), pp. 781 and 1083, and Adeed Dawisha, *Syria and the Lebanese Crisis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980), chapters 4–7.

²Syria, Ministry of Higher Education, *Higher Education* (in Arabic) (1982), pp. 11, 15, 21 and 26.

³Syria, Ministry of Education, *Yearbook for School Year 1983–1984* (in Arabic), p. 13.

fense Minister Mustafa Talas, Chief of Staff Hikmat Shihabi—he relies heavily on members of his own family and tribe to staff the military and security services.⁴

This policy is not popular with many Syrians, especially those who by religion and family status—primarily urban Sunni Muslims—once had guaranteed access to jobs and power. It clearly grates on the Sunnis to be subordinate to members of a social group that only a few decades ago occupied the lowest level in Syrian society.

The one serious challenge to the Baathist regime began in 1976, when the Muslim Brotherhood started a campaign of assassination. The Brotherhood, joined by other Muslim militants, aspired to replace what it considered to be an atheistic regime with an Islamic one.⁵ The campaign was carried on with brutality on both sides, but the insurgents never developed significant support outside the major cities. In those cities, the militants drew support primarily from Sunni Muslims affiliated with the traditional elite, which had been pushed aside by the Baath revolution. Rural people and recent migrants to the cities, enjoying prosperity and remembering the days when powerful urban families owned most of the agricultural land in the country, withheld their support. The challenge came to a bloody end four years ago, when Syrian troops crushed a Brotherhood uprising in Hama with a severity that left at least several thousand dead and much of the old part of the city in rubble.⁶

Since the Hama episode, Assad has skillfully played on divisions within the Brotherhood (some of its members had opposed a campaign of violence as likely to be counterproductive). The chief surviving military component of the militants, Adnan Abu Aqlah and his followers, accepted a government amnesty.⁷ The sister of Brotherhood leader Isam Attar has been in office as minister of culture and guidance since 1976. Although scars and bitterness remain, only a few instances of antiregime violence have occurred in the past two years.

Syria's political future does not therefore focus on a contest between secular Baathism and Islamic resurgence, but on Assad's health and the issue of who is to

⁴Hanna Batatu, "Some Observations on the Social Roots of Syria's Ruling Military Group and the Causes for its Dominance," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 35, no. 3 (Summer, 1981).

⁵"Manifesto of the Islamic Revolution in Syria," in Umar F. Abd-Allah, *The Islamic Struggle in Syria* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983), pp. 201–267.

⁶Estimates of the number killed range from 5,000 to over 20,000, with the higher figures coming from spokesmen for the defeated militants. On several occasions Hama has been the site of militant Islamic activity.

⁷Yahya M. Sadowski, "Cadres, Guns, and Money: The Eighth Regional Congress of the Syrian Ba'ath," *MERIP REPORTS*, no. 134 (July–August, 1985), p. 4.

⁸Alasdair Drysdale, "The Succession Question in Syria," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 39, no. 2 (Spring, 1985), pp. 246–257, is a thorough and clear discussion of this issue.

⁹In Baath parlance, the entire Arab world is the nation (*qawm*), and each country is a region (*qutr*). There is a Baath party National Command situated in Damascus, but the party in Syria is run by the Regional Command.

succeed him and when and how that succession will occur. Assad's illness two years ago indicated some of the factors that will come into play on his death. Assad was hospitalized, probably with a heart attack, in mid-November, 1983, did not return to his residence in Damascus until the end of January, 1984, and resumed a full workload only in the spring.

While he was sick, an open rift appeared in the ranks of his supporters. The dispute ranged Assad's brother Rifaat against several senior military officers. Forces loyal to each side maneuvered in and around Damascus. After some weeks, President Assad sent the protagonists abroad on a face-saving mission. When Rifaat returned, he had the title of vice president for security affairs but had lost direct control of the Alawite-manned Defense Companies, an important internal security force that he had formerly headed.⁸ For the past year, he has appeared largely in ceremonial roles.

It does not appear that Rifaat was trying to push the President aside but rather that he was ready to step into his place should Assad not recover fully. But Rifaat made two miscalculations. First, Hafez Assad remained able and eager to govern Syria. Second, the President's lieutenants are loyal to him directly, not through another family member. Moreover, despite his manifest ability in some areas, Rifaat suffers from two handicaps. He is given to confrontation rather than accommodation, and he has a reputation for corruption. In a succession period he would be a liability to other senior regime figures. In the first instance, senior officials are likely to act collectively as the least disruptive method of dealing with the problems that arise when Assad's strong hand disappears. These officials will be concerned with protecting their own status and preserving political stability.

At the end of 1985, Hafez Assad has a strong domestic position. His health cannot be evaluated with any precision; he probably works too hard for his own good. But his country is running smoothly. The Baath party eighth regional congress in January, 1985, brought together some 800 delegates from military and civilian party units around the country.⁹ They are the men—and women—who must explain and carry out the regime policies. Party leaders rely on them for local knowledge of conditions and attitudes. The eighth congress approved new regional command, which dropped three of Rifaat's supporters, and nominated Hafez Assad for a third seven-year term as President. He was elected, virtually unanimously, in February. A Cabinet reshuffle followed in April, but Prime Minister Abdul Rauf Kism remained in office.

ECONOMIC AFFAIRS

Much of the longevity of Assad's regime can be ascribed to its economic efforts. The government has spent substantial amounts of money on infrastructure and on services that benefit the growing cities as well as rural areas. Work is nearing completion on a countrywide

rail net of some 2,000 kilometers (more than twice the mileage in Assad's first year in office), which links major cities with scheduled passenger service and the ports to the agricultural areas of the northeast and to the phosphate mines near Palmyra.¹⁰ The country has been a net exporter of petroleum since the 1970's but has to import over 100,000 barrels a day (b/d) of low-sulfur crude oil to blend with its own crude before refining. A new oilfield, discovered in 1984, contains low-sulfur oil. When it comes into production in 1986 at an anticipated rate of 35,000 to 40,000 b/d, Syrian reliance on Iran for crude will be reduced. The full extent of the field is not known; it may be large enough to relieve Syria of the need to import any oil until well into the next decade.

Several events in 1985 showed the regime's continued attention to economic matters. The key post of deputy prime minister for economic affairs went to Salim Yasin in April. He is a former university head, with experience as minister of trade and of transport. The January Baath party congress devoted considerable attention to the state of the economy, including deficiencies in public-sector institutions. In the debate over the issue of public versus private activity, those who would like to see the country move further along the road to socialism—an attitude clearly favored by Syria's supporter, the Soviet Union—were not able to carry their point. Professional economists argued that defense burdens were so heavy that the country could not afford to risk relying too heavily on the ponderous public sector. Others pointed to the many potential regime allies among the commercial classes. The argument that it would be better to rely on the proven efficiency of the bourgeoisie prevailed.¹¹ In its final statement, the congress recommended that the private sector be encouraged to play a larger part in the economy.¹²

The budget passed by the People's Assembly in early June included a 23 percent increase in investment for the agricultural sector, which is a stronghold of private enterprise. Much of the money is designated for land reclamation and irrigation. The only other sector to receive an investment budget increase of this magnitude was the much smaller construction sector.¹³ Assad had urged the

new Cabinet of Prime Minister Kism to make "concentrated efforts to exploit agricultural lands" and to take advantage of "all our skills" in Syrian industry.¹⁴ In preparing the budget, the Cabinet heeded this signal not to impede private efforts.

Syria's principal economic burden shows up starkly in its budget figures. More than half its expenditure in 1985 is earmarked for defense (the figure is 30 percent if current and investment budgets are combined). Published budget figures, which contain little detail in the defense area, do not appear to include payments to the Soviet Union for military equipment. In addition to their high financial cost, men in uniform number some 400,000, one-sixth of the country's work force. High levels of fiscal and human resources have for years been earmarked for the military. These levels are likely to persist as long as Syria seeks strategic parity with its traditional enemy, Israel.

Syria's armed forces exist primarily to confront Israel, although they are a principal support for the regime and have been used to further Damascus's political aims in Lebanon. Syria sees no alternative but to build its own strength, with Egypt at peace with Israel, Iraq embroiled in an unending war with Iran, and Jordan wanting to strike a deal with its western neighbor if such a deal would give King Hussein a dominant role in the West Bank. Syria has long asserted that only the threat of Arab military strength would bring a response from Israel, even though it has been very prudent about its own use of such force. Syrian ground forces gave a respectable account of themselves in the fighting with Israeli forces that invaded Lebanon in June, 1982. Syria's air force, by contrast, suffered heavily; more important, the Israeli ability to neutralize Syrian air defenses left Syria open to attack from the sky.

The Soviet Union moved promptly to replace and even to add to the equipment Syria lost in the June, 1982, fighting. Moscow also sent equipment for two air defense complexes built around the SA-5 long-range missile; Soviet personnel set up and manned these complexes early in 1983. By mid-1985, the Soviet air defense crews had returned to their country and Syrian troops had full operational control of the new system.¹⁵

Syrian leaders see strategic balance (or parity) with Israel as "a basic condition for the attainment of a peace that would restore rights to those who have a claim to them."¹⁶ That is to say, they hope to increase pressure on Israel to agree to Syrian terms or come to an accommodation on the Golan Heights and Lebanon. A second Syrian purpose is to make conflict, should it break out, more costly to Israel than past wars; to some extent the Lebanese affair has sent this message to Israel. Bare numbers of weapons would seem to be in Syria's favor, but there is more than numbers to a military balance. Israel's senior military officials have repeatedly warned that Syria would suffer a serious defeat in a war between the two countries.¹⁷ Assad's record of the prudent use of

¹⁰*Middle East Economic Digest* (hereafter *MEED*), August 3, 1984, p. 35.

¹¹Sadowski, op. cit., p. 6.

¹²National Command, Arab Socialist Baath party, *Concluding Statement of the Eighth Regional Congress . . . in the Syrian Arab Region* (in Arabic) (Damascus: al-Baath Press, 1985), p. 23.

¹³*MEED*, August 3, 1985, pp. 45-47.

¹⁴Damascus Television, April 10, 1985 (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, hereafter FBIS, April 11, 1985).

¹⁵Commander of the Israeli air force Amos Lapidot, Radio Jerusalem, July 14, 1985 (FBIS, July 15, 1985).

¹⁶Hafez Assad, "Message to the Armed Forces," Radio Damascus, August 1, 1985 (FBIS, August 2, 1985).

¹⁷Minister of Defense Yitzhak Rabin, Radio Jerusalem, September 11, 1985 and *al-Hamishmar*, September 24, 1985; Chief of Staff Moshe Levy, *The New York Times*, September 14, 1985.

force in external matters indicates that he holds the same opinion privately.

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

The contrast between the first 20 years of the Republic of Syria's independent life and the second 20 is as sharp in external as in internal matters. In its first two decades, Syria was the object of other states' policies. In the 1970's and the 1980's, it has actively pursued its own goals. As the largest state created after World War I in the area known from antiquity as Syria, the modern republic has an ongoing interest in Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians. The division of geographic Syria into several states ran counter to the wishes of the majority of the Syrians, who supported the short-lived Hashemite regime established in Damascus in 1920.¹⁸ Hashemite ambitions did not die; until his death in 1951, Amir Abdallah of Transjordan, grandfather of King Hussein, actively tried to arrange matters so that he might reign in Damascus over a united geographic Syria.¹⁹ He lacked the resources and the supporters in Syria, as well as in Palestine and in Lebanon, to achieve his aim. Moreover, by the 1940's, the people and the leaders of the several states were accustomed to living within the boundaries created in the 1920's.

Syria has been charged with "a tenacious dream of a Greater Syria . . . [which] encompasses all of Jordan and all of Israel" as well as Lebanon.²⁰ Assad's ambitions, however, are much more subtle than merely incorporating Syria's neighbors into a single Syrian state. Assad is also more practical, given the political and military realities of the region. Israel is extremely powerful militarily. Jordan has been careful to cultivate the support of Arab neighbors like Iraq and Egypt and to avoid dependence on any of them. And the record of Syrian caution in avoiding direct responsibility for Lebanese internal political decisions speaks for itself. Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon thought that he could persuade Lebanese President Bashir Gemayel to take an overtly pro-Israel position. Despite all his troubles in 10 years of military involvement in Lebanon, Hafez Assad has not made the mistake of relying on one sectarian community.

Syrian troops moved into Lebanon in mid-1976 after the major confessional groups had rejected a Syrian proposal to solve a major cause of the year-old civil war. Maronite leaders, in particular, were unwilling to give up any of the positions—the presidency, the Christian majority in Parliament, and control of the army and security services—that they were guaranteed under the National Pact of 1943. At the time of this writing, leaders

¹⁸A. H. Hourani, *Syria and Lebanon: A Political Essay* (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. 54.

¹⁹King Abdallah of Jordan, *My Memoirs Completed (al-Takmilah)* (Washington, D.C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 1954), pp. 27–30.

²⁰James H. Scheuer, "How to Stop Syria," *The New York Times*, March 15, 1984.

²¹Agence France Press reporting meetings of Lebanese leaders in Damascus, October 27, 1985.

of the more important Lebanese factions are signaling that they are close to accepting a Syrian-brokered agreement "more fairly reflecting the present size of the [major] groups in the population."²¹ It is by no means assured that the Lebanese factions will submerge their hatred sufficiently to agree on a new "national pact." But the Syrian goal remains a Lebanese system in which no one sectarian faction dominates the country and in which Syria has much influence but no governing responsibility.

In the course of a 10-year pursuit of its goals in Lebanon, at times Syria seemed to be the dominant external force there and at other times it appears to have had little influence. After the Israeli invasion of June, 1982, Syria seemed almost impotent. Its air defense system in Lebanon was shattered; it lost radars and more than 80 aircraft. Only political considerations kept the Israeli forces from taking control of the highway from Beirut to the Syrian border just west of Damascus.

Assad maintained two aims of more immediacy, the necessary precursors of broader goals: Israel was not to realize any "gains" from the invasion of Lebanon and Lebanon itself was to remain a united sovereign state.

The withdrawal of United States troops in February, 1984, sharply increased Assad's influence among the Lebanese; within days, President Amin Gemayel canceled the United States-sponsored Lebanese-Israeli agreement of May 13, 1983. When Israel completed the staged withdrawal of its troops from Lebanon in June, 1985 (except for several hundred men in the border strip to support Antoine Lahad's Army of South Lebanon), Lebanese perceptions of Syrian power became clearer.

In subsequent months, the Syrians concentrated their efforts on the three most important Lebanese armed factions: the Lebanese Forces (Christian), led since mid-1985 by Elie Hobeika, the Amal (Shiite), led by Nabih Berri, and the Druse, led by Walid Jumblat. Significantly, all three leaders are less than 50 years old—young by Lebanese patriarchal standards of political leadership—and only Jumblat comes from a traditional notable family. The three leaders can begin the process of damping down the sectarian and often mindless violence that has torn Lebanon to shreds in recent years. They face opposition in their respective communities, and enormous difficulties must be overcome. It remains to be seen whether some form of sectarian accommodation can be worked out. Bitter divisions are most apparent in the Maronite community, where accepting diminished formal power is meeting heavy resistance.

As of mid-November, 1985, Syria is maintaining the pressure on the various Lebanese factions. It maintains

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"Mubarak continues to zigzag between conflicting demands and ideologies. He promotes the corrupt capitalism of the private sector alongside the wasteful socialism of the public sector and assures competing groups that each can find a secure niche in Egypt's increasingly compartmentalized economy. [However,] he has collided with most of the same groups that opposed and ultimately deposed his predecessor."

Egypt: Drift at Home, Passivity Abroad

BY ROBERT BIANCHI

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WHEN Hosni Mubarak became Egypt's President in October, 1981, his countrymen evidenced an understandable blend of expectation and apprehension concerning the quality and the likely direction of his leadership. Mubarak insisted early and often that he was neither a Sadatist nor a Nasserist. For the many Egyptians who were disillusioned with President Anwar Sadat's policies at home and abroad, this was good news. It implied prudence, independence and an effort to reconcile deepening social and ideological differences.

The more optimistic even spoke of the gradual emergence of "Mubarakism" as a synthesis of the best elements from the legacies of Presidents Gamal Abdel Nasser and Sadat—a mixed economy in which capitalist growth could be combined with greater concern for social equity, and a better planned and more orderly liberalization of the economy that would be compatible with greater liberalization of the political system. Before long it became fashionable to describe this formula as an Egyptian variety of "social democracy."

For those who had benefited most from the Sadat regime, however, the new President's tentative identification with the immediate past was unsettling and potentially threatening. To many it suggested timidity, procrastination and an effort to make incompatible pledges to conflicting groups and interests. From their perspective, Mubarak seemed to be a weak leader who would invite challenges to his authority. He might eventually be swept away by forces beyond his control unless he opted for a more consistent strategy of capitalist development that combined unpopular but unavoidable austerity measures with tougher authoritarian rule.

In the fifth year of his presidency, Mubarak continues to zigzag between conflicting demands and ideologies. He promotes the corrupt capitalism of the private sector alongside the wasteful socialism of the public sector and assures competing groups that each can find a secure niche in Egypt's increasingly compartmentalized economy. But over time he has steered closer to the political and social interests that formed the backbone of Sadat's

coalition, and he has collided with most of the same groups that opposed and ultimately deposed his predecessor.

The parliamentary elections of May, 1984, were an important turning point. They hastened a repolarization of Egyptian politics by permitting the resurfacing of some tensions that had been kept submerged since Sadat's assassination. During the highly controlled campaigning that preceded the elections, Mubarak strengthened his identification with the ruling National Democratic party, dashing the early hopes of opposition leaders that he would decline the leadership of Sadat's party or at least limit his role to ceremony.

After the results of the voting were released, it was clear that the government's support was concentrated in the countryside and in the most affluent urban districts. Despite many obstacles, the three major opposition parties demonstrated strength in the cities and provincial capitals, especially in districts with large numbers of working class voters. This evidence of sharply variegated popular support for the Mubarak regime was very similar to the configuration that had emerged in October, 1976, the only time that Sadat had permitted anything approaching free and competitive national elections. Observing the enduring character of political cleavages in Egyptian society, Mubarak has allied himself more forthrightly with an inherited coalition of supporters even though this seriously compromises his continuing efforts to portray himself as "above party" and capable of mediating among all special interests.

Mubarak has moved in a more independent direction with regard to foreign policy. Israel's return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon have provided a more flexible but also a more exasperating context for Egyptian diplomacy in which the merit of the Camp David accords has been questioned. Similarly, the increasingly conspicuous and meddlesome American presence in Egypt has contributed to an all too common deterioration in relations between the United States and a formerly enthusiastic Middle Eastern protégé.

During the treacherous transition period following

Sadat's assassination, Mubarak moved swiftly to isolate and crush a local rebellion in the Egyptian city of Assyut. He snuffed out an incipient war party in the People's Assembly that was demanding immediate reprisals against Libya before the facts of the murder plot were known. He promptly completed the constitutional procedures needed to terminate the provisional presidency of Sufi Abu Talib, the speaker of the People's Assembly. He gradually released the 1,500 political prisoners who had been arrested during the final month of Sadat's reign.

And, above all, he made sure that the Israelis had no excuse for postponing the final phase of their withdrawal from the Sinai beyond the scheduled date of April, 1982. Thus, less than seven months after the assassination, Mubarak had ended a major political crisis, arranged a smooth transfer of power, and restored Egyptian territory that had been under foreign occupation for nearly 15 years.

THE PHANTOM OF REFORM

During his first two years in power, Mubarak benefited from the general release of tension that followed Sadat's death. The new President cultivated an "era of good feeling" by consulting with formerly imprisoned opposition leaders and by distancing himself from some of Sadat's more unpopular policies. Mubarak insisted in his public statements that he sided with the advocates of "continuity" against the advocates of "change." But he invited debate and criticism of the Sadat legacy and was prepared to reverse key aspects of Egypt's economic and foreign policies in response to widespread popular dissatisfaction.

Trials of the clandestine groups connected with the assassination were accompanied by simultaneous trials of corrupt businessmen who had exploited their ties with the government, the ruling party, and the Sadat family to line their pockets during the "open door" period of economic liberalization. By bulldozing luxury villas that had been illegally built around the pyramids and "rehabilitating" imprisoned religious zealots, Mubarak was trying to demonstrate that the shaken regime not only could defend itself but could correct itself as well.

Thus, for a time at least, Mubarak appeared to have the makings of a reformer. In 1983 and 1984 he encouraged the gradual emergence of a new economic nationalism that sought to strengthen the state's diminished powers in economic policymaking in order to regain control of the burgeoning private sector and to limit Egypt's deepening external dependence. Mubarak and his key economic ministers called for a fundamental shift in the strategy of economic liberalization away from Sadat's "consumptive open door," which promoted luxury imports, banking and real estate speculation, toward a "productive open door" that would stimulate manufacturing and agricultural output and would eventually permit greater self-sufficiency in more commodities. Government spokesmen frequently underlined their commit-

ment to central economic planning, invoking various West European and Asian models of "guided capitalism" in which the state set goals and coordinated allocations for each sector of a mixed economy.

Mubarak made significant gestures to reassure the defenders of public-sector industries that their interests would not be jeopardized. With uncharacteristic playfulness he incorporated a string of socialist slogans into his 1983 May Day speech and then refused to continue until the audience of union leaders rewarded his "conversion" with enthusiastic applause. To quash lingering rumors about the imminent divestiture of the state enterprises, Mubarak arranged a long series of "surprise" factory inspections during which television viewers frequently saw the President clad in civil servant "fatigues" reminiscent of Nasserist days. To insure that the intended symbolism of these telecasts was not misunderstood, they were often followed by rebroadcasts of nationalist and socialist songs that had not been aired since the industrialization drive of the 1960's.

Most important, Parliament adopted a chain of controversial measures giving the Ministry of Economy sweeping regulatory powers over imports, private banking, and foreign exchange transactions. These measures threatened to cut to the heart of the commercial, financial and construction interests that had been the principal beneficiaries of the Sadat regime.

Until the end of 1984, the Mubarak government was apparently tapping enough support from Egypt's diverse private business community to succeed in this attempted renewal of state-led import substitution. Predictably, many business leaders interpreted interventionist economic policies and the refusal to liquidate public-sector enterprises as evidence of "neo-Nasserism" and a revival of "totalitarian socialism." However, there were also local capitalists who eagerly sought greater state protection and subsidies in order to move into light manufacturing, to guarantee access to imported raw materials, and to improve their bargaining power with foreign investors by requiring foreigners to form joint ventures with local partners.

At first, the only solid and persistent opposition to the government's new policies came from the business underworld—the network of black-market currency smugglers who virtually declared economic war on the government by steadily inflating the price of foreign exchange and demanding Economic Minister Mustapha Said's resignation. This strengthened the impression that only the most "parasitic" and "reactionary" segments of local capital were committed to the status quo and that Mubarak was attracting "progressive" business elements to a new coalition that would correct the abuses and heal the divisions of the Sadat era.

During the autumn of 1984 and throughout 1985, expectations about the possible emergence of an independent and reformist "Mubarakism" began to seem more and more like wishful thinking. When government poli-

cies were challenged by disgruntled pressure groups, Mubarak took positions that were strikingly similar to those of Sadat in the months preceding his assassination. In October, 1984, industrial workers rioted in Kafr al-Dawwar to protest new austerity measures and price increases in basic consumer goods. Although for three years Mubarak had assured union leaders that the gains of the socialist revolution would not be rescinded, he set his administration on a collision course with the labor movement in order to assuage Egypt's foreign creditors.

In February, 1985, riot police battled with a broad assortment of nationalist demonstrators who burned an Israeli flag in front of the Israeli pavilion at a Cairo exhibition center. University students and the leaders of several professional syndicates joined to protest the "normalization" of relations with Israel and demanded the reinstatement of the elected student unions abolished by Sadat.

In March and April, the government signaled a sudden retreat from its interventionist economic policies in the face of widespread and concerted opposition from private business organizations. The Chamber of Commerce, the Chamber of Industry, and the Egyptian Businessmen's Association mobilized powerful support within the ruling National Democratic party and among sympathetic Cabinet ministers to annul government controls on private banking and foreign trade before the ink had dried on the new regulations. Prime Minister Kamal Hassan Ali led the attack on what was thought to be government policy. Economic Minister Said, who for over a year had symbolized the state's determination to resist "anarchic" and "exploitative" forces in the marketplace, was driven from office and indicted for his own alleged involvement in a foreign currency smuggling scheme.

Finally, during the summer of 1985, various opposition parties and religious associations demanded that the government make good on its often repeated pledge to codify the Sharia (the Islamic law) as the basic law of the land. The President ordered the Ministry of the Interior to cancel a mass march on Parliament that had been scheduled for the last Friday of Ramadan (the Islamic holy month of fasting). Then, in an unusually confrontational gesture, Mubarak revived Sadat's audacious project to nationalize all private mosques and place them under direct government administration. Sadat's plan, announced no more than a month before his death, had been an ill-conceived attack on the only area of associational life in Egypt that remained relatively free and voluntary.

When Mubarak came to power he wisely ignored the scheme, which had inflamed religious opposition to Sadat. In any event, the government would not have been able to provide the funding and trained personnel required for effective state supervision of collective worship. In 1985, Mubarak was so eager to crush religious radicalism that he appeared bound to repeat Sadat's fatal mis-

calculations—overreacting to political opponents and unwittingly strengthening them.

Although Mubarak's rule has toughened visibly in the last year, it has not yet revived the widespread repression and glaring inegalitarianism of the late 1970's. Compared to Sadat, Mubarak has needed only a modest level of coercion to maintain an authoritarian regime; the facade of democracy has been preserved. Mubarak's "live and let live" attitude has encouraged drift, inconsistency, and frequent policy reversals. But it has also quieted Egyptian society.

THE LIMITS OF DIPLOMACY

Like Sadat after the October, 1973, war, Mubarak has tried to advance Egypt's national interests through diplomatic rather than military means. He has insisted on scrupulous observance of the peace treaty with Israel while urging the United States to resume its role as a "full partner" in efforts to resolve the fate of the Arab lands under Israeli occupation. Since the Camp David accords, both of Egypt's Presidents have tended to overinvest in diplomacy and to overvalue their country's new reputation for good will, patience and self-restraint. To be sure, Egyptians may well believe that they gave the United States and Israel their only real chance for peace and that both countries squandered the opportunity by trying to widen their spheres of influence instead of broadening the basis for a negotiated settlement.

The Americans quickly lost interest in the "peace process" when they believed that the Soviet Union was at last at bay and that the Egyptians would be mollified with tribute. The Israelis, in turn, were unable to resist the temptation to impose their own solution by using their military advantage to tighten their grip on the occupied territories and invading Lebanon.

Meanwhile Egypt has been committed to fulfilling contracts, to discussing countless proposals for compromise, and to presenting a case for mediation. Egypt's diplomacy has been measured and correct, but it has not been particularly imaginative or effective. Contrasting their devotion to diplomacy with the bloody and humiliating results of American and Israeli military action in Lebanon, for example, Egyptian leaders have tended to relish their "blamelessness" as the closest approximation to a moral high ground. This self-congratulation together with the passivity it implies have become serious flaws in Egypt's foreign policy.

Nevertheless, Egyptian policymakers have come a long way from Sadat's conviction that the conflict with Israel is "70 percent psychological" and that "the Americans hold 99 percent of the cards." Self-delusion has vanished after nearly six years of "cold peace." The shrewdness of Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the ruthlessness of his defense minister, Ariel Sharon, and the helplessness of Prime Minister Shimon Peres have given Egyptians a sharper image of their adversary and far fewer expectations of peaceful coexistence. Egypt's lead-

ers have come to realize that the key to peace lies in Jerusalem, not in Washington, and that Israel will remain for some time a house divided.

In this situation, the most that can be expected from any sort of Egyptian diplomacy is continued disengagement. And disengagement cannot be passed off as a lasting peace. No Egyptian diplomacy, no matter how resourceful or deliberate, will fashion a silk purse from what has become the sow's ear of Camp David.

The United States expected the Camp David negotiations to generate a momentum through which Sadat would lead Egypt and then Egypt would lead the rest of the Arab world (beginning with Jordan's King Hussein) to accept an American-brokered accommodation with Israel. The result, of course, has been nearly the opposite. Egypt has not led Jordan into the pro-American fold; instead, Jordan has provided a model and at times a conduit so that Egypt can repair its relations with Iraq and the Gulf states, with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and with the Soviet Union. Mubarak approaches negotiations on the occupied territories from a position more independent of (and in conflict with) American views and closer in many ways to the position of King Hussein than to Sadat's.

First, according to Mubarak, Egypt will negotiate alongside of but not in lieu of separate representatives of the Palestinian nationalist movement. Second, Egypt will urge the leaders of the PLO to modify important aspects of their position, but Egypt will not endorse any negotiating formula that explicitly excludes representatives of the PLO, whom it supports as the most authentic spokesmen for Palestinian nationalism.

Third, Mubarak does not believe that the United States alone can arrange a comprehensive exchange of land for peace in the Middle East. So long as the administration of President Ronald Reagan perceives Middle East conflicts primarily as a theater of the cold war and considers Israel to be its principal fortress against Soviet ambitions there, Mubarak has little confidence in American diplomacy. This is the lesson that Cairo drew from President Reagan's swift burial of his own September, 1982, peace plan and his decision to strengthen military ties with Israel almost immediately after Jerusalem's rejection of the American peace proposals in the autumn of 1982. Egypt was apparently more enthusiastic about the Reagan plan than Reagan himself.

Subsequently, Mubarak has joined other Arab leaders in efforts to involve more nations including the Soviet Union in peace discussions and to link peace in the Middle East with a general relaxation of tensions between the superpowers. The Fez summit of September, 1982, and the "committee of seven" headed by King Hassan II of Morocco, the Franco-Egyptian peace initiative of November, 1982, and renewed calls for a Geneva conference including the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council all testify to Egypt's desire to internationalize the search for peace.

Certainly, one of the major catalysts in this reorientation was the behavior of the Israeli air force. The Israeli attack against the Iraqi nuclear reactor in June, 1981, occurred just hours after a mini-summit meeting between Sadat and Begin at Sharm al-Shaykh. Sadat had boasted about the progress of Egyptian-Israeli understanding, and was clearly stunned by the incident; but his principal response was to intensify the campaign of repression against domestic critics of his foreign policy.

In August, 1981, Sadat visited Washington to meet the new American President. When he returned to Egypt in early September, he ordered mass arrests of virtually all opponents, touching off the political crisis that soon cost him his life. At the time, it was widely believed in Egypt that Sadat precipitated this confrontation largely to quiet growing complaints from Begin (which reportedly were reiterated by Reagan during the Washington visit) that Egyptian opponents of Camp David were getting out of hand and that Israel might delay its scheduled withdrawal from the Sinai unless Sadat demonstrated firm control over his own people.

Israeli troops completed their withdrawal from the Sinai on schedule in late April, 1982, but then quickly invaded Lebanon in early June. By this time even the staunchest Egyptian defenders of Camp David were persuaded that Israel was more concerned with hegemony than compromise. In sharp contrast to Sadat's behavior a year earlier, Mubarak recalled the Egyptian ambassador from Tel Aviv and laid down three firm conditions for his return—Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, resolution of the border dispute over the Sinai town of Taba, and resumption of talks to prepare for the autonomy of the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza (the so-called second stage of the Camp David process).

Unlike Sadat, Mubarak has not tried to suppress the growing Egyptian anger at Israeli militarism and American passivity. Instead, he has attempted to translate that anger into policy changes that isolate Israel politically and reduce Egypt's exaggerated reliance on American mediation. Most recently, for example, after the Israel bombing of the PLO headquarters in Tunis on October 1, 1985, Mubarak suspended the talks over Taba and supported France's leadership in passing a unanimous UN Security Council condemnation of the attack.

On October 9, after he had negotiated the release of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* from its Palestinian captors, Mubarak ignored American demands that he break his pledge to turn over the pirates to the PLO. When the

(Continued on page 82)

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Declining oil revenues may strain Saudi society, but "the regime is well established, its financial reserves are still sufficient to supplement current revenues for several years, there is no popular unrest, and foreign relations are satisfactory."

Saudi Arabia Faces the Future

BY RAMON KNAUERHASE

Professor of Economics, University of Connecticut

SAUDI Arabia faces a major challenge. Recent events in the world oil market have led to a significant decline in oil income, the source of its power and internal stability. Crude oil output and oil revenues have fallen precipitously, from a high of 9.9 million barrels per day (mbd) in 1980 and \$101.8 billion in revenues in 1981, to 4.6 mbd and \$35 billion in revenue in 1984. The slide in output has continued, and in September, 1985, daily production fell to 2.2 million barrels. Revenues for 1985 will probably not exceed \$25 billion. As a result, the government's budget and the balance of payments have gone into deficit. Today, Saudi Arabia's deficit on current account is second only to that of the United States. To reduce this deficit it has been necessary to liquidate long-term capital held abroad, reducing it from about \$150 billion to \$100 billion in less than two years.

The 1986 situation contrasts markedly with Saudi Arabia's experience since 1970. The decade from 1970–1971 to 1980–1981 saw considerable economic progress. During that period, gross domestic product (GDP, measured in constant 1969–1970 prices) rose from 19.6 billion Saudi riyals (SR) to SR 53 billion, at an annual compound rate of 10.5 percent. This growth rate compared favorably with those of Japan and Germany during the 1950's and 1960's, and exceeded that of the United States for the same period by a factor of three. In less than 15 years, most of Saudi Arabia's necessary physical infrastructure was in place, and the Saudi economy became an integral part of the world economy.

The contribution of the oil sector to GDP has changed greatly in recent years. In 1969–1970, petroleum sector output amounted to 54.5 percent of GDP, of which crude oil output accounted for 47.3 percent and refining for 7.2 percent. In 1974–1975, at the end of the first five year development plan, it generated 59.1 percent of GDP. Because of the diversification effort during the second and third development plans, the oil sector's contribution to GDP declined from SR 24.2 billion to SR 12.5 billion, reducing its share from 45.6 to 25.7 percent in 1985. Despite this decline, however, oil is still the engine that pulls the economy along.

To take advantage of the higher value added of products and the availability of cheap stocks of raw materials, the second and third development plans called for the expansion of the refining capacity and the creation of a

petrochemical industry. This has been achieved in the last 10 years. Today, Saudi Arabia is self-sufficient in refined products and will soon have an export capacity of refined products like gasoline and jet fuel of 835,000 barrels daily.

Under the direction of the Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (Sabic), two of the most modern petrochemical complexes in the world have been built in Jubail and Yanbu. It is expected that by the end of 1986, Saudi Arabia will produce between 4 and 5 percent of the world's output of methanol, urea and high- and low-density polyethylene. To assure markets for its products, Sabic entered into joint-venture agreements with various international petrochemical producers.

The rise of Saudi Arabia as a major petrochemical producer has caused some concern among European and American companies. In European and United States markets, there has been talk of restrictions on Saudi exports. The Saudis have argued that this is an overreaction, because its production will not be large enough to be disruptive. In the case of high-density polyethylene, for example, the kingdom would be producing only 4 percent of United States capacity, 6 percent of West Europe's and 15 percent of Japan's. It is not clear whether the Saudi argument will be accepted in the current protectionist climate, and there appears to be little chance that the Saudis can retaliate.

The non-oil sector also grew rapidly in the period 1970–1971 to 1980–1981, increasing 3.5-fold at an overall rate of 13.2 percent annually. Unfortunately, the non-oil sector did not perform as well as the planners had hoped. The high growth rates achieved by the construction and utilities industries suggest that Saudi economic development has been primarily a matter of building infrastructure and social overhead capital. Although the manufacturing sector grew at a respectable rate, very little progress was made toward the creation of a modern non-oil manufacturing sector, which is reflected in the fact that the relative shares of the production and services sectors in non-oil GDP changed only 2.2 percentage points in favor of the producing sector. Despite the decline in oil production since 1980–1981, the non-oil sector continued to grow. Indeed, the overall growth of this sector cushioned somewhat the effect of the decline of the oil sector.

The recent decline in oil revenues has put pressure on the economy and is forcing the government to reconsider its oil policies. Saudi Arabia has been the keystone of the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) cartel. It has been the main proponent of a fixed, non-market-determined price for oil. To this end, Saudi Arabia has acted as the swing producer in the cartel. Until 1980–1981, this policy required periodic increases in output to maintain the agreed-upon price and to prevent the price hawks from pushing prices upward too quickly. Since 1981, when OPEC developed its first formal production quotas, Saudi Arabia has reduced its output to prop up the OPEC price and to protect the other members' quotas. While Saudi Arabia stuck to its responsibilities, other members, especially Iran and Nigeria, tried to increase their market share by exceeding quotas and discounting the agreed-upon price.

The need for a change in policy became apparent when the Saudi government announced that the budget for fiscal year 1986 was based on an oil production target of 3.8 mbd. The current level of output threatens a deficit for this fiscal year of between \$20 billion and \$30 billion. This was not acceptable to a government that wants to balance its budget. Given the drain of the past two fiscal years on the reserves, the Saudis must think of protecting the remainder, especially because it may not be possible to turn some portion of their remaining foreign reserves into ready cash without great loss. Furthermore, an output of at least 3.5 mbd is required to generate the associated gas needed as input for the petrochemical industry, as well as to run various installations, like seawater desalinization and electricity-generating plants.

As the pressure mounted, the Saudis began to signal their intentions. In June, 1985, Sheik Ahmed Zaki Yamani, the Saudi oil minister, read a message from King Fahd to some OPEC oil ministers at a meeting in Taif, Saudi Arabia, announcing that there was a limit to Saudi willingness to make sacrifices for OPEC. A meeting of OPEC in July did not grant a higher level of output for Saudi Arabia, and Yamani threatened that Saudi Arabia would raise production to over 4 mbd if OPEC members did not cooperate and discipline themselves. OPEC continued in disarray, and in mid-September Saudi Arabia announced that it had signed a new sales contract with Exxon and was negotiating with Mobil and Texaco to provide oil at a discount of between \$2.00 and \$2.50 per barrel, effective in October, 1985.

The new pricing arrangement is a significant change in Saudi policy, because it is based on the netback price, which is equivalent to what a barrel of oil is worth after it has been refined into gasoline, naphtha and other products. Furthermore, Yamani announced that if this move failed to restore the Saudi market share to the desired levels, Saudi Arabia would sell its oil at the free-market price.

The effect of this decision on the world oil market depends on the reaction of the other producers. In the

short run, it should be relatively minor. In the northern hemisphere, the approach of winter should stabilize demand and absorb the additional Saudi output. However, some producers will raise production because of their increasing need for revenues. Iraq has already announced that it will raise production by 500,000 barrels per day as soon as its new pipeline through Saudi Arabia is completed. If other producers follow suit and raise output, it is conceivable that the price of oil will fall to \$18.00 a barrel by the spring of 1986. This would certainly be the case if Saudi Arabia implements its threat to price its oil at free-market levels.

REGIONAL FOREIGN POLICY

Until the 1970's, Saudi Arabia was an unimportant power in regional and world affairs. The kingdom was surrounded by radical regimes wanting to overthrow the monarchy; its strategic importance and huge oil resources made it a tempting target for attack and subversion. The Egyptian invasion of the peninsula in support of the revolution in North Yemen (1962–1967) highlighted the dangers facing the nation and revealed its vulnerability. During the pre-1970 period, the main aim of Saudi foreign policy was to stay out of intra-Arab entanglements. But since the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser and since the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, which gave the Arab world an important psychological lift, the Saudis have involved themselves actively in regional events. This involvement was made possible by Saudi Arabia's large oil revenues and its rapidly accumulating foreign reserves. To achieve its goals, the government spent billions of dollars on subsidies in Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, Pakistan and other countries.

The first steps toward a new regional policy were taken in the early 1960's. To blunt the force of radical ideology and to diffuse its potential threat to Saudi security, the Saudis focused on Islam as a unifying force. They stressed the common religious and cultural heritage of all Muslims, in order to minimize intra-Arab differences based on foreign ideologies, hoping to submerge many of these disputes in a broader Islamic context. To provide a forum for discussion and a means for action, the Saudis established the Muslim World League in 1962, followed several years later by the Islamic Ministers Conference.

The rise of Islamic fundamentalism in recent years has made the success of the Saudi-supported Islamic movement more important. The Saudis view the fundamentalist movement as an aberration, but they also regard it as a serious political threat. The assassins of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and the fundamentalists of Iran set Muslim against Muslim and are seen as a threat to the entire Muslim world. To promote Islam and at the same time to protect its own security, Saudi Arabia has been actively involved in and has given generous financial support to many Islamic movements and causes.

Saudi Arabia faces several potential trouble spots. On the Arabian Peninsula, it is surrounded by weak neigh-

bors. Difficulty may arise in its relations with the Yemens. South Yemen, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), is firmly anchored in the Soviet bloc, and it is known that Cuban and East German soldiers and advisers are stationed there. There have been several armed border clashes between Saudi Arabia and South Yemen. Saudi attempts to lessen the tensions and to establish closer ties with the PDRY came to an end in 1978. The North Yemenis still hope to regain the area around Jazan and Khamis-Mushayt in the southwestern corner of Saudi Arabia, which were annexed by King Abdul Aziz in the mid-1930's. But neither North Yemen nor South Yemen is strong enough to mount a credible military challenge.

If there is a latent problem, it may surface if the Saudis repatriate a large number of the more than one million North Yemeni "guest" workers. These returnees cannot be successfully absorbed into the economy of their home country. The situation would be further aggravated by the loss of several billion dollars in remittances. Thus, these returnees may become a source of instability and radicalization in North Yemen, which could easily spill over the frontier into Saudi Arabia.

The Saudis have been active participants in the Arab-Israeli conflict, but have modified their position in one respect. In the summer of 1981, they presented the so-called Fahd plan, which by implication accepted Israel's right to exist within secure borders. The plan was presented at a summit meeting of the Arab League states but was rejected because of Syrian opposition. A modified version was accepted a year later, shortly after the plan advanced by United States President Ronald Reagan, which called for a federation between the West Bank and Jordan. Despite the apparent moderation of the Fahd plan, Saudi Arabia remains a major actor in the dispute by bankrolling the PLO and Syria. But unless there is a major war between Israel and the Arabs, it is unlikely that Israel will become a focus of Saudi policies.

Saudi Arabia's relationship with Syria and Iraq is complicated. During the 1960's, Saudi Arabia feared the secular Baathist ideology that was dominant in both countries. With Nasser of Egypt, Syria and Iraq called for the overthrow of the monarchy and supported the tiny Saudi opposition groups that existed during this period. After 1973, Saudi relations with Iraq improved, partly because of the required cooperation in OPEC and partly because Iraq dropped its claim to Kuwait. The war between Iraq and Iran has forced a further rapprochement, as Iraq has come to rely more and more on Saudi financial support for its war effort.

There have always been links between Syria and Saudi Arabia, which are based in part on the personal relationship between Rifaat Assad, a member of the ruling Alawite elite and a brother of Hafez Assad, the Syrian President, and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, the next in line to the throne. Despite its opposition to Syria's policies in Lebanon, its support of Iran and its close relationship

with the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia has maintained a cordial relationship with Syria. It is the only Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member not to have broken relations with Syria over its policies in Lebanon and the Arabian Gulf. Because of its financial aid to Syria, the kingdom has had some leverage over that nation; but this may change. Recent discoveries of oil at Deir ez Zor may turn Syria into an oil exporter and thus loosen its ties with the kingdom. Syria is unlikely to attack Saudi Arabia, but as the region's strongest military power it may achieve its goals by threats.

The Saudis regard the war between Iran and Iraq as the greatest immediate danger. From the first, the Saudis have supported Iraq. As the war dragged on and the danger to the Gulf states became more intense, the Gulf Cooperation Council was formed in February, 1981. Its members—Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Oman and Saudi Arabia—have given Iraq an estimated \$25 billion, mostly from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. To offset the closing of the Iraqi pipeline through Syria and the destruction of the export terminals at the head of the Gulf, Saudi Arabia has agreed to the building of an Iraqi pipeline through its territory to Yanbu, on the Red Sea. Upon completion, this pipeline should raise Iraqi crude oil exports to over 2 mbd. This will ease some of the financial pressure on Saddam Hussein's regime as well as on the Saudis, whose recent cash-flow problems have made it more difficult for them to continue financial support to Iraq.

Thus far, Saudi Arabia has not been actively involved in the war. Iraqi attacks on Kharg Island, the major Iranian oil export terminal, have led to some Iranian retaliation against Saudi shipping. The first exchange of fire took place in June, 1984, when two Saudi fighters downed an Iranian F-4. It is unlikely that the Saudis want to become actively involved. Although their armed forces are well equipped, they are untried, and a considerable body of opinion holds that Saudi troops would not perform well under fire. Failure to perform well would certainly be a blow to the government's prestige, for it would call into question the efficacy of the many billions of dollars spent on armaments.

Saudi relations with Egypt have undergone several changes since World War II. Until 1967, Nasser conducted a vigorous propaganda campaign against the Saudi regime, calling it corrupt and reactionary and inciting the population to rid itself of the royal family. After his defeat in the Six Day War of 1967, Nasser toned down his propaganda and withdrew his troops from North Yemen in return for substantial subsidy payments. Saudi-Egyptian relations remained cordial and subsidy payments continued until the Camp David accords. The Saudis then broke diplomatic relations with Egypt and suspended all subsidy payments. Since Sadat's assassination, Saudi Arabia has cautiously tried to reintegrate Egypt into the Arab world. Nevertheless, it would not like to see Egypt too strong. Historically, the Saudis have

feared Egyptian power, because the Egyptians launched the only successful invasions of the peninsula—once in 1806, under Muhammad Ali, which ended the first Saudi state, and again from 1962 to 1967, in support of the revolution in North Yemen.

INTERNAL STABILITY

The recent decline in Saudi oil revenues has raised the question of the regime's internal stability. There can be no doubt that the royal family runs the country and that the King holds the final decision-making power. Nevertheless, at least four groups influence the political process: the bedouin, the ulema (religious leaders), the commercial interests and, since about 1970, the technocrats. It is rather difficult, however, to state how the decision-making process works, because so little is known about who influences the King and how.

The key to the internal stability and the survival of the regime is the fact that the "nature of the Saudi policy is such that no important group has ever been in a position to isolate itself from the Saudi power elite—and retain independent power."¹ Many senior and junior members of the royal family hold positions in all levels of government. The relationship between the bedouin and the King is based on intermarriage between the royal family and the women of various tribes, as well as on a system of subsidies, in return for which the tribal leaders secure the loyalty of the tribesmen.

The relationship between the King and the ulema has been one of mutual support and dependence. This relationship traces its origin back to the year 1745, when Abdul Wahhab, a religious reformer, and Abdul ibn Saud (Muhammad I, 1742–1765) signed a compact in which Ibn Saud swore to defend, support and spread Wahhabism, a fundamentalist and puritanical religious movement. This agreement is the basis of the Saudi state and provides the religious-moral authority that legitimizes the government. Control over all religious matters, the courts, and the education of females has given the ulema considerable power, which they have used to shape the nature of the state, while at the same time assuring that the Wahhabi version of Islam, Wahhabiya, prevails within the kingdom.

But this may have changed in recent years. Changes in the justice system, especially the replacement of the Grand Mufti by the Ministry of Justice, the growth of administrative law, the decline of the Al Shaykh family (the descendents of Abdul Wahhab, who in the past were strong supporters and allies of the royal family), and sociological changes among the ulema have led to a

reduction in their political power.² Indeed, this decline "may suggest that they no longer represent religious elements in the Saudi population."³ On the one hand, this has strengthened the ruling family, because the ulema have tended to acquiesce in the King's desires in nearly all instances. On the other hand, it may have weakened the Saudi monarchy's grip on the nation. The ulema are interested in preserving their version of Islam and will probably collaborate with any group in power, as long as it guarantees the survival of the Wahhabiya.

The merchant community has long been a pillar of support for the regime. Concentrated in the Hejaz (the western province, especially Jedda) and in Haṣa (the eastern province), the merchants were the main source of financial support between 1926 and 1933 and continued to provide substantial amounts of revenues until 1947. The relationship between the merchants and the royal family was reinvigorated when, during the 1970's, more and more family members joined commoners in business ventures. The decline in business activity has forced some bankruptcies and has reduced business activities, but there are no signs that the merchant community would shift its support from the regime.

Without a doubt, the technocrats have become one of the most powerful groups in the kingdom. Without their efforts, the development process would collapse. Despite their ubiquitous presence in all branches and levels of government, their survival in the halls of power depends on the King. This was recently illustrated when King Fahd dismissed the highly competent and talented minister of health, Ghazi Ghosaibi, because he ran afoul of some of the senior princes.

The political system has been remarkably stable. In the past 35 years, the ruler has been changed four times without disruption. The dethronement of Saud ibn Abdul Aziz in 1964, potentially a serious threat to stability, was carried out smoothly and quickly, without causing major long-term ruptures in the royal family or among the population. The line of succession to King Fahd, the current ruler, has already been established, foreshadowing an orderly transition of power for at least the next 20 years.

There are a number of potential sources of internal conflict, of which the most important are the strains associated with rapid economic development after 1973. This has created a new middle class that sooner or later will want to participate in the political process. The decline of economic activity since 1983 because of the current oil glut has increased the pressure for reform. As long as the oil revenues came in, there was enough chal-

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Ramon Knauerhase spent two years as an adviser to the Saudi Ministry of Finance and National Economy, and as a visiting scholar at the Saudi Ministry of Planning. Among his publications are *The Saudi Arabian Economy* (New York: Praeger, 1975).

¹Thomas R. McHale, "The Saudi Arabian Political System," *Vierteljahres Berichte, Probleme der Entwicklungs-Länder*, no. 89 (September, 1982), p. 205.

²For details see Alexander Bligh, "The Saudi Religious Elite (Ulema) as Participant in the Political System of the Kingdom," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, vol. 17, no. 1 (February, 1985), pp. 37–50.

³Ibid., p. 49.

BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE MIDDLE EAST

SACRED RAGE: THE WRATH OF MILITANT ISLAM. *By Robin Wright.* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1985. 315 pages, photographs, notes, bibliography and index, \$17.95.)

Islamic fundamentalism remains an enigma to most Americans; shadowy terrorist groups, fanatical suicide bombers and young Iranian boys running across mine fields are the images that most often come to mind. Wright's penetrating review of the rise of Islamic fundamentalism should broaden understanding of what Islam is and is not. The author gives sense and proportion to the actors and events that have captured American headlines since the Iranian revolution. The American misreading of who opposes the United States in the Middle East and why is given clear definition, and Wright's chapter on the Reagan administration's involvement in Lebanon is a trenchant exposition of the show of force that ended when almost 300 American soldiers were killed by a smiling suicide car bomber.

Other chapters cover the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and its impact on various Middle East and North African states. Wright relies heavily on the work of Islamic specialists for background, but her first-hand reporting and interviews with major Islamic figures are informative in their own right. While not a definitive work on Islam, this is a perceptive book that should be required reading. W.W.F.

ARAFAT: TERRORIST OR PEACEMAKER? *By Alan Hart.* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1985. 501 pages, notes, photographs and index, \$19.95. [Distributed in the United States by Salem, NH: Merrimack Publishers' Circle.]

The author, a well-known British journalist, argues that Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasir Arafat is misperceived in the West; he is not a terrorist, but a true nationalist and the only Palestinian leader who can reach an agreement with Israel on the Palestinian issue. Hart says he hopes his book will change people's views of Arafat, but his uncritical acceptance of most of Arafat's (and other Fatah leaders') statements will not convince the skeptical, and his sometimes fawning portrait of Arafat (e.g., "Arafat is really only happy when he is among children") will exasperate most people. W.W.F.

SAUDI ARABIA: THE CEASELESS QUEST FOR SECURITY. *By Nadav Safran.* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985. 524 pages, notes, appendix, bibliography and index, \$25.00.)

THE NEW MIDDLE CLASS AND REGIME STABILITY IN SAUDI ARABIA. *By Mark Heller and*

Nadav Safran. (Cambridge: Center for Middle Eastern Studies, Harvard University, 1985. 36 pages, notes, appendixes and index, \$7.00, paper.)

FROM PRINCE TO KING: ROYAL SUCCESSION IN THE HOUSE OF SAUD IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY. *By Alexander Bligh.* (New York: New York University Press, 1984. 140 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$25.00.)

Safran has recently come under criticism for not acknowledging that he received a research grant for *Saudia Arabia* from the Central Intelligence Agency. The question of propriety should not, however, detract from the merits of this study, which is a comprehensive examination of Saudi Arabia's security policies. Safran shows that security concerns have been paramount for the Saudi leadership since the first monarchy; his analysis of the growth of the Saudi defense establishment following the increase in oil revenues is excellent.

The short monograph by Safran and Heller is both a good introduction to a topic that is receiving increasing attention and a warning that cutbacks in oil production and decreases in revenue "may well cause a crisis for the new middle class that could lead to a political explosion" in Saudi Arabia.

Bligh's book is a straightforward descriptive history of the Saudi monarchy; it is a useful addition to the short history of the early monarchy in Safran's book. W.W.F.

THE OTHER WALLS: THE POLITICS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS. *By Harold H. Saunders.* (Washington, D.C.: The American Enterprise Institute, 1985. 179 pages and appendixes, \$9.95, paper.)

The title of Saunders' book comes from Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's remarks in Jerusalem that a psychological "wall" blocks peace between Israelis and Arabs. Saunders, a veteran of Middle East peace negotiations, offers an interpretation of the Arab-Israeli conflict that, he hopes, will break down the walls of misperception and misinterpretation. His acute, insightful and evenhanded analysis stands out from the verbiage on the Middle East. W.W.F.

BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND JERUSALEM: A REPORTER'S NOTEBOOK. *By Wolf Blitzer.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985. 259 pages and index, \$15.95.)

Blitzer, a correspondent for the *Jerusalem Post*, is best known in the United States as a Middle East commentator on American news programs. His book focuses on United States-Israeli relations since the 1970's. Blitzer appraises Israeli and American policymakers and

offers some revealing background information with regard to several incidents that have marked relations between the two states. He is a sure supporter of Israel, however, uncritically accepting assertions that Israel's economy is faltering because of its large defense expenditures and that the American media is biased against Israel. W.W.F.

THE OTHER ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: MAKING AMERICA'S MIDDLE EAST POLICY FROM TRUMAN TO REAGAN. *By Steven L. Spiegel.* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. 522 pages, notes and index, \$24.95.)

Spiegel analyzes United States Middle East policy-making in the executive branch since 1948. His interpretive history is critical of American policy, but does not reflect the commonplace arguments that United States policy has always been a reaction to events in the Middle East. Instead, he argues that each President's policy has been guided by a conscious, intentional design that incorporates the ideas and attitudes of the previous administration. Spiegel is a strong supporter of Israel, and his interpretation of events reflects his bias. W.W.F.

THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW LEBANON: FANTASY OR REALITY? *By Edward E. Azar et al.* (New York: Praeger, 1985. 292 pages, notes and index, \$32.95.)

This comprehensive assessment of Lebanon by eight specialists includes noteworthy studies of the Christian Lebanese Forces by Lewis Snider and of the Shiite Amal by Augustus Richard Norton. W.W.F.

GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY IN RURAL PALESTINE, 1920-1948. *By Ylana Miller.* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985. 218 pages, bibliography and index, n.p.)

Arabs owned almost all the cultivable land in Palestine during the British mandate. Why then, Miller asks, did they "lose" their land to a small Jewish population in 1948? In her excellent study, Miller tries to answer this question by examining the roles played by British colonial authorities, local government, the small Jewish farming communities, and the urban and rural Arab communities during the 28-year period before the end of the mandate. She finds no easy answers, but she does use new material to show how local government policies influenced rural Palestinian reactions to Jewish immigration and British rule. W.W.F.

SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY. *Edited by Louis René Beres.* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1985. 242 pages, notes and index, \$25.00.)

The essays in this work start with the supposition that Israel has nuclear weapons and has integrated them into its defense system. The volume is a readable

survey of the implications of nuclear weapons for Israel and the Middle East states; the authors are recognized specialists who argue against Israel's possession of nuclear weapons, pointing out that Israel maintains a credible conventional deterrent without the need for a nuclear deterrent. W.W.F.

ISLAM AGAINST THE WEST. *By William L. Cleveland.* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985. 223 pages, notes, bibliography and index, \$19.95.)

Cleveland reviews the life of Amir Shakib Arslan, the Lebanese prince best known as the forceful proponent of Islamic nationalism during the period between World War I and World War II. Cleveland's explanation of Arslan's close relations with fascist Germany and Italy forms one of the more interesting chapters in the book. Cleveland says that Arslan's revolt against British and French colonialism in the Middle East and North Africa drove him to accept and encourage Germany and Italy's territorial ambitions in Africa as a counterweight to the British and French. W.W.F.

ISRAEL: LAND OF TRADITION AND CONFLICT *By Bernard Reich.* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985. 227 pages, suggested readings, photographs and index, \$28.00, cloth; \$13.95, paper.)

This descriptive, generally sympathetic account of Israel is a volume in Westview's Nations of the Contemporary Middle East series. The book is a basic well-written introduction to Israel's history, politics, economy and regional foreign policy. The author has written widely on Israel and the Middle East. W.W.F.

MISCELLANEOUS

AMERICAN INDUSTRY IN INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION: GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES. *Edited by John Zysman and Laura Tyson.* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985. 435 pages, notes and index, \$34.95, cloth \$19.95, paper.)

Recent concern over the United States trade deficit focuses on the radical increases in the trade deficit since 1981 (an increase largely attributable to the overvalued dollar). However, the United States balance of trade has been negative for the past decade, and the editors of this volume attribute this to the quasi-laissez-faire attitude the United States government has adopted toward the changes in international trade during this period.

In the introduction, the editors argue that most industrialized nations have set an industrial policy and that the United States should do so also. The six case studies that follow discuss how industries like steel, automobiles, textiles, and electronics have fared because of government and corporate decisions. The chapters on the decline of the United States steel industry by Michael Borrus, the development of the Japa

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ISLAM AND POLITICS

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neant government manipulation of Islam to delay or control elections, ban or restrict political parties, impose press censorship, or suppress political and religious dissent. The vast majority of moderate Islamic activists have been overshadowed by a radical minority who assassinate, kidnap and bomb in the name of Islamic political and social justice.

The realities of current Muslim politics raise two questions: whose Islam? and what Islam?

Is the implementation of Islam the primary function of kings, military rulers and the clergy? Is it to be entrusted to elected Parliaments? Many Muslims today insist that greater political participation is required in a modern Islamic state that takes seriously the traditional notions of community consultation (*shura*) and consensus (*ijma*). This expectation is common to most Muslims, whether they are Islamic or secular in orientation. It united factions in their revolt against the Shah and, more recently, was a basis for the MRD (Movement to Restore Democracy), which pressured Zia ul-Haq for elections in Pakistan. Government sensitivity to these concerns has led to parliamentary elections in Jordan and Kuwait and to a Saudi commission to consider the creation of a Parliament.

Will Islamic renewal be directed toward restoration or reconstruction? Islamic revivalists run the gamut from conservative traditionalists, who seek to restore past norms and values through the reimplementation of traditional Islamic laws, to modern reformers, who seek to reinterpret tradition, to reformulate Islam to meet the changing conditions of modern life.

Whatever its orientation, Islamic revivalism does not mean a rejection of technology. Technology has become part and parcel of Muslim life. Technology and science (mass communications, travel, education) are harnessed to spread Islam. The danger is not technology but the loss of identity and values. The issue is not television and education but the content of media programs and educational curricula. The target of revivalists is the uncritical imitation of the West that has led to the secularization of Muslim societies and the displacement of Islamic attitudes and values by foreign, Western values that affect political, social and family life. Fear of cultural assimilation or domination and the threat of political and military dependence on the superpowers make an explosive mix.

The anti-Americanism that has sometimes accompanied Islamic politics is not the product of an instinctive hatred of America, but a response to the threat to Muslim identity of American political and cultural domination. Iran and Lebanon provide two examples. For many Iranians, United States–Iran relations—from the CIA*-coordinated return of the Shah from exile in 1953 and the

CIA training of the Shah's secret police to the substantial American military and economic presence and support for the regime until its fall in 1979—provided proof that the United States was pro-Shah and anti-Islamic, i.e., opposed to Iranian self-determination. Similarly, in Lebanon the United States is viewed as part of the problem, rather than the solution. United States support for an unpopular Christian President and its close relations with Israel, even after Israel's invasion of Lebanon and its occupation of the south, have drawn the anger and firepower of Lebanese radicals. United States government installations have been bombed and American citizens, who had long been a welcome presence, are now victims of kidnapping and murder.

Attempts to Islamize Muslim states and societies have raised many important issues, including the nature of Islamic government, the scope of Islamic law, the feasibility of introducing traditional social welfare taxes and Islamic interest-free banking, the status of minorities and women, and the expression of political and religious dissent. If Muslims are to modernize without simply Westernizing, then they will have to formulate appropriate models for political, social and legal change. Since there are no ready-made answers, the process of formulation and implementation will include experimentation and exploitation by established governments and opposition groups alike, as each seeks to control and lead. Thus wherever Islam is part of public life, tension and conflicts can be expected in the struggle for ideological supremacy and power.

Yet several important points must be remembered. The process of modernization in the West extended over several centuries. The establishment of modern states, the creation of a sense of national identity and political legitimacy and the development of appropriate economic and social institutions took time and experimentation. The process was accompanied by heated debates, riots, revolutions (American, French and Russian). The accommodation of religion and science and the resolution of issues of modernization (the family, women's role in society, the rights of minorities) have remained a challenge to modern Judeo-Christian communities. Issues of political and cultural identity and religious values, as well as the pace and impact of modernization, remain important concerns in the West today, inspiring a variety of reform and revivalist movements: Christian and Jewish revivalism in the United States, liberation theology and Christian-based communities in Central America.

The political and economic realities of the post-World War II independence period (the Arab–Israeli conflict, poverty, illiteracy) have hampered the process of self-determination in the Muslim nation of the Middle East. Until political and educational reforms permit a more consensual approach to indigenously rooted national political systems, Middle East governments, like current Middle East politics, will remain fragile, precarious and potentially volatile. ■

*United States Central Intelligence Agency

EGYPT

(Continued from page 74)

Americans "hijacked" the hijackers the next day, they were stunned to see that Italy was also determined to demonstrate its independence in its relations with the PLO.

Many observers in Cairo believe that Egypt's dogged dependence on diplomacy may itself have become an obstacle to a broader peace.¹ Even Sadat understood that diplomacy could not be effective in the absence of a credible military threat, that at times one had to make war (or at least be prepared to do so) before one could make peace. This is precisely why Sadat initiated the October War in 1973—a limited war he fought for political more than military purposes, but without which even a partial or "cold" peace would have been inconceivable. How can Egypt, which is committed to nonbelligerency both by treaty and by military disadvantage, reasonably expect to induce the Israelis to accept an exchange of land (which they value highly) for peace, which they do not urgently desire?

THE "UGLY AMERICAN" REVISITED

When President Reagan ordered United States Navy fighters to intercept one of Egypt's civilian airliners over the Mediterranean, he touched off an uncommon display of popular anger against the United States. This crisis clearly helped to drive Egyptian-American relations into a more openly contentious phase.* But an accumulation of grievances preceded these demonstrations and contributed to their severity. Many of these grievances stem from the highly conspicuous and intrusive nature of the American presence in Egypt—a presence that has engendered a local backlash at least as serious as the backlash in Turkey during the 1960's and in Iran during the 1970's.

For example, when the Reagan government boasted publicly about the intelligence report that made interception of the Egyptian airliner possible, it implicitly confirmed growing accusations that foreigners and their agents are being allowed to gather sensitive information that can be used to violate Egypt's sovereignty and compromise its national interests. One can hardly overestimate the suspicion and mistrust that such an incident is likely to breed in United States relations with Egypt. The relaxed and perhaps overly hospitable way in which Egyptian authorities have traditionally treated foreigners and their freedom of movement in Egypt may well be a casualty of this incident.

*Editor's note: However, in late November, Egyptian-American relations improved after the United States supported Egypt's ill-fated efforts to rescue hostages on a hijacked Egyptian airliner in Malta.

¹Critiques of Egyptian diplomacy, while daily fare in the opposition press for several years, now appear with increasing regularity in the government newspapers as well. See, for example, the articles by Muhammad Asfur and Saad al-Din Ibrahim in *Al Ahram*, October 12, 1985, p. 14.

Another important source of irritation is the enormous \$1.8-billion economic assistance program of the United States Agency for International Development (AID)—program with political motivations and ideological colorings that are even more transparent and troublesome in Egypt than in other developing countries. First, AID's massive expenditures are, above all, a reward for ending hostilities with Israel, an inducement to continue observance of the peace terms, and an insurance policy against the commitment of American troops in a regional war.

For these reasons, many AID officials argue that the program should be viewed as a \$1.8-billion-a-year bargain for the United States even if it yields no substantial economic benefits to either country. Egypt believes that it is subject to discriminatory treatment; Israel always receives higher levels of American aid, is required to repay a much lower proportion of what it receives, and is bound by far fewer restrictions on how it spends its allocations.

Second, to the extent that American aid is perceived as economic, not political, it is increasingly argued in Cairo that American rather than Egyptian economic interests are being advanced. The United States Congress has imposed conditions that effectively transform much of the aid into a welfare program for American businessmen, contractors and farmers. Many of Egypt's leading economists, including several who are indisputably "pro American," have pointed to the incompatibility of United States insistence on investment in infrastructure, imported foodstuffs and private enterprise with Egypt's desire to emphasize industrialization, local food production and the renovation of the public sector.

In recent years, a rich literature has appeared in Arabic dealing with the issues of "dependency" and "dependent development," comparing Egypt with Latin American and East Asian countries that have experienced capitalist growth under American sponsorship. This literature expresses alarm over growing foreign indebtedness and calls for greater economic self-sufficiency. During Mubarak's presidency these views have spread. Much of what Americans once dismissed as the idle rhetoric of the left has been incorporated into the agenda of the Western-trained technocrats and Cabinet ministers who are now demanding a renegotiation of aid levels and conditions to match more closely their own vision of Egypt's national interest.

Third, the American aid program has become a key factor in the conflict among Egyptian interest groups struggling for political power and economic advantage. The United States is playing a dangerous game in Egypt. It is an openly partisan force, trying to shift the domestic balance of power toward an assortment of special interests—favoring the private sector over the public sector, importers over producers, landlords over tenants, the self-employed over wage earners. American officials insist that such biases are necessary to correct the "distortions" and "disincentives" inherited from Nasser's socialist ex-

periments, and they have established a strong, paternalistic bureaucracy in Cairo to insure that most expenditures reach their chosen constituencies.²

Fourth, an army of bureaucrats and their dependents form a large component of the mushrooming American community in Egypt. The "little Americas" that once occupied prominent portions of Ankara and Teheran have sprung up again in the Cairene neighborhoods of Garden City and Zamalak and in the suburb of Maadi. Simply put, there are too many Americans in Egypt, attracting too much attention to themselves and lending an unfortunate credibility to the cynic's wisdom that familiarity breeds contempt.

Finally, American officials in Washington and in Cairo must disabuse themselves of the notion that Egypt has been bought and paid for. Egypt is a rarity among developing countries—an economically struggling land with a firm grip on its national identity and a clear understanding of its critical world role. Egyptians are aware of their need to depend on foreigners, but they are also aware of the high value foreigners place on their friendship. Egypt's leaders have sent great powers packing more than once and they certainly would not remain empty-handed if they were to do so again.

Americans must remember that there are at least two profiles of Egyptian nationalism—not merely the ingratiating and cosmopolitan pose of Sadat relishing his conversations with American news commentator Barbara Walters, but also the defiant and anti-imperialist visage of Nasser nationalizing the Suez Canal. On July 26, 1986, President Mubarak will lead his countrymen in celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of that historic occasion. This year both the American and the Soviet ambassadors will be in attendance. ■

²A good overview of the political motivations of American aid to Egypt can be found in Joost Hiltermann, "Egypt and America: An Uneasy Embrace," *The Middle East*, no. 131 (September, 1985), pp. 49–53.

UNITED STATES POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

(Continued from page 52)

incompetence in the *Achille Lauro* affair and the last-minute collapse of a planned meeting between the British foreign minister and a joint Jordanian–PLO delegation. While the "realists" applaud this trend, wiser heads realize that no peace is possible without credible Palestinian representation. The shocks being administered to Yasir Arafat are weakening the moderate Palestinians, paving the way for violence and terror against Israelis, moderate Arabs, and Americans in the Middle East. Palestinians are desperate; against the intransigence of Israel and the United States and the intrigues of supposedly supportive Arab regimes, growing numbers of Palestinians, especially the youth, feel they have nothing to gain by diplomacy and nothing to lose by renewed armed struggle.

In terms of regional and international strategic realities, there is little incentive for diplomacy and compromise. Israel's military superiority, steadily increased since the 1973 war, is unquestioned. American aid will undoubtedly continue at a level of over \$3 billion annually regardless of Israel's regional policy. The Arabs have abandoned even the pretense of a joint "eastern front" against Israel. Camp David plucked Egypt out of an anti-Israel coalition, and the Iraq–Iran war effectively neutralized two of Israel's most powerful adversaries to the east. Political rivalries have disintegrated the so-called Steadfastness Front of "radical" Arab regimes that existed during the 1970's—Algeria, Libya, Syria, South Yemen and the PLO; while in the fertile crescent Syria finds itself at odds with Jordan and Iraq, and Lebanon remains in chaos. In short, the Arabs have little military-strategic leverage. Nor do they have any economic-strategic leverage since the advent of a buyer's market in the oil business. "Realist" analysts conclude that the Arab–Israeli conflict is essentially over: the Israelis have won and the Arabs (and especially the Palestinians) have lost. Therefore, there is nothing for the United States to worry about. This argument might have some validity if the Arab and Palestinian regimes were invulnerable to domestic socioeconomic and political currents, but in fact their vulnerability to increasingly militant and even subversive currents is increasing.

THE OIL BOOM

The oil windfalls of 1974 and 1979 occurred in societies that were already undergoing rapid transformation. The growth of cities, the increase in wealth, the spread of education and exposure to the mass media had already set in motion the emergence of a different kind of politics—a politics in which masses of people would become involved. Because of domestic and regional tensions, however, Middle Eastern regimes in general were too insecure to permit or promote political participation by the masses except through tightly controlled single-party systems or traditional practices. The oil boom strengthened these absolutist tendencies, and as vast new revenues flowed into government coffers the states grew in size and power. Those elites close to the heights of state power benefited enormously, and to a degree there was a "trickle down" effect from the windfall. The oil boom affected not only the oil-exporting states, but also their less affluent neighbors, who supplied labor for the rich countries' development projects and overall economic expansion. No development of institutionalized political participation accompanied the socioeconomic transformations of the 1970's.

Despite material growth, fundamental domestic and regional political tensions remained and even deepened. The Iranian revolution, the occupation of the Grand Mosque in Mecca, and the assassination of Egypt's President Anwar Sadat were the most dra-

matic visible tips of an iceberg of discontent that stemmed from the disjunction between an increasingly politicized yet unorganized society and an increasingly capable yet absolutist state.

The bursting of the oil bubble exacerbated the legitimacy problem of the established order in the Arab world in several ways. Its effects may be felt first not in the oil-exporting states but in manpower-exporting neighboring areas like Jordan, the West Bank, Lebanon, Egypt, Sudan, North Yemen and Tunisia. According to modernization theory, regimes face serious danger when rapid growth begins to taper off; influential elites and social groups feel squeezed and resentful, and the "trickle down" effect evaporates for the lower classes. The foreign and domestic policies of the incumbents are examined more critically and less sympathetically than they would be during boom times. Arab observers believe that there is a great deal of popular discontent although it cannot generally be expressed openly. In foreign affairs, this unhappiness is focused on the evident failure of Arab regimes (particularly those with the so-called "American connection") to make progress on a just solution for the Palestinians. Many Arabs are also impatient with the inability of their leaders to engineer a degree of pan-Arab coordination and to settle the increasingly dangerous Iraq-Iran war.

The oil recession is also having a direct effect on the foreign policy of Arab states. Saudi Arabian revenues are less than one-third of what they were in 1981 and the Saudis are running a \$20-million annual deficit. Consequently, Saudi Arabia and other oil exporters are cutting their financial assistance to key neighboring governments, notably Jordan, Syria and the PLO. Some observers think that this development may actually enhance the peace process. More likely effects include an increase in the insecurity of the Arab oil exporters and a tendency on the part of "front-line" Arab actors to take a more militant nationalistic posture and to turn to the Soviet Union for assistance.

The third factor clouding the long-term outlook for Middle East peace is the rise of extremist religio-nationalist fundamentalist movements in the Arab countries and in Israel. The rise of influential movements, like those headed by Rabbi Meir Kahane and Moshe Levinger in Israel and among settlers in the Palestinian territories, has already been mentioned. On the Arab side Islamic militancy is a concern, particularly to the governments of Egypt and Jordan, and to the Arabian monarchies. It feeds on socioeconomic dislocation and on threats to national, religious and cultural integrity. Unfortunately, the failure of the Arabs to make any progress on the Palestinian issue—still by far the major "national" issue—weakens the legitimacy of established regimes and limits their ability to make compromises in a peace process. Behind all these governments lurks the example of Iran.

In 1986, a trend toward anomic violent behavior is emerging; and Arab social scientists link this trend to economic and sociopolitical phenomena. The Egyptian political sociologist Saad Eddin Ibrahim, for example, has discerned a new type of Arab whom he terms, not wholly in jest, "the mad Arab." Citing recent examples in which individual Arabs have killed individual, civilian Israelis (he mentions incidents in the Sinai peninsula, Tunis, and the West Bank), Ibrahim observes that such behavior is not really crazy but is an expression of deep sociocultural anger. The long-term implications of this for any Arab-Israeli peace process are ominous.

Many adherents of the Israel-first school of thought and the self-styled realists counsel benign neglect as the best American approach to the Middle East. To them, the region is essentially stable, despite all the turmoil. Observers more familiar with the region, however, believe that the present situation is explosive and dangerous for Americans and American interests. That is why so many of them, and many others who are genuinely and rightly concerned with Israel's long-term prospects, are urging an energetic and evenhanded policy for the United States.

They are heartened, therefore, at the indications that Washington and leaders of key parties in the region seem to be positioning themselves for still another attempt at a peace process. However, relatively favorable conditions may not last much beyond 1986. The short-term prospects are problematic, but the long-term indications point toward significant setbacks for the United States in the Middle East. ■

SYRIA

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substantial numbers of troops in Lebanon, but the units that once faced Israeli soldiers there have been withdrawn. Damascus has refused to send forces into Beirut. It has deployed troops to enforce a cease-fire in the northern city of Tripoli between Islamic Unification Movement (Tawhid) forces and a pro-Syrian grouping, the Arab Democratic party. The situation in Tripoli is less complex; only two main militias are involved, and the Syrians have substantial direct influence over one of them. Moreover, Iranian mullahs have helped to persuade the Unificationists to stop fighting.

The Assad regime's ties with figures prominent in the Islamic Republic in Iran, which go back at least to the last year of the late Shah's reign, have usually benefited Syria in Lebanon. Relations between Iran and Syria are essentially based on realpolitik; each is an enemy of Iraq. The regime of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini chooses to overlook the fact that Syria follows the "atheistic" Baath ideology for which it castigates Iraq. Syria tolerates talk and organizational activity by activist Muslims in Lebanon but has given no indication that it envisages a role in Lebanon for those who want an Islamic state.

Syrian-sponsored opposition to the Islamic Unification

Movement in Tripoli gave rise to concern in Iran. However, after visiting the city and talking with Assad, the head of an Iranian delegation asserted that the President's stand "with regard to the establishment of calm in Tripoli was very promising."²² Under considerable pressure because of the Iraqi bombing of its main oil export terminal, Iran is not inclined to pick a fight with Syria.

The tangled and changing web of positions and tactics that characterizes Syria's relationships with Jordan, the Palestinians and Israel almost defies explication in a few paragraphs. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has been weakened severely by the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and subsequent events. Syria assisted a split in that organization and forced PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to establish working relations with King Hussein of Jordan. Arafat and his PLO associates are in an unenviable position. They have no chance of establishing even a small political entity on Palestinian soil without the help and assistance of Arab governments. Yet they know that no Arab regime will sacrifice an important state interest for the sake of the Palestinians. Hence, Arafat's desperate efforts to keep space to maneuver in his relations with Jordan when his legendary political skill seems to be waning and his ability to control his subordinates is increasingly being called into question.

At the same time, Syria and Jordan are finding it in their own interests to respond positively to Saudi efforts (springing from a decision of the August, 1985, summit meeting of Arab states) to improve relations between them. Why? One might begin by noting that they share a common interest in preventing a Palestinian state not dependent on them. Hussein would like Jordan to become the dominant external influence on the West Bank (as it was until 1967). But he knows that Assad will not consent to a settlement that eliminates Syrian influence over a Palestinian entity and he is aware that Syria is prepared to spoil any such agreement.

Hussein has been urging an international conference as a framework for dealing with Arab-Israeli differences. In so doing, he is advocating a position that Assad has supported since before Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's 1977 trip to Jerusalem. Additionally, the fortunes of Iraq's war with Iran are tilting somewhat in Iraq's direction. Although no decisive outcome is in prospect and although the stalemate may go on for years, an Iraq even marginally less preoccupied with Iran might focus greater attention on Syria. Syria, therefore, has an interest in better relations with Jordan.

Improved relations between Syria and Jordan are marked by exchanges of visits at the ministerial level and by improvements in commercial contacts. The reopening of freight services on the Damascus-Amman railroad coincided with the second set of conversations between

²²Radio Teheran, October 20, 1985 (FBIS, October 21, 1985).

²³MEED, October 26, 1985, p. 28.

²⁴The Economist (London), July 27, 1985, p. 25; The New York Times, July 21, 1985.

the two countries' Prime Ministers.²³ Further improvements are to be expected in the economic climate; even when Jordanian-Syrian political relations were at their poorest some economic and commercial activity continued.

A MIDDLE EAST PEACE?

It is possible that some sort of accommodation between Israel and its neighbors may be worked out. For domestic political reasons, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres has used language that could lead to talks about Arabs governing Arabs on some parts of the West Bank. There have been hints that the restoration of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel might facilitate the return of the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights—demilitarized—to Syria.²⁴ On the Arab-Israeli issue, Syria's principal goals are:

—the restoration of Syrian sovereignty over the Golan Heights;

—a complete Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon;

—Syrian influence over any Palestinian entity.

Israel has the capacity to concede two of these goals.

The obstacles to a Middle East peace are formidable. Just to list a few is sobering. And any single obstacle could prevent progress. For example, Assad's style of holding out for maximum advantage may discourage his interlocutors (it almost prevented United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from arranging the May, 1974, cease-fire and disengagement with Israel). In addition, many Israelis oppose returning any part of the West Bank to Arab control. Third, internal differences among Palestinian leaders could weaken those leaders' authority and their ability to control their putative followers—witness the *Achille Lauro* episode. Syria has been successful in its effort to dominate Lebanon; it can take a share of the credit for forcing Israel to pull out of Lebanon almost entirely and sharply reducing Arafat's status and influence. Thus, without serious risk of a domestic backlash, Syria might be able to make "peace" with Israel on the basis of its three goals. Whether all the requirements for peace will fall into place is another matter.

Syria has been working consistently to seek a responsive regime in Lebanon, to control the Palestinians and to exert an influence in Jordan for many years. Its policy reflects Syria's perception of itself as the rightful dominating force in geographic Syria, and it derives strength from Assad's ambition to be that region's chief Arab leader. Relations with outside powers—the Soviet Union, which provides military and political support, or the United States, with which Syria has many differences—will continue to be governed by Syria's perception of itself. Neither the clear Soviet opposition to Syria's anti-Arafat moves nor the United States preference for bilateral Jordanian-Israeli negotiations influenced Assad to alter his priorities. His stubborn determination to make sure that Syria gets its due in the region is as strong as ever. It will not disappear. ■

DISUNITY IN ISRAEL'S UNITY GOVERNMENT

(Continued from page 66)

foreign policy priorities have been affected by the time constraints of the rotation agreement. Peres spent more than half a year on the withdrawal from Lebanon, which left him little time to devote to other foreign policy projects. Overall, under Peres Israel has been trying to normalize its situation, building on Camp David and projecting a more flexible image.

THE WEST BANK

Israel's overriding foreign policy problem is partly a domestic concern, namely, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The domestic implications are brought into sharp relief by the articulation of Kahane's views that the territories must be incorporated into Israel and that the Arabs must be encouraged to leave (the most moderate interpretation that one can place on his rhetoric). Kahane is not the only Israeli who is concerned; most thinking Israelis worry about the West Bank.¹³

Likud and the rightist parties believe that the territories are an inherent part of the biblical patrimony, the Jewish homeland, and should be a formal part of Israel. On the other hand, Labor and the leftist parties would consider territorial compromise west of the Jordan River, but reject a return to the 1949 armistice lines. Both left and right believe that Jerusalem is an integral part of Israel and both reject the idea of a Palestinian state. As an alternative, both groups are willing to consider autonomy arrangements based on the agreement at Camp David.

In addition to questions about rights to the land and the security of Israel, the underlying issue concerns how the Jewish state can deal with large numbers of Arabs living in its midst. During Israel's first 19 years of statehood, the proportion of Arabs in Israel was relatively small, perhaps one-sixth of the population. Arabs were given citizenship and the right to participate in the political process. But when over 1 million additional Arabs came under Israeli control as the result of the Six-Day War in 1967, the situation began to change. As long as it was assumed that eventually the territories (or at least large parts of them) would be traded for peace, Israel did

¹³An excellent comprehensive discussion of the subject is found in Daniel Elazar, "Israeli Attitudes to the Palestinians," in George Gruen, ed., *The Palestinians in Perspective* (New York: Institute of Human Relations Press, 1982), pp. 65-79.

¹⁴A dispassionate analysis of the emotionally charged issue is found in Mark A. Heller, *A Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983). Heller concludes that a Palestinian state would be the best solution from Israel's point of view.

¹⁵The plan is described in the report of a study group headed by Daniel J. Elazar, *Shared Rule: The Only Realistic Option for Peace* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute Center for Public Affairs, 1983).

¹⁶Bernard Gwertzman, "Hussein Says P.L.O. Agrees on Parley with the Israelis," *NYT*, May 30, 1985, p. A1.

not confront the hard choices indicated by demographic analyses.

The notion of keeping the territories gained currency during the 1970's and was given a boost in 1977 by Menachem Begin's election as Prime Minister. The need to confront the issue consequently became more pressing. The Camp David accords shunted the problem aside temporarily. But as the chance of negotiations with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation looms ahead, the day of reckoning seems closer at hand. There is no consensus as to whether Israel can absorb so many Arabs and remain true to its vocation as a Jewish state. Israel's leaders must find a position that commands broad political support and may serve as the basis for discussions with whatever interlocutors may emerge to represent the Arabs. No such position has yet been articulated. Even a temporary solution would probably require a new election in order to establish a government with a negotiating mandate.

Besides the position of the two main factions, other positions have been put forth either on the fringes of the political spectrum or by independent analysts. In addition to Kahane, there are elements on the right, like Tehiya and Gush Emunim, who refuse to contemplate any territorial concessions and who are dubious about a halfway arrangement, like an autonomy plan. On the left, there are elements that would negotiate with the PLO (on the grounds that one must make peace with one's enemy), would consider major territorial concessions and would even contemplate the possibility of a new Palestinian state west of the Jordan River.¹⁴ Among independent suggestions, the one with the greatest potential may be a condominium arrangement for the disputed territories, wherein Israel and Jordan would share the responsibility for administering the areas, and the question of sovereignty would not be resolved.¹⁵ There are reports that Peres may be willing to consider such a plan, but there has been no ground swell of support for it among Israel's political elites.

All the speculation about substantive issues is now subordinated to procedural problems; these are very complicated, although they are probably not insurmountable. On February 11, 1985, King Hussein and Yasir Arafat met, proclaimed their joint willingness to trade peace for territory on the basis of United Nations resolutions, and decided to formulate a joint strategy for peace talks. Thereafter questions of who, when, and how have predominated.¹⁶

This process is likely to be more prosaic than the experience of 1977, when Anwar Sadat of Egypt made his grand gesture of going to Israel. The role of the PLO is probably the central procedural issue, which has implications for substance as well. Israel wants to exclude the PLO from negotiations because it believes that PLO objectives are incompatible with the continued existence of Israel, no matter what Arafat says for international consumption. Jordan, of course, wants to include the

PLO on the grounds that only that organization can properly represent the Palestinian Arabs of the territories.¹⁷ The United States, to its credit, has been searching for an intermediate position that can satisfy both sides.¹⁸ Even if the talks begin, probably with a non-PLO Palestinian component in the Jordanian delegation, the substantive issues are so intractable that early success is unlikely.

The chance of completing negotiations before Shamir returns as Prime Minister in October are very slim indeed. For that reason, King Hussein may well calculate that it is not worth his while to become involved at all. The risks involved in talking to the Israelis formally (he has reportedly met them in secret on many occasions) are far greater than the returns he might reasonably anticipate. Talks may be in the offing, but even if there are negotiations, the prospects for success are unclear. Thus the Israelis are left with the dilemma of what to do with the territories and their inhabitants if there is no one with whom they can deal. In the face of growing support for Kahane (who outflanks the traditional rightists), it is more difficult to maintain a moderate position.

There is little doubt that the February, 1985, Hussein-Arafat declaration may mark a turning point in Israeli-Arab relations, although recent disagreements between Syria and Jordan may neutralize some positive aspects. The declaration represents the closest approach yet to formal PLO recognition of Israel's legitimacy; yet Arafat has repeatedly declined to follow through with a definitive statement on the issue. Thus he leaves himself open to the criticism that the joint statement does not really mean what it seemed to say.

Experience has taught the Israeli leadership to be wary of Arab pronouncements on peace with Israel. Moreover, Israel's experience with Egypt since the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty has led many Israelis to question whether genuine peace with the Arabs is a meaningful goal. Israelis are mindful of the fact that three Arab leaders who did talk about peace with Israel, King Abdallah of Jordan, Anwar Sadat of Egypt, and Bashir Gemayel of Lebanon, were assassinated.

Shimon Peres is hardly a reckless politician. But apparently he perceives the Jordanian-Palestinian declaration as an opportunity that must be explored. It remains to be seen whether the two sides can overcome their respective constraints and move the peace process forward toward a real peace. ■

¹⁷Abraham Rabinovich, "Hussein and the West Bank," *JPIE*, no. 1305 (November 9, 1985), p. 16.

¹⁸See, for example, Thomas L. Friedman, "Israel Rejecting Palestinian List for U.S. Talks," *NYT*, July 18, 1985, p. A1.

SAUDI ARABIA

(Continued from page 78)

challenge and opportunity to distract the Saudis from the fact that those who were building the modern state were essentially disenfranchised. In the past two years, oppor-

tunities for advancement have declined, and many recent graduates of domestic and foreign universities have had to lower their sights. The current ruler, Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz, has not lived up to expectations. His elaborate life-style has met with disapproval. The Western-educated Saudis, who saw Fahd as a decisive leader and an advocate of their interests, are particularly disappointed. Fahd has apparently withdrawn from the day-to-day operations of the government and can no longer be counted on to advance the interests of the educated Saudis within ruling circles. The appointment of Prime Minister Abdullah ibn Abdul Aziz, a conservative who distrusts the rising middle class and is next in the line of succession, has dimmed middle class chances for wider participation in the decision-making process in the near future.

Another possible source of dissent is the military. The armed forces are divided into two parts: the army, navy and air force, who protect the country against external threats, and the national guard, whose mission is internal security. To launch a successful coup, the army and the national guard would have to cooperate and take control of the cities. This is highly unlikely for several reasons. First, the services draw their men from different strata of the population. The national guard is recruited from among the nomads, while the army, navy and air force are composed of members of the settled population. Because of their different views, it is unlikely that the two groups would combine against the royal family. Second, able young princes are spread on all levels throughout the armed services. Third, the army is dispersed away from the major population centers in military cantonments along the border, while the national guard, whose loyalty to the Saudis has not been questioned, is stationed near cities. Any army coup d'état would require long marches to the cities, and the rebels would be discovered and countered before they reached their destination.

The greatest threat to internal stability comes from Iran. The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's Islamic republic is a greater danger than was the Shah's Iran. The Shah merely sought political and military domination of the Gulf region, but Khomeini threatens the monarchy with his views on Islamic government. According to Khomeini's Shiite doctrine, all power belongs to God, who delegated earthly power to the prophet Mohammed and his successors. Since the disappearance of the Twelfth Imam, Muslims should have been ruled by the ulema because they are best qualified to interpret God's will as revealed in the Koran. However, in Saudi Arabia the ulema are only partners in the government. This violates God's will, and therefore the Saudi government is illegitimate.*

In recent years, it has been argued that the Shiite community in Hasa province could be a significant source of opposition. This group has become more asser-

*Editor's note: See the article by John Esposito, "Islam in the Politics of the Middle East," in this issue.

tive since the revolution in Iran, as the violence of 1979–1980 (in which between 40 and 60 people were killed or injured) indicates. The Shiites have been oppressed and neglected by the Sunni majority, but an attempt has been made to remedy this. Since 1980, schools, hospitals and roads have been built in the Shiite communities of the eastern province to bring them up to the standards of the rest of the country. Furthermore, as the nature of the new Iranian regime has become apparent, its appeal to Saudi Shiites appears to have declined.

The occupation of the mosque in Mecca in November, 1979, has been blown out of proportion. While it was a manifestation of an extreme form of Wahabbism, it was an isolated incident. The number of participants was small, and there is no evidence that the insurgents had the support of the religious establishment or the population.

There have been upheavals in the past and there are sources of potential conflict, but an immediate threat to the stability of the regime is unlikely. The Saudis are essentially a conservative people who like stability and, despite its shortcomings, the royal family provides stability. The oil revenue bonanza has wiped out many centrifugal tendencies, and no major groups have been permanently excluded from the benefits of the oil boom.

The recent decline in oil revenues has thrown the government's budget and the balance of payments into deficit, and the only way out of the dilemma is to cut back on expenditures. Although this will strain Saudi society, the regime is well established, its financial reserves are still sufficient to supplement current revenues for several years, there is no popular unrest and foreign relations are satisfactory. In fact, the current recession may be a blessing in disguise. The rush to development placed a great deal of stress on Saudi society, and a more measured pace over the next few years should relieve the strain. ■

LEBANON

(Continued from page 62)

Having committed itself to the reestablishment of a sovereign Lebanon, the Amal leadership adopted a patient stance in the fall of 1982. Amin's election raised hopes that the Shiite community would enjoy a more equitable share of political power and that socioeconomic reforms would address the plight of many poor Shiites. But early in his presidency, Amin Gemayel signaled that he would not be nearly so cooperative as many assumed. When Nabih Berri, the lawyer from the south who emerged as the leader of Amal in 1980, sought an appointment with Amin in October, 1982, he was told by one of the President's closest advisers that "the President is not seeing any lawyers."

In south Lebanon, where Israel sought to establish an infrastructure that would leave the area under Israel's

effective control, the Israelis thoroughly misread Shiite politics. Not long after the invasion, resistance cells became active in the south. Initially, the Lebanese leftists who had previously been aligned with the PLO were most active, but by 1983 village-based cells, often under the leadership of young Shiite clerics, took up the cudgel of resistance. In fact, the imperatives of effective action against the Israeli Defense Force (IDF)—decentralized control and secrecy—made it doubly difficult for the moderate Amal to assume a leading role. Throughout most of 1983, Amal seemed to be eclipsed in the south where its mute stance earned the ridicule of those it pretended to represent. Only in October, 1983, when an Israeli convoy tried to wend its way through the streets of Nabatiya during an important religious commemoration was Amal aroused.¹⁴

While the IDF was busy making enemies in south Lebanon, many of the other fault lines that marked Shiite politics began to surface. Throughout Lebanon, the Shiites seemed to be under siege. In the south, the Israeli presence was becoming increasingly onerous, and in the Beirut environs the Shiite suburbs were regularly the target for sweeping arrests and worse by the Lebanese Army, which acted in apparent league with the Lebanese Forces. In the northern Bekaa Valley city of Baalbek, in 1982, the Syrians had permitted the Pasdaran (Iranian Revolutionary Guards) to establish themselves, joined by several extremist Shiite groups including the Hezbollah (Party of God) and the breakaway Islamic Amal.

Young Shiite clerics, who were inspired by Iran's Islamic Revolution and who had begrudgingly accepted Amal's dominance before 1982, now made their own way. As the situation in Lebanon deteriorated, Amal found its claim to communal leadership challenged.

Berri's delicate situation was well illustrated during the TWA hijacking incident of June and July, 1982. Although Amal was not involved in planning or carrying out the hijacking of an American plane, Berri's competitors in Hezbollah (who may themselves have co-opted the hijackers) were undercutting his authority among the Shiites. Accordingly, Berri acted by taking custody of the hostages, much as he had acted in February, 1984, when he moved into West Beirut partly to arrest the erosion of his following. But the very limitations of his action illustrate his dilemma and the dynamics of his political environment. In Middle Eastern political movements, followers are more easily swayed, cajoled or enlisted than directed. Suasion is Nabih Berri's technique. He can do no more than the political mood of his constituency permits, and if he forgets this rule he may find himself without a following. Berri could secure the hostages, but their release had to await the intervention of Syria, a far more powerful actor. At best, Berri denied his competitors a clear-cut victory, but they succeeded in demonstrating his lack of clear-cut authority.

The looming test of Amal's vitality (and Berri's political survival) will take place in south Lebanon. Although

¹⁴Augustus Richard Norton, "Making Enemies in South Lebanon: Harakat Amal, the IDF, and South Lebanon," *Middle East Insight*, vol. 3, no. 3 (1984).

the bulk of Israel's forces withdrew from south Lebanon in June, 1985, a significant number remain. Several hundred Israeli soldiers serve as "advisers" to the South Lebanon Army (SLA) of General Antoine Lahad, reinforcing an unimpressive force that would probably disappear were it not for the Israeli presence. On his own, Lahad protects the south Christian city of Jezzine, which houses not only its own inhabitants but thousands of Christian villagers who fled from the Sidon environs during the spring fighting between the Lebanese Forces and the Druse-Shiite-Sunni forces. However, Jezzine's safety seems more a function of Druse guarantees and Amal's assurances than the prowess of the Lahad militia. One or two Israeli mechanized battalions and an Israeli military governor also remain in the eastern region, largely unnoticed by the international press. The continuing Israeli presence serves as a lightning rod, and it carries the risk that military actions and counteractions will ignite yet another explosion in the south.

There are indications that, after months of hectic signaling, the leaders of Amal have reached a tacit understanding with Israel. Public statements and actions on the ground have shown that Amal has no intention of attacking Israel, although it retains the right to attack Israeli forces in Lebanon. To make its point, Amal militiamen have interdicted arms shipments, personnel and money from groups intent on disrupting Amal's security framework. Meanwhile, Amal has continued to hammer at the SLA, as have Amal's more extreme competitors. Senior Amal officials recognize that they are trapped in a potentially disastrous game. Political imperatives permit only subtle signals to Israel, and the Israeli leadership is unwilling to turn over the security of the south to a chimera, whatever its public statements and actions. The threat of further warfare lurks like a phantom in the south.

It is clear that no single political organization enjoys a monopoly on the allegiance of the Shiites, but if Amal emerges supreme in the south it will hold a strong card. The south is not only the geographic center but the Shiite spiritual heartland, and those Shiite politicians who rule there will play an extraordinary role in shaping Shiite politics.

Within Lebanon, there are widespread apprehensions about the ascendant Shiite community. Many non-Shiite Lebanese perceive the Shiites as a behemoth threatening to dominate Lebanon culturally, socially and politically. Thus, all manner of novel realignments among Leb-

¹⁵Augustus Richard Norton, "Changing Actors and Leadership among the Shiites of Lebanon," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, no. 482 (November, 1985), pp. 109-121.

¹⁶When Sheik Abbas Mussawi, a key cleric in Hezbollah, was asked in July, 1985, how the party was financed, he replied: "The money comes from Iran." See FBIS, vol. 5, no. 133, pp. G2-G3.

¹⁷Similarly pessimistic conclusions are reached in Ronald D. McLaurin, "Peace in Lebanon," an unpublished paper read at the University of Southern California, April 9, 1985.

non's other sects are possible. Nonetheless, while some observers have predicted that the Shiites will dominate the state, there is, in fact, little of Lebanon left to dominate. The Shiites have a clear stake in the territorial integrity and independence of Lebanon, and they may—after a time—provide the glue for putting Lebanon back together, but even the most optimistic Shiite politicians see a long and hard road ahead.¹⁵

CONCLUSIONS

Foreign powers will continue to exert considerable influence over events inside Lebanon. Despite its failures, Israel maintains ties with the Druse and perhaps with the Maronites as well. Iran is continuing to shop for suitable Lebanese clients. Amal's relatively moderate political program and its nonclerical leadership have not played well in Teheran for several years, and Iran is likely to continue to lend support to Amal's adversaries.¹⁶ For the time being, however, Syria's hand is the strongest.

Syria's policy seems to be based on realism. Instead of intervening en masse as it did in 1976, Damascus has tried to bolster those Lebanese elements that serve its interests and that can exercise effective control over parts of Lebanon. Thus Syria has strengthened the militias, as it did in late July when it transferred 50 T-54 tanks to Amal amid reports that an additional 20 would be distributed to Amal and Walid Jumblat's PSP. Syria's difficulty in reaching a tripartite settlement with Berri, Hobeika and Jumblat in November, 1985, made it clear that Lebanon is still a long way from a return to civility.

Even with a healthy skepticism, it is overly cynical to claim that the Lebanese do not want peace. The Lebanese do want peace, but each faction wants it on its own terms. Leadership struggles within the Sunni, Shiite and Maronite communities are unlikely to end soon, and there will be no early halt to the intersectarian fighting that springs from irreconcilable visions of Lebanon's future.

While most sectarian leaders condemn partition, partition is emerging nonetheless. Lebanon is destined to be a state in fragments for years to come. Perhaps after the Lebanese have learned to live apart, after the warlords have tired and the young bloods have matured, they can learn once again to live together. But that is likely to be a long wait.¹⁷ ■

BOOK REVIEWS

(Continued from page 80)

nese and American semiconductor industries by Borrus, James Millstein and Zysman, and the growth of the Japanese automobile industry by David Friedman are especially informative. W.W.F.

ERRATUM

In the article by Jia-lin Zhang in the September, 1985, issue of *Current History*, the last line in the right column of page 247 should read "The resolution of the Hong Kong issue . . ." not "The resolution of Hong Kong independence. . . ." The editors regret the error.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

A Current History chronology covering the most important events of December, 1985, to provide a day by day summary of world affairs.

INTERNATIONAL

Arab League

Dec. 11—Arab League envoy Cloyis Maksoud criticizes U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz for berating countries that recognize the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

Cartagena Group

Dec. 17—The 11-nation Latin American debtor group ends a 2-day conference with a call for reduced interest rates and new loans.

Contadora Group

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Dec. 3—The Contadora nations issue a new draft resolution that calls on the U.S. to resume negotiations with Nicaragua; the draft will be presented later today to the UN for approval.

Dec. 8—At Nicaragua's request, Contadora suspends for 5 months negotiations on a Central American peace agreement.

European Economic Community (EEC)

Dec. 2—A bomb explosion outside the meeting site of EEC leaders in Luxembourg marks the beginning of a 2-day summit conference.

Dec. 4—EEC leaders make the first changes in the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the founding charter of the organization; the changes will hasten the removal of trade barriers among the EEC nations.

European Security Conference

Dec. 20—The 8th session of the 35-nation conference ends in Stockholm; talks focused on preventing accidental nuclear war.

International Terrorism

(See also *Malta; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Dec. 27—Four Palestinian terrorists kill 10 people and wound 70 when they throw grenades and fire submachine guns at and around the check-in gate of Israel's El Al airlines at Rome's Leonardo da Vinci Airport; 3 of the terrorists are killed by security guards.

Almost simultaneously, 3 Palestinian terrorists fire submachine guns and detonate grenades at the El Al desk at Vienna's Schwechat Airport; 3 people are killed, including 1 terrorist, and 47 are wounded.

Dec. 28—Italian police say that Abu Nidal's Fatah Revolutionary Council, a Palestinian group opposed to PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat's faction, carried out the airport killings. Two more people have died from their wounds.

Dec. 29—Admiral Fulvio Martini, the head of Italy's military intelligence, says that the terrorists were trained in Iran.

Dec. 31—Libya denies any involvement in the airport massacre; Israeli and U.S. officials say Libya is harboring Nidal.

Iran-Iraq War

Dec. 15—The Iraqi government announces its 55th air raid on Iran's Kharg Island oil terminal since mid-August, 1985.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

Dec. 5—NATO offers a proposal calling for the withdrawal of 5,000 U.S. and 11,500 Soviet troops from Europe over a 3-year period.

Dec. 11—The winter meeting of the NATO foreign minister agrees to a plan that will coordinate the research and development of conventional arms for NATO.

Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)

Dec. 8—Oil ministers agree in principle to abandon the \$28-a-barrel price ceiling and to sell oil at the market level.

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation

Dec. 8—In Dacca, Bangladesh, the leaders of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal and the Maldives announce the formation of the association; the member promise not to intervene in each other's internal affairs.

United Nations (UN)

(See also *UK, Great Britain*)

Dec. 2—The UN Commission on Human Rights reports that in Afghanistan, Soviet and Afghan troops have engaged in widespread human rights violations, including mass bombings and the killing of civilians.

Dec. 9—The General Assembly unanimously adopts a resolution condemning acts of international terrorism as criminal.

Dec. 10—Jean-Pierre Hocke, a Swiss national, is elected by the General Assembly as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.

Dec. 18—The Security Council unanimously adopts a resolution that condemns "all acts of hostage-taking and abduction" and requires the immediate release of hostages; the resolution is binding on all UN countries.

AFGHANISTAN

(See also *Intl, UN; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Dec. 26—The government appoints several non-Communist to top-level ministerial and advisory posts.

ALGERIA

Dec. 16—Exiled in London, Algeria's first President, Ahmed Ben Bella, announces the formation of a united front party opposed to Algeria's 1-party rule.

ANGOLA

(See *South Africa*)

ARGENTINA

Dec. 9—Five former military junta members are sentenced for crimes committed during their tenure; 2 are given life sentences.

President Raúl Alfonsín lifts the state of siege he imposed in October.

AUSTRIA

(See *Intl, Intl Terrorism*)

BANGLADESH

(See also *India*)

Dec. 15—General H. M. Ershad, the head of the military government, says that he will lift a 10-month ban on opposition party rallies on January 1.

BRAZIL

Dec. 18—Planning Minister João Sayad says that Brazil needs \$2.5 billion in new loans; Brazil's foreign debt totals \$104 billion.

BURKINA FASO

Dec. 29—State radio reports a truce between Burkina Faso and Mali; both countries have been fighting over the Agacher border area for the last 5 days.

CANADA

Dec. 2—The Québec Liberal party defeats the ruling Parti Québécois; Robert Bourass, the party leader, will be the new province premier.

CHILE

Dec. 14—The military government extends restrictions on civil liberties and on the press for 90 days.

CHINA

(See also *U.S.S.R.*)

Dec. 1—The New China News Agency reports that U.S. investment in China has reached \$1 billion.

Dec. 7—China establishes diplomatic relations with Nicaragua.

Dec. 15—Government officials report that China has concluded agreements with Britain and France to purchase \$1.5 billion in reactors and turbines for its first nuclear power plant.

Dec. 25—The Foreign Ministry confirms that a Soviet airliner was hijacked to China on December 19 and that the plane's crew members and passengers were returned.

The government denounces the Soviet Union's military involvement in Afghanistan; it says the 6-year-old war undermines regional security and threatens China.

COLOMBIA

(See *Nicaragua*)

CUBA

(See *Nicaragua*)

CYPRUS

Dec. 8—President Spyros Kyprianou's Democratic party wins 27.7 percent of the vote in today's parliamentary elections; Kyprianou will continue to rule in a coalition with the Socialist party.

EGYPT

(See *Israel; Malta*)

EL SALVADOR

Dec. 14—The government says it will not allow leftist guerrilla officials to enter El Salvador for talks on ending the war.

Dec. 25—The government agrees to a guerrilla-proposed 10-day cease-fire, the longest cease-fire of the 6-year-old war.

ETHIOPIA

Dec. 3—Rony Brauman, the president of the French medical organization Médecins Sans Frontières, says his organization was expelled from Ethiopia on November 29 because the

group accused the government of killing 100,000 famine victims in its resettlement program.

FRANCE

(See also *Ethiopia; Lebanon*)

Dec. 4—President François Mitterrand meets with Polish leader General Wojciech Jaruzelski.

GERMANY, WEST

Dec. 14—U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz arrives in West Berlin; he says Berlin and Germany's division since World War II is "unnatural and inhuman."

Dec. 18—Chancellor Helmut Kohl's coalition government announces that it will negotiate with the U.S. on sharing the research results of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (Star Wars).

GUATEMALA

Dec. 8—Christian Democrat Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo wins an overwhelming victory in today's runoff election for Guatemala's first civilian President in 15 years.

GUYANA

Dec. 11—President Hugh Desmond Hoyte announces that he won the December 9 presidential election; opposition parties charge that there was massive fraud and interference in the elections.

HAITI

Dec. 24—Sylvio Claude, the head of the opposition Christian Democratic party, is beaten by members of the President's palace guard.

Dec. 31—President Jean-Claude Duvalier appoints 14 new ministers and downgrades the positions of 5 ministers in a shakeup of his Cabinet.

INDIA

Dec. 16—In Kalpakkam, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi dedicates India's first breeder nuclear reactor; the Indian-built reactor can produce weapons-grade plutonium.

Dec. 17—Prime Minister Gandhi and Pakistani President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq agree not to attack each other's nuclear installations.

Dec. 18—Results from yesterday's state elections in Assam show that the Assam People's Front, an anti-Bangladeshi party led by Prafulla Mahanta, has outpolled the ruling Congress party.

Dec. 20—Mahanta, who will serve as chief minister of Assam, says that his party will deport all immigrants who have entered Assam illegally from Bangladesh.

IRAN

(See *Intl, Intl Terrorism, Iran-Iraq War*)

IRAQ

(See *Intl, Iran-Iraq War*)

ISRAEL

(See also *Lebanon; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Dec. 1—Prime Minister Shimon Peres apologizes to the U.S. for any Israeli spying activities in the U.S. and says that the government unit that controlled Israeli spying activities in the U.S. will be dismantled.

The Israeli Cabinet approves the resumption of talks with Egypt on Taba, a 700-yard stretch of beachfront south of Eilat.

Dec. 2—The government reportedly will allow the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to interview 2 Israeli diplo-

mats who were involved in the spy case of U.S. naval analyst Jonathan Pollard.

Dec. 3—The military announces that Israeli soldiers have killed 5 Palestinians in Israel's "security" zone in southern Lebanon.

The Fatah Revolutionary Council, headed by Abu Nidal, claims responsibility for yesterday's killing of a politically moderate Palestinian lawyer on the Israeli-occupied West Bank.

Dec. 8—President Chaim Herzog commutes the sentences of 2 Jewish terrorists who tried to blow up the Muslim Dome of the Rock shrine in 1983.

Dec. 15—Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Moshe Levy says that in the last 3 weeks Syria has deployed surface-to-air missiles along the Syrian border with Lebanon.

Dec. 18—The Foreign Ministry announces that Prime Minister Shimon Peres met in Geneva with President Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Ivory Coast; the 2 leaders said they would soon restore diplomatic relations.

Dec. 26—Peres says that Syria has moved mobile antiaircraft missiles into eastern Lebanon.

ITALY

(See also *Intl, Intl Terrorism*)

Dec. 11—The government issues indictments against several people in connection with the 1980 bombing of the Bologna train station by right-wing terrorists; 85 people were killed.

IVORY COAST

(See *Israel*)

JAPAN

(See also *U.S., Administration*)

Dec. 3—Two Japanese semiconductor companies follow the NEC Corporation's lead and announce an increase in the dollar prices of all types of semiconductors; most other Japanese chip manufacturers are expected to follow suit.

Dec. 28—Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone shuffles his Cabinet but retains the same ministers of foreign affairs, defense and finance.

JORDAN

(See *Syria*)

KOREA, SOUTH

Dec. 2—Students take over the U.S. cultural center in Kwangju for 9 hours to protest the military government of President Chun Doo Hwan.

LEBANON

(See also *Israel; Syria*)

Dec. 1—Beirut radio reports that guerrillas ambushed and killed 5 Israeli soldiers on patrol in Israel's self-declared security zone in southern Lebanon; Israel does not confirm the report.

Dec. 11—The Lebanese Army and Beirut police begin a joint patrol of West Beirut in an attempt to end militia control of that section of the city; the patrols are part of a security plan worked out between rival militias last month.

Dec. 23—Two negotiators for the French government return to Paris after they fail to obtain the release of 4 French hostages being held by the Muslim extremist organization Islamic Holy War.

Dec. 28—In Damascus, the leaders of the Shiite Amal, the Druse Progressive Socialist party and the Christian Lebanese Forces sign a peace pact ending their decade-long civil war and instituting political changes that allow for power-sharing between Christians and Muslims. Syria will

provide military assistance until the Lebanese Army is reorganized.

Dec. 31—The Beirut newspaper *An Nahar* reports that Israeli-backed Christian militiamen and Israeli troops forced all 2,000 inhabitants of Cunin, a southern Lebanese village, to leave their homes in reprisal for recent attacks on Israeli patrols in southern Lebanon.

LESOTHO

Dec. 29—American and foreign envoys attend the funeral of 6 South African exiles who were killed by South African troops on December 20; South Africa denies responsibility for the attack.

LIBYA

(See *Intl, Intl Terrorism; Malta; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

MALI

(See *Burkina Faso*)

MALTA

Dec. 1—It is reported that 3 senior U.S. military officers were invited by the Maltese government to help coordinate the Egyptian commando assault on the hijacked Egyptair jet on November 24; 56 passengers and 2 hijackers were killed in the assault.

Dec. 2—A senior Maltese official and U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C., say that the Maltese government barred the U.S. military men from taking part in the assault for fear of angering Libya; the Maltese also denied permission to a military aircraft to land with U.S.-supplied technical equipment for the commandos.

NEW ZEALAND

Dec. 10—The government introduces legislation to ban from New Zealand ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons

NICARAGUA

(See also *Intl; Contadora; China; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Dec. 6—President Daniel Ortega Saavedra denies U.S. charges that Cuban military advisers are taking part in combat. Ortega says Nicaragua will recall its ambassador to the U.S. to protest the shooting down of a Nicaraguan helicopter on December 2 by rightist guerrillas (contras); he says the contras used an American missile for the attack.

Dec. 12—Aristides Sánchez, a member of the directorate of the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, the main U.S.-supported contra group, says his guerrillas bought about 20 Soviet-made SA-7 antiaircraft missiles on the black market and that 1 of the missiles was used to shoot down the Nicaraguan helicopter.

Dec. 15—Interior Minister Tomás Borges denies charges by U.S. President Ronald Reagan that Nicaragua aided the Colombian rebel group that took over Colombia's Palace of Justice last month.

Dec. 30—Defense Minister Humberto Ortega Saavedra reports that 1,143 soldiers and 4,608 contras were killed in fighting this year; the contras assert that over 5,000 soldiers were killed.

PAKISTAN

(See also *India*)

Dec. 25—In Lahore, police arrest about 200 people taking part in a protest march against the martial law government of President Zia ul-Haq.

Dec. 26—The government orders the release of 260 political dissidents arrested since December 22.

Dec. 29—President Zia names 3 retired military officers and

civilian as the governors of Pakistan's 4 provinces.

Dec. 30—Zia declares an end to 8½ years of martial law; however, some martial law restrictions have become part of the civil code. Zia will remain President and army chief of staff.

PERU

Dec. 25—President Alan García Pérez threatens to seize 3 American oil companies operating in Peru if they do not agree to invest more in the country and pay higher taxes.

PHILIPPINES

(See also *U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Dec. 2—A 3-judge panel acquits Chief of Staff Fabian C. Ver and 25 other defendants of involvement in the 1983 murder of opposition leader Benigno Aquino Jr.; the judicial panel accepts the military's contention that a lone gunman, Rolando Galman, killed Aquino when he arrived in Manila.

Dec. 3—Corazon Aquino, the wife of Benigno Aquino, announces her candidacy for President of the Philippines; she says that she will seek justice for her husband and "all the victims of [President Ferdinand] Marcos."

Marcos announces that presidential elections will be held on February 7, 1986.

Dec. 7—About 20,000 young people stage a rally in Manila in support of Marcos.

Dec. 11—Marcos is named the presidential candidate of his party, the New Society Movement. Marcos selects Arturo Tolentino as his vice presidential running mate.

The opposition movement names Corazon Aquino as its presidential candidate and former Senator Salvador Laurel as its vice presidential candidate.

Dec. 15—Aquino says that if she is elected, Marcos will be tried for the murder of her husband.

Dec. 26—Aquino tells supporters near the U.S. Subic Bay naval base that as President she would allow the U.S. to maintain the naval base and other Philippine military bases at least until 1991.

Dec. 29—A court orders the seizure of a sugar plantation owned by the Aquino family ostensibly because of the Aquinos' failure to comply with land regulation.

POLAND

(See also *France*)

Dec. 15—Police block several thousand people from holding a memorial service in Gdansk in commemoration of workers killed by police during food riots in 1970.

Dec. 21—Nobel Peace Prize winner Lech Walesa says that he is being indicted for "slandering" the government during the October, 1985, elections; Walesa gave election turnout figures that were lower than the official figures.

ROMANIA

Dec. 15—U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz tells President Nicolae Ceausescu that further government repression of Romanian Christian sects could lead the U.S. to drop Romania's preferential trade status.

SINGAPORE

Dec. 1—Stock Exchange of Singapore chairman Ong Tjin announces that the exchange will be closed for 3 days to prevent the panic selling of stock because the Pan-Electric Industries Ltd. went into receivership yesterday.

SOUTH AFRICA

(See also *Lesotho; U.S., Foreign Policy*)

Dec. 1—The Congress of South African Trade Unions, a newly formed labor federation of 36 predominantly black labor

unions, says that it backs divestment by American and British companies of their holdings in South Africa.

Dec. 3—Winnie Mandela, a black activist and the wife of jailed African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela, breaks a government ban when she speaks at a mass funeral for 12 of 15 blacks killed by security forces on November 21.

Dec. 9—The government prosecution drops charges of treason against 12 leaders of the antiapartheid United Democratic Front (UDF) after conceding that there were legal errors in the trial; 4 UDF members still face charges.

Dec. 13—The government censorship board bans the autobiography of Winnie Mandela and makes it a crime to import or distribute the book in South Africa.

Dec. 19—Military officials decline to comment on a television report that South African troops have again invaded southern Angola in pursuit of Namibian guerrillas.

Dec. 22—Winnie Mandela is arrested for entering the black township of Soweto to visit relatives; Mandela was banned from entering the segregated township yesterday.

Dec. 23—Six whites are killed by a bomb at a shopping mall near Durban; no group takes responsibility.

Dec. 25—It is reported that at least 53 people have been killed in fighting between the Zulu and Pondo tribes south of Durban in the last 2 days.

Dec. 29—Nobel Peace Prize winner Bishop Desmond Tutu and other black leaders and parents call on black high school students to end their boycott of classes.

Dec. 30—Mandela is again arrested for trying to enter Soweto; she was released from jail on December 23.

Dec. 31—Mandela is freed on bail.

SPAIN

Dec. 1—José Maria Ruiz-Mateos, the former head of the Rumasa Group, is jailed after he is extradited from West Germany; Ruiz-Mateos fled after the government seized Rumasa in February, 1983, to prevent the company's failure.

SUDAN

Dec. 29—The military government announces that general elections will be held on April 1.

SYRIA

(See also *Israel; Lebanon*)

Dec. 15—Government radio announces that Syria has received an undisclosed number of naval craft from the Soviet Union.

Dec. 29—President Hafez Assad assures the visiting leaders of Lebanon's 3 largest militias that Syria will help carry out the conditions of the peace treaty the 3 signed yesterday.

Dec. 30—Assad meets with Jordan's King Hussein for the first time since 1979.

TAIWAN

Dec. 25—President Chiang Ching-kuo says that the National Assembly will be allowed to choose his successor.

UGANDA

Dec. 17—The military government signs a peace accord with guerrilla leaders in Nairobi, Kenya.

U.S.S.R.

(See also *Intl, NATO, UN; China; Syria; U.S., Foreign Policy; Zimbabwe*)

Dec. 2—Yelena Bonner, the wife of Nobel Peace Prize winner Andrei Sakharov, leaves Moscow for 3 months of medical treatment in the U.S. and West Europe.

Dec. 4—Minister of Grain Procurement Grigory Zolotukhin is moved to the position of minister of bakery products.

Dec. 10—General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev tells a group

of 400 American business executives that trade relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union will remain limited until the U.S. removes "political obstacles" between the 2 countries.

Dec. 11—The Defense Ministry announces that Admiral Sergei Gorshkov, the commander of the navy, has been replaced by Admiral Vladimir Chernavin.

Dec. 14—Boris Gostev is named finance minister.

Dec. 15—Coal Industry Minister Boris Bratchenko is retired from his post; Mikhail Shchadov takes his place.

Dec. 19—The government says it would allow some on-site inspections of nuclear test ranges if the U.S. would agree to a moratorium on nuclear weapons testing; the U.S. rejects the offer, saying additional testing is necessary.

Dec. 21—Tass, the government press agency, reports that Veniamin Dymshits, a Deputy Prime Minister and the only Jew in the Soviet Union's top leadership, has been retired; Yuri Batalin will take his place.

Dec. 23—Gorbachev meets with Li Peng, a Chinese Deputy Prime Minister.

Dec. 29—The government rejects U.S. charges that the Soviet Union has broken strategic arms treaty commitments.

UNITED KINGDOM

Great Britain

Dec. 4—The government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher says that Britain will withdraw from the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) at the end of the year because of UNESCO's political agenda.

Dec. 6—The government signs an agreement with the U.S. to take part in the research of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) known as Star Wars; Britain is the first country to join the U.S. project.

UNITED STATES

Administration

Dec. 1—Surgeon General C. Everett Koop says that "if I had my way I would certainly ban advertising" by the cigarette industry; he calls nicotine an addictive drug.

Dec. 2—Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) James M. Beggs is indicted by a federal grand jury in Los Angeles on charges of defrauding the U.S. Army on cost overruns for the Sergeant York prototype anti-aircraft gun while he was employed by General Dynamics Corporation; 3 other officers of the company and the company itself are also indicted.

Dec. 3—The Census Bureau reports that the U.S. fertility rate for women of child-bearing age has declined from the higher levels of the 1970's to 65.8 births per 1,000 for women in the 18-to-44-year-old category.

In a preliminary finding, the Commerce Department determines that in a so-called dumping operation, Japanese electronic firms have been selling 64K random access memory (RAM) chips at from 8 percent to 94 percent below cost on the U.S. market.

Dec. 4—Navy intelligence analyst Samuel L. Morison is sentenced to 2 years in prison for stealing classified documents and giving supposedly secret photographs of a Soviet aircraft carrier to a British magazine.

President Ronald Reagan names Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter to replace Robert McFarlane as his national security adviser.

Beggs takes an indefinite leave of absence.

Dec. 5—Secretary of Health and Human Services Margaret Heckler announces that in January, 1986, the department will resume the review of the 2.6 million people on the Social Security disability rolls to determine their right to receive disability benefits.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is sued by states and 4 environmental groups for failing to revise its allowable levels of sulfur dioxide pollution in accordance with the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act.

Dec. 6—The EPA reports that only 492 of the almost 1,600 landfills taking toxic wastes have qualified for permits to continue to bury such waste.

Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige announces that President Reagan is initiating an unfair trade complaint against Japanese companies accused of dumping high capacity memory chips on the U.S. market.

Dec. 10—Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Nunzio Palladino announces that he has asked President Reagan not to reappoint him when his term expires at the end of June, 1986.

Dec. 11—The White House announces today that, under the terms of a security measure signed by the President on November 1, a "selective number of individuals who have highest levels of access" to government secret material will be required to undergo lie detector (polygraph) tests.

Dec. 12—Secretary of the Interior Donald Hodel announces that in January his department will conduct a sale of offshore oil leases near Alaska's Bristol Bay, which is a rich fishing ground.

Dec. 18—The Federal Aviation Administration orders a broad investigation of the engine repair facilities of major airline and contract overhaul companies; the investigation is in response to 2 crashes of planes with Pratt and Whitney JT8J engines.

Speaking to some 100 Democratic and Republican legislators in the White House, President Reagan says that a balanced federal budget can be achieved by cutting "wasteful and unnecessary" items in the domestic budget, not in the military budget.

Dec. 19—Secretary of State George Shultz says he doubts the usefulness of the President's proposed polygraph tests; he reveals that he would resign "the minute in this government I am told that I'm not trusted."

In his annual report, Surgeon General Koop says that for Americans, "cigarette smoking represents a greater cause of death and disability than their workplace environment."

Dec. 20—The White House issues a statement saying that polygraph tests are a "limited though sometimes useful tool" in security investigations.

Dec. 28—The National Security Agency initiates a 5-year program to encode most electronic messages sent by government and defense contractors; the Agriculture Department and the Internal Revenue Service are among the agencies included in the program.

Dec. 29—The Census Bureau reports that the population of the U.S. rose at a 5.4 percent rate in the last 5 years; as of July 1, 1985, the U.S. population was 238,740,000.

Dec. 30—Although it calls a key provision of the new budget balancing law signed by President Reagan on December 11 unconstitutional, the Justice Department asks the U.S. district court in Washington, D.C., to dismiss a suit challenging the law filed by 12 members of Congress; the department claims they have no standing to file the suit.

Civil Rights

Dec. 8—In U.S. district court in Alabama, Judge U. W. Clemon orders Alabama to stop racial segregation in Alabama universities.

Economy

Dec. 6—The Labor Department reports that the nation's unemployment rate declined to 6.9 percent in November.

Dec. 13—The Labor Department reports that its produce

price index rose 0.8 percent in November.

Dec. 16—The New York Stock Exchange's Dow Jones industrial average of 30 selected stocks closes at 1,553.10, a record high.

Dec. 17—The Commerce Department reports that the U.S. foreign trade deficit for the 3d quarter of 1985 was \$30.5 billion.

Dec. 20—The Labor Department reports that its consumer price index rose 0.6 percent in November.

The Commerce Department estimates that the nation's gross national product (GNP) rose at an annual rate of 3.2 percent in the 4th quarter of 1985 and at a 2.4 percent annual rate for all of 1985.

Dec. 30—The Commerce Department reports that its index of leading economic indicators rose 0.1 percent in November.

Dec. 31—The Commerce Department reports a \$13.68-billion trade deficit for November.

Foreign Policy

(See also *Intl*, *Arab League*, *Contadora*, *NATO*; *China*; *Germany*, *West*; *Israel*; *Korea*, *South*; *Lesotho*; *Malta*; *Nicaragua*; *Peru*; *Philippines*; *Romania*; *U.S.S.R.*; *UK*, *Great Britain*; *Vietnam*; *Yugoslavia*)

Dec. 1—Secretary Shultz says that "we are satisfied" with Israel's apology for Navy analyst Jonathan Jay Pollard's purported espionage in the U.S. for Israel.

Dec. 2—At a meeting of the Organization of American States (OAS) in Cartagena, Colombia, Secretary Shultz says that the U.S. will not resume direct negotiations with Nicaragua under peace initiatives proposed by Panama, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela.

The State Department says that the acquittal of Philippine General Fabian Ver in Manila after his trial for involvement in the 1983 assassination of Benigno Aquino Jr. is "very difficult" to reconcile with the findings of a civilian investigative panel.

Dec. 5—State Department spokesman Bernard Kalb says that the U.S. hopes that Syria will join with Jordan and Israel in reviving Middle East peace talks.

In testimony before the House Foreign Affairs subcommittee, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Elliott Abrams asserts that Cubans are fighting "on the mainland of North America" in Nicaragua; he says that some 2,500 Cuban advisers there "seem to be in combat, too."

Dec. 7—The State Department reports that citizens of East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria, allies of the Soviet Union, are required to make travel arrangements within the U.S. with the State Department to cut down on possible spying.

Dec. 9—In Moscow, Secretary of Commerce Baldrige says that the U.S. will intensify its promotion of U.S. products in the Soviet Union; some 400 U.S. business trade executives attend a 3-day meeting of the U.S.-Soviet Trade and Economic Council to hear Baldrige's address.

Dec. 10—In a speech marking International Human Rights Day, President Reagan says that "human rights will continue to have a profound effect on the United States-Soviet relationship as a whole."

Dec. 12—The Administration reports that President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev approved a broad and detailed agreement on environmental protection during their Geneva meeting in November.

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Richard Armitage says that the U.S. is reducing the amount of intelligence information it shares with Israel in the wake of the espionage case against Jonathan Pollard.

Dec. 13—Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead makes

public the contents of a U.S. letter to the United Nations stating the willingness of the U.S. to act as guarantor of a peace settlement in Afghanistan; the letter calls for the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the end of U.S. aid to the rebel forces.

Dec. 18—Secretary Shultz returns after visiting Yugoslavia, Hungary and Romania.

Dec. 20—The State Department reports that documents provided by Jonathan Pollard to Israel have been returned and that the Israeli unit that directed espionage operations involving Pollard has been dismantled.

Dec. 21—According to the State Department, the Soviet Union has supplied Libya with SA-5 long-range, ground-to-air missiles, a threat to aircraft in some areas of the Mediterranean in dispute between the U.S. and Libya.

Dec. 23—The State Department protests to South Africa about Sunday's arrest of Winnie Mandela, the wife of Nelson Mandela, leader of the African National Congress.

Dec. 24—According to the White House, President Reagan has written to Gorbachev to propose that U.S. and Soviet experts meet to discuss improving the verification process of the agreements on underground nuclear tests.

The State Department reports that next month the President will ask Congress for funds to provide full-time protection for some foreign ambassadors stationed in the U.S.

Dec. 27—The White House reports that President Reagan and Gorbachev will exchange videotapes of New Year's greetings for broadcast in the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The State Department says that the terrorists responsible for the attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports today are "beyond the pale of civilization."

Dec. 28—In a message to Israel, President Reagan asks for restraint in dealing with the terrorists; but he says that the terrorists must "be brought to justice."

Dec. 30—White House spokesman Larry Speakes says that the U.S. believes that Libya aided the Palestinians who mounted terrorist attacks at the airports in Rome and Vienna; he says that the U.S. is considering various options, including military, to discourage terrorism.

Dec. 31—The State Department reports that the Afghan government has presented it with an informal schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Labor and Industry

Dec. 10—In Houston, Texas, Judge Solomon Casseb Jr. upholds a jury verdict awarding \$10.53 billion in damages to the Pennzoil Company against Texaco, Inc., because Texaco interfered with a Pennzoil agreement to buy the Getty Oil Company in 1984; Texaco has 30 days to appeal.

Dec. 11—In a deal worth some \$6 billion, the General Electric Company agrees to acquire the Radio Corporation of America (RCA).

Dec. 20—The United Mine Workers of America ends a 15-month strike against the A. T. Massey Coal Company, the nation's 6th largest coal producer.

Legislation

Dec. 3—The House votes 255 to 161 to complete congressional action on a bill limiting imports of textiles, clothing and shoes; the Senate voted 60 to 39 to approve the measure in November.

Dec. 5—In a 1,200-page report, Justice Department attorneys are accused by the House Judiciary Committee of misconduct because they have refused to release 1983 EPA files dealing with toxic waste cleanups and conflicts of interest.

Dec. 10—A compromise plan to reduce the federal deficit and achieve a balanced budget by 1991 is approved by House and Senate conferees.

Dec. 11—In a 61–31 vote, the Senate approves the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Reduction Control Act of 1985 (sponsored by Phil Gramm [R.,Tx.], Warren Rudman [R.,N.H.] and Fritz Hollings [D.,S.C.]). The mandatory budget-balancing legislation sets progressively lower deficit ceilings until the budget is balanced in 1991; under the bill, the President is required to impose automatic spending cuts on military and nonmilitary spending in any year that the budget deficit would otherwise exceed the statutory limit. The legislation also raises the national debt ceiling to over \$2 trillion.

The House votes 271 to 154 to approve the legislation.

Dec. 12—President Reagan signs the 5-year mandatory deficit reduction bill and the increase in the debt ceiling.

The House and Senate agree to approve a stopgap appropriation bill to finance government operations through December 16.

The Senate votes 93 to 2 to confirm Dr. Otis R. Bowen as secretary of health and human services.

Dec. 13—House and Senate conferees approve a Defense Department budget of \$298.7 billion, limited production of chemical weapons (after a 16-year ban), and subsidies for tobacco sales to cigarette companies.

Dec. 16—Congress approves the Compact of Free Association, which recognizes the right of the Micronesian islands in the Pacific Ocean to self-government, while maintaining arrangements for leasing testing grounds and missile ranges in the area.

Dec. 17—Congress approves temporary financing to fund federal functions through December 19.

On a voice vote after intense controversy, the House approves an extensive tax reform measure supported by President Reagan. The bill will be considered in the Senate after the holiday recess.

The President vetoes the bill restricting imports of textiles, clothing and shoes.

Dec. 18—Both houses of Congress approve 2 farm measures: one reduces income and price supports for farms for the first time since 1933; the other reorganizes the government's farm credit system. The House approves the farm policy bill with a 325–96 vote; the Senate approves the measure with a 55–38 vote. The farm credit bill, passed by the Senate last night, is approved by the House in an unrecorded vote.

Dec. 19—The House votes 261 to 137 and the Senate approves by voice vote a \$368-billion catchall bill to fund the government for the rest of fiscal 1986.

The House and Senate approve legislation requiring all states to establish regional disposal facilities for radioactive wastes by 1993.

Dec. 20—The first session of the 99th Congress adjourns after extending the cigarette tax. Senate Republicans refuse to approve a 3-year, \$74-billion deficit reduction package.

Dec. 23—President Reagan signs the \$52-billion, 3-year farm bill and the bill reorganizing the farm credit system; he also signs the legislation extending the cigarette tax through March 15.

Military

Dec. 3—The U.S. Navy suspends the General Dynamics Corporation from receiving any new government contracts; the corporation and 4 former or present officials were indicted yesterday on fraud charges in connection with military contracts.

Dec. 4—The Navy extends the deadline on bids for 4 new nuclear-powered submarines in order to give the General Dynamics Corporation a chance to bid on the contracts.

Dec. 12—A chartered DC-8 plane operated by Arrow Airlines crashes on takeoff from the Gander, Newfoundland, airport;

250 soldiers returning home after serving in the international peacekeeping force in the Sinai and 8 crew members are killed.

Dec. 17—The Air Force insists it was “not technically responsible” for the chartering or the safety of the crashed Arrow Airlines plane.

Dec. 28—Energy Department officials announce an underground test in Nevada of a nuclear-powered x-ray laser weapon being developed for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) program.

Politics

Dec. 19—Senator Edward Kennedy (D.,Mass.) announces that he will not seek the Democratic nomination for President in the 1988 election.

Science and Space

Dec. 3—The space shuttle *Atlantis* lands safely after a weeklong voyage in space.

Supreme Court

Dec. 3—In a 7–2 decision, the Supreme Court rules that two states may prosecute a person for the same criminal act without violating the double jeopardy provision of the Constitution.

In an 8–1 decision, the Court upholds lower court decisions and rules that the voluntariness of a confession in state court “is a matter for independent federal determination” in habeas corpus cases.

The Court rules 5 to 4 that U.S. courts may not require states to pay damages for past violations of federal law.

Dec. 4—The Court unanimously overrules a lower court and says that all wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are protected by the Clean Water Act.

Dec. 10—Ruling 5 to 4, the Court reverses a lower court ruling and says that statements made by a defendant to an informant may not be used in court.

Dec. 12—In a unanimous decision, the Court reverses a lower court ruling and says that the University of Michigan was able to dismiss a medical student without giving him a second chance to pass an important examination.

VATICAN

Dec. 7—An extraordinary synod called by Pope John Paul II ends.

VIETNAM

Dec. 1—A joint excavation of the site of a crashed U.S. bomber from the Vietnam war ends; bone fragments retrieved from the site will be returned to the U.S.

WESTERN SAMOA


Dec. 27—Prime Minister Tofilau Eti Alesana resigns after Parliament rejects his 1986 budget.

YUGOSLAVIA

Dec. 17—Visiting U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz meets with Foreign Minister Raif Dizdarevic; Shultz pounds a tabletop during a news conference because Dizdarevic does not condemn the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* in October by Palestinian terrorists.

ZIMBABWE

Dec. 4—Prime Minister Robert Mugabe signs an accord in Moscow with Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhkov to increase economic and technological cooperation. ■



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